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The  Creative  component of  this  submission is  a  poem  series  eutitled  [Happenstance ].   
Written  within  the   frame  of   the  middle  period  of   the   research   process  at  a  rate  of 
approximately one per  week  for  a year,  each poem focuses on the research preoccupations 
of  the  moment  as  they  infiltrate  daily life. They have the deliberate intent of mixing literary 
critical  with  cognitive  scientific  language  as content,  of  blending these discourses with the 
everyday,  and  of  balancing  the  spontaneity  of  conversational  tone  with a deliberation of 
poetic language, all   within  an  open  field  format. The focus is on writing as an enactment of 
cognition,
  the  process  made  manifest,  a  practice  that parallels the later work of American 
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  [Happenstance:]   
 
 
“Too often … reason has been shown to work in profoundly irrational ways, 
certainties have bred fractious conflict, authority has been revealed as the mask of 
intolerance & oppression, and directions have been confounded in a maze of dead 




[Happenstance:] Nuts & Bolts 
 
 
I’m going to set my timer a talk within talk in Kat’s front room 
Sam is under the piano with his reverb gizmos 
as if any of us are really prepared 
it is (after all) in the timing 
 
counter to this everything is up for grabs 
the separations artificial how dull the intention merely to describe 
 
counter to that the details & their imprecisions delight 
 
perhaps it is that Gertrude Stein had the secret 
rather than only (in Skinner’s words) an involuntary reflex 
the mutterings of an unread and unlearned mind 
 
you can imagine her blunt response 
I achieve by [e]xtra consciousness, [e]xcess 
a mind unconstrained by a behaviourist’s nightmare 
 
as for /mʌɪˈsɛlf/ 
etymology tells us 
to read from the Anglo-Saxon rædhan  
giving-receiving advice or counsel  
 
which by way of solving a riddle became explaining something obscure  
 
having read that situation 
having taken due counsel 


















[Happenstance:] This One That 
 
 
Point & purpose of course 
as a collector caught in the British Library 
with a razor blade 
poems cannot live alone 
nor going back 
keep breathing 
break a line 
cut a line 
‘make each line 
cut itself’ 
Jack’s breath as one measure 
 
mid the spurious reference the argument 
my lemon (‘this one that one’) MNLatex style file v2.2 
exploration & retreat 
 
lift the discourse out of context (that’s two don’ts for Ben) 
drop it in some other bucket 
see what gives 
one supposes this surrenders preconception 
bias 
prejudice back of the mind 
a Duchamp unto myself 
pits life against art 
in the decisive 
moment 
while the academic demands 
its premise inference conclusion in support of a proposition 
writing is writing 
 
boldly stated this script argues its work the etching compliant with the plate 
if an old grey donkey can arrange three sticks on the ground 
 
but let’s get on 
each interjection a reminder of improvised disobedience 
 
simply put upon the page deftly 
but without [e]xcessive frontal forethought 
three-quarters of the pleasure 
 
far below this cabin window Fiennes at the third attempt 





















[Happenstance:] TP Atten 
 
 
Among aficionados of systematic chance 
rip it up start again 
 
Shakespeare previewed a play or two in Prescot Merseyside it seems 
nothing is now off the table in this 
reality on the ground 
 
lacking top & bottom twirly bits 
capitals proportioned after Trajan’s column 
Klee said eyes see eyes feel 
though a voice in a typeface seems hard to credit 
 
occasionally or perhaps more often 
it’s hard to say 
unlike the questionable decisions of Parliament 
we are exploring parallel events 
as we walk where we walk 
as if a reordering of text 
& seek the first connecting tissue of causes 
 
in consequence of airport shut down 
rail link closure over Yuletide 
we begin to doubt lexical weight 
hence change suffix add helping word change helping word shuffle order 
Mac Low: it’s mainly a simple judgement of taste 
 
more than I can put into exact words 
imagine a poem that thinks 
its own algorithm 
 
as if protest on the streets of Bucharest over regulation of sheepdog numbers 
or a clock ticking on Mourinho 
 
meaning floats between this economic & this resonant 
or in ‘practically everything I was reading’ 
& between us 
day-to-day definitely 
a sound-filled distance between lines 
spatial temporal each in correspondence 
 
those activities locations 
under the soundtrack of new regimes 
 
while piling on the runs in a Southern African warm-up 
clocking up the syllables in absentia san serif 

















[Happenstance:] What Matter If 
 
And what of play 
the play’s the thing 
 
where thought & expression have revealed their limitations 
there remains a simple pleasure 
 
let us unravel & reassemble 
 
let the old authoritative texts be subject to the same indignities 
they after all must prove their case 
as must ‘chips & egg with lots of bread & butter’ 
 
to be a way of happening is to be elaborately this 
 
while puzzling how a cooperation (a coalition even) should be so easily dismissed 
the fact is of the unrealized making things happen 
our rearrangements of the line 
our alchemies of transformation 
 
& now an emergence of the Left 
pilloried for positing more optimistic worlds 
 
where does authenticity fit 
does the pleasure lie in this simplicity 
at a precise psychological moment 
in which a language grows as you speak 
 
out of the past after all with one or two perhaps perfectly imperfect poems 
she loves bare facts 
something uncompromisingly itself 
yet which reverberates 
 
an old man startled in the mirror 
& by poems with too much point 
 
hearing mostly noise 
a static between stations 
but having that raw astonishment 
with best fit parameters to quantify errors 
finally names in conversation 
not the subtle suggestion of those 
chosen so carefully 




[Happenstance:] She Being Brilliantly Mad 
 
 
What are the chances 
sitting as we do 
walking as we do 
mostly not noticing 
 
your delivery as counterpoint to the tappity-tap-tap (of Effie Perine) 
this agéd radiator feet on sill the open sash window 
 
hardly Corbyn in rockabilly mode 
 
begin again with the insistence of an aunt 
with her kosher countdown of festive treats 
 
carpet gives way to stone at the head of the staircase 
 
you have the sonority of analogue plus 
as buttoned-down a solo 
& as now as anyone can get 
 
in the face of such revenge music 
the passive aggressive turned art form 
 
& while keeping shtum 
tossing it idly 
(some things don’t ever sink in) 
time to uninstall 
 
an iron gate clanks two flights below we go down by the stairs 
 
what are the chances we will notice 































[Happenstance:] Outside Eye 
 
 
Make no mistake 
 
into the great divide a PM’s pledge must fall 
even Mourinho now is gone 
 
wrap up 
remember the impact of Xerox on the availability of information 
 
left with no real choice 
but blessed with a fortunate convergence of voices 
why struggle alone 
 
being rooted in a point of time & placed at an Olsonian confluence 
to compute an answer is not to understand 
 
at the roadside perhaps one iota of clarity 
the particular problem of a loose connection 
clouds that trace wind solutions that fail 
 
what language is doing all the time 
 
one hopes 
it’s not a case of which is worse 
nor changing tack 
each variant drifting off 
 
but look what they do 
 
wary of perverse political logics to fit the sensibilities of now 
if Bowie can get more radical with age 
why not the rest of us take a few chances 
 
in this explosion of the present moment 
Mina Loy’s arrangements by rage of human rubble 
are still with us seventy-five years later 
 


























[Happenstance:] Early Doors 
 
 
No getting through certain hours without serious reassessment 
 
while absolutely certain of the factual & expository 
the individual allusion as component of a hinterland of reference 
perhaps not 
 
like a Cornell dream shoe-horned into the wrong box 
events can seem exceptional 
especially other people’s 
the experience of strangers so much more promising 
their futures deferred to our present 
 
it is said that pilgrimages are on the rise 
with Nanao time walked in the wind 
 
not every problem is complex 
 
bootleg booze with its screen-wash & anti-freeze 
dancing with versus dancing at 
even freshwater pearls in the River Ythan consigned to history 
 
like a genome wave from the Pontic-Caspian steppe 
times move on 
 
while 9,356 people in the UK watch only black & white TV 
mine relative to yours 
theirs to somewhere else 
each is inexorable 
(& it turns out Bowie knew his number was up) 
 
with poor data & a fresh arrest the Shanghai Composite slumps again 
 
I’m thumbing through a Moleskin(e) weekly 
a Malden organiser 
a monochrome pocket 
planning futures in spite of the market 
 
while Zuckerberg sends Free Basics to India Deutsche Bank offloads 
 
in fact since footfalls on the High Street (according to Springer) are lower this year 
I am encouraged into town 
where in my first-half spell woodwork is struck twice 
(no getting through to you in this mood) 
 
in this absence of homospatial thinking Candlemas comes & goes 
doing my bit for the RSPB count the small birds arrive first 
 
& from imitation to emulation to steal being to possess where being given 
is to take responsibility 
 
no chance of copyist-to-master in a month à la Picasso June 1901 
no stripped-down design ethos on the lines of those eleven lithographs 
 
though we reduce to enhance flavour 
when awake when asleep it happens it cannot be forced 
 
in thinking a million miles away in breaking loose the stubbornly rusted 






I try to make the work mean what you mean 
the spools quietly folding 
unfolding upon themselves 
 


























































[Happenstance:] Not Proven 
 
 
It sounds convincing 
getting a grip on where we are a touch closer though still far off 
 
so what is offered 
 
a narrow alley between high fences 
a claim on our attention 
the pursuit of a single logic versus an impinging flux 
the trip is the thing 
 
against a charge of laziness (not so m’lud) 
(Simon’s subtle defence a tactical sacrifice) 
not proof but failure to prove 
 
we make no pretensions 
but a box Brownie puts possibility into everyone’s hands 
 
& far from those Cagean snapshots of St Ives by systematic instamatic chance 
memory still sneaks through the viewfinder 
plants us all into dubious compositional space 
 
rain hanging in the street as mist late afternoon 
 
fending off a localised accumulation of wintry worries 
the boy on the platform fooling about 
the prospect of gall bladder removal on credit 
 
in refining a hierarchy of truths 
live versus live recording versus studio 
spotting a problem is not the problem 
 
in this machine for living 
meaning circulates inside speech outside 
(the signs that mock me as I go) 
are we only to dress old words new 
spend what is already spent 
 
in H3 a coal fire offers its dismal heat where a poker asserts alternatives 
 
what I’m trying to translate is less certain 
given pixels are not sent passively to the brain 
since December 1910 it’s all change 
the eye not enough one needs to think 
 
now I am pleased to be a work in progress 
 
wrestling a waterproof sheet across a soft-top 
while the PM in his Hunters wades through shallow water 
(the locals less than impressed) 
 
nothing stays difficult forever 
 
let the tape-recorder speak for itself 










[Happenstance:] Seeing Red 
 
 
Hardly able to believe . the subtlety . of fingers on keys  (Marcin) 
strings (Slawomir) 
sticks & skins (Michal) 
 
it’s January . the way one thing finds its place with another 
like Paul B. I’ve been leaving my heart everywhere 
 
so it goes 
this temporal succession 
this spatial redistribution 
 
without semantic consequence cars along the kerb pull in pull out 
 
what fits fits 
 
only in our heads are we . skating on thin ice . suffering 
a cyber-sickness of the soul 
I’m not the enemy here 
so what are you 
a day of confusion criticism still no reshuffle 
 
in the question of balance 
multiple inputs are in disagreement 
seeing movement but not feeling it 
an inversion of the familiar 
an absence of intent 
 
headlights flicker through gusted branches 
a couple of co-codamol & the selected works 
 
in natural response to an unnatural environment 
like Wilson running a Bolshevik revolution with a Tsarist Cabinet 
 




























[Happenstance:] XIX (It Don’t Mean) 
 
 
Café soundscape . Ella in the back 
 
one book is open one closed 
the half-read 
discoveries yet unmade 
how it really is 
 
here in the sum of my mistakes 
easy to criticise 
another suspect Briton in security lapse 
to Syria via Paris by coach 
 
forward backward going forward really going forward 
for the years going – enough let us restore the transparency of the code 
 
you walking you arriving 





To make matters even more complicated 
reality doesn’t trickle in one smell at a time 
 
Paul’s Amsterdam full of sun, long window, narrow room 
my Leiden taxi to Huygens Dalgarno in the back smiling at banter 
 
but wait it gets worse 
it is a parsing problem & a binding inexplicable from the bottom up 
a cacophony of cells bound into unified perception who is looking down 
 
or how at any moment shuttling between & separating 
 
what makes people cross that line 
slugging it out with yourself at the Copper Box Arena 
 
add a dash of subjectivity some contextual clues & the sensory verdict shifts to ambiguous inputs 
 
in contrast parmesan cheese & vomit (butyric acid pungent top note sweetish linger) 
we deceive ourselves 
 
what we taste is an idea what we hear see . just to understand one note 
memory frames the moment . at a certain point on the road . an illusion of autonomy 
 
(you’ve got to fake it to be real) it seems 
a cheap Burgundy better than a cheap Bordeaux 
 




So what does get yelled before reaching for the wires 
 
perhaps the health risk of loneliness even poor old Otzi had a stomach ulcer 
 
the Romans acquired tapeworm eggs through fish-paste 
not to mention hot baths breeding faecal-oral whipworm 
 






now it seems we need the Taliban on our side 
 
experience apparently to modulate sensitivity 
the brain feeding-back 
never too late to become a gourmet 
 
under this peripheral plasticity I like to take my experience half-seriously 
no theory no formula better 
 
my brain is not your brain . being is irreducible . if it works it’s true 
 
in this street wet from last night’s rain 
where Paul finds the news from a leftover newspaper March 1968 




















































Concerning Jack Spicer’s two a.m. walk from Gino & Carlo’s Bar to a basement 
apartment in Polk Gulch in 1964. 
 
 
Opening the hatch the words with which we hold on 
even a programmatic touch 
(take a couple of inconsequentials A plus B that combine to equal consequential C) 
 
she speaks of the dark side of yoga 
 
& having been found out 
having found out 
I’m not falling for this line 
 
finger to lip lip to finger mirror to mirror 
a metonymic adjunct to our relationship 
this finger’s syllable upon the lip 
 
all very well it is to reject syntactic inversion 
(& redundancy) for straight talking 
 
yet I cross the street against the flow shoelace in a deliberate muddled knot 
Jack’s high wire act drags this real into his poem untethered 
celluloid capturing a tactile graininess 
 
let us sit upon the floor as we used to sit in the street 
toast farewell to our musical Stalinist grand-daddy 
those nights at the Roundhouse Ligeti’s tea tray 
 
alternatively take a poetry as brain-game 
download the app 
protect against age-related decline 
until Lumos Labs buy us out for billions 
 
dodging life’s tripwires for the unwary in ineffective detox 
I am reluctant to concede to a hard exit 
float my stake in Alibaba 
 
George & Mary answered for one another 
finished sentences the other had begun 
occasionally spoke the same words in unison 
 
you & I have our own telepathic connection 
it gets tricky 
 
a fluorescent tube in Jack’s room flickers on & off 
gives glimpses of lumps & chunks of morpheme phoneme grapheme 
 
& then an early morning sky 
tornadoes in the clouds 
an urban garden standoff between species over scraps 
 
the boss was at home in Barbados 
perhaps we expect too much 
from health screening 
from budget surplus based on small-beer revisions 
 
do we need to know the referential object of the verbless poem 
to know what is said is to make (it) redundant 







in rejecting the hit-single opt for the album 
particulars met & connected but particulars 
 
Pound’s scientist-poet identifies the empirically valid 
each morning a clearing of ash before placing 
a small paraffin block kindling offcuts ovals a log 
 
out of a shape of each moment 
there is the encountered & the implied whole 
 






















































“The danger is of the chess-board: on which everything has already been named.” 
George Oppen 
 
It didn’t quite 
nothing can 
knight to queen four in the precision of placement 
 
this weld rail to rail 
you & I inexplicable each to the other 
I repeat I’m not falling for your lines 
not as common audit of the day 




face-timing with the south of France 
(strolling down that highway) 
Tim steps out 
reminds us 
nothing compares 
ignoring the tawdry eulogies 
every stick-&-poke tattooist knows it’s not what he spent his life working for 
any more than a plaque on a bandstand 
ask Sinclair 
driving into Gloucester Massachusetts at night in the rain 
I liked him right off 
write to me 
 
& who handles what well 
you have mistook me all this while 
this ego this habit of mind 
 
drop another shilling in the metrical meter 
(enough, no more/ ‘Tis not so sweet now as it was before) 
 
let us defend against the unsubstantiated vigorously 
my dog is a mongrel as I am 
 
in Steep Street among the well thumbed 
winter rain on glass 
functions touch mutate reconfigure 
factors fall towards a solution 
in this calculation as collage 
the operator resonant as a tram ticket 
(strips   pasted  around  the  edge)f  
we may wonder at the cheek of inaccessible form 
versus that which 
constrained by the hour 
standard issue 
is easily disassembled 
old arguments resurface 
clogs to clogs in three generations 
 














Yes but even can’t quite 
this grasp (gasp) of reason 
 
cell by cell we make ourselves thought by thought 
 
while the immaculate spirals (unexpectedly) hold 
let us restore the transparency of code 
unpick the irrational 
as if by percolation of the word 
come into my paragram 
 
Tim’s up there adapting to zero gravity 
Gary’s down here on hands & knees with a leaky gate-valve 
 
decentre the subject to foreground the artifice of verbal process 
 
bogus claims given a byte 
transcriptions of resistance 
problematic poetic properties 
processed & packaged between weighty & witty 
(shall we avoid the tele-bio-sketch) 
 
Simon’s puzzle is the transcendental 
(ignoring for a moment those theory boys) 
mine a fumbled bread knife 
 
sucking up the early morning mountain air 
watching distant smoke its convolutions 
 
I might just accept differences in obligation 
a bilingual edition 
chairs that wait under the trees 
 
this poem as transducer 
 
beyond a grasp of reason . what is a word really 
(at a certain corner, suddenly) 
on se retrouvait là 
 
a nail gun on a distant roof 
spuggies come to call among the little round tables 
 
with its major program of improvement 
this is the best time for work to be done 
call me now with your disclosure of the sensitive 
 
words fall (fail to fall) into place 













So it goes 
tum-ti-tum 
no east no west where then is north & south 
(am I in it) 
 
it is a metonymic passage 
in my head an enclosed mathematical system 
hypotheticals 
without necessary correspondence 
to actuals 
call it a poetic slice (London cut) 
a facet of the hour 
stuck in strips 
this cubist reality in a single plane 
 
here & there that tappity-tap-tap marks the flow of attention 
 
among rumours of increased longevity in mice 
the reportage of Lucan now deceased 
those wrinkly look-alikes in far off corners of the globe set adrift 
 
watching a typography that floats across the glass 
comme si Braque 
the cup that sits 
 
there are few extractable propositions that could be ascribed as endorsed positions of the author 
 
of course we are being used 
by language 
the muddy prints of a night time visitor 
from item to item 
anything & everything won’t do 
they are not the same 
the same that always changes 
I make my carefully random choice 
 
a van pulls out the bike goes under 
moments that turn without malice 
why fudge issues of irreplaceable loss 
we are in conversation 
waves lap 
umbrellas flutter 
it is a metonymic passage 
through rain the road a next service station 



















[Happenstance:] Addendum – Of Indeterminacy 
 
 
Especially apt| to release a string| implicit & directly perceived 
BY MEASURE A MOVEMENT OF SPEECH 
shape & meaning at a single glance three rhythms between fixity & flux 
the very life 
Quotation Reference ALLUSION TITLE TAG short sharp long list catalogue all – SWEPT UP 
 
Rimbaud’s rhythm is much more exclamatory and fragmented; short phrases pile up and sentences 
having normal subject-predicate word order do not follow one another so as to form a coherent 
discourse. 
 
“ by asking      
‘what does this mean ?’   
              they express a wish that eveRything   
                 is understandable. but if onE does not   
                   reject the mystery, oNe has quite  
                 a different responsE. one asks  
other things. ”  
 
BACK IT COMES OF FLUID & CHANGING UNDECIDABILITY 
text is our first anomaly| of a telegram again & again| known because needing to be said 
in careful placement as between the two 
BEYOND ABOVE A STEP THAT SKIRTS wide enough for one 
neither edge nor convexity to stem the flow 
 
In painting over and behind his numbers, using brushstroke to create broken, textured surface, 
dissolves the distinction between figure and ground; aware of the flatness of picture plane as well as 
the non-functioning of number. 
that jostle| us| have seen| insistently 
we can after all| after all go or to| knowing who one| On The Shallow Screen 


































The focus of each falls variously 
a language worn more loosely 
call it a calculated risk 
 
in response to a point of inflexion in every game 
(a stand-in sparing Van Gaal’s blushes) 
forms of frontal grammar in verbal planes fill the billboard field as poetic space 
 
we bump along 
without access to a drone when short on facts 
chit chat on Reddit 
spiking the infectious 
blindsiding the emotional 
by turns 
across this field of reference 
poems planar 
horizontal viewed full face 
 
while Apple snaps up SwiftKey 
ChemChina snaps up Syngenta 
nothing is off limits 
 
with unrealistic expectation Wetherby is not alone in lockdown 
in my take-five box with all that misshapen fruit & veg 
ten grams of iridium-192 are on walkabout from Basra 
 
given this late bloomer in arch-funk playlist ignored ego set aside 
the truth (doo-da-doo-da-di-da) if anywhere is up there 
 
the week’s whistle-blower is left again in the lurch 
while out & about playing a game of zones 
bulldozers move into the Jungle 
 
from this whetstone & loom-weight we graduate to a wheel in Fenland mud 
 
these the joys of hacking back 
Monty’s big dreams in small spaces 
planning for Spring 
 
this (is a) logic (not) displaced roll the die question answered 
 






















[Happenstance:] From A-G to H 
 
Leaves in a wind from which 
a proposition stitched in open line 
hinged between cut & continuity 
none that wraps . opens . shuts 
 
the trick is to pick something which won’t mis-sell 
surely not (well no) 
daubed across a poster 
put in a corner for grot-punk’s oppositional spirit 
(as in my cupboard that tin of sardines) 
 
failing to appear rooted in reality 
with a strange & uneasy crowd & taking no heckles lying down 
we jump predication’s pratfall 
fixing a pitfall in this speculative space between 
 
in Aleppo once free practice of conscience 
the Levant’s first printing press 
Al-Ma’arri’s forgiving poetics of rationality 
 
now we go down to ground level with smaller shadows 
for better or worse a first contact for the Mashco-Piro 
 
still I cannot countenance the argument as game of thought 
 
a skulking warbler rarely in the open 
not just the argumentative hectoring absurd solipsism again no 
immune to this explosive four-note song of blackcap quality 
along the runnel of a displaced downpipe the quiet thread 
among clues to the labyrinth a rill that circumnavigates a stone 
 
let us praise all debate 
BoJo backs Brexit 
the mud-slinging begins 
 
is conversation on a step where smokers gather 
or here beside the fire poker poised 
 
it is a dance of undifferentiated steps 
a Free Range improv 
life leads us (I’ve been thinking) 

























Where to go . what to know 
East-Asia’s best kept secret 
(& what’s a bounded bowser anyway) 
those words as ghosts . And so on 
cup aslant 
non-referentiality takes a break 
 
within this bundle of unresolved stresses resolutions balances old hat harmonisations 
to speak of the world as a two-way street flawed words & stubborn minds in a mould 
 
take no sides but offered dire warning 
face the irrefutable dualistic formulas that clog (up) debate 
 
get your bearings 
 
mad Mary Lou gets 48% for the Texas Board of Education 
Trump still trumps 
the Swiss back out of a universal income 
 
we’re all back-tracking 
 
on our street each line is conjured by dynamic pricing 
intelligibility a function of demand 
occasional nudging down that stimulates a poethic market 
 
I could provide answers but who wants to be misconstrued 
(it’s a cock-up I perfectly accept that) 
 
to resist or to evade 
rumours of a plot 
heading for a drubbing . Now that is 
 



























[Happenstance:] 3# Format 
 
 
Nothing off limits 
no jaded script low key low price 
 
after the predictable drama 
stand-up goes back on the road without prompt 
as a front moves in with warnings of exposure to vaping 
 
what it was & it was 
easy to blur the lines 
a lot of people didn’t know bits of this a bit of that 
it just happened 
she was the boss I wasn’t 
 
we watched as the switch was flicked that dying eye round & round 
the clouding over the foggy obscuration 
 
of course the jury’s out 
whatever Neanderthal interbreeding for the unlucky four percent 
 
the reader will note 
a historicist account of the work of new pragmatists 
an ongoing project for viola 
tonal colours that wash across 
 
what is the possibility 
(she read it rolled her eyes couldn’t make it up if she tried) 
 
my recommendation keep track-dotting until you can afford smart luggage 
 
































[Happenstance:] Dox (99.9), or How It Means 
 
“The impotence of human language to generate poetic truth is clearer than ever 
where it rages most unanswerably after it.” Keston Sutherland ‘Sub Songs versus 
the subject’, 141 (2014) 
 
 
How it means by taking not making in avoiding doubt For example 
 
no frame no phenomenology 
so many many words to set against the quiet 
 
I am breathing the line as requested 
transcriptions cognisant of the cornerless mystery of thought 
 
Sajid picks up the phone to Beijing finds it engaged 
 




the Cuban heels of Cartesian ego are swopped for sandals 
 
by metric measure as the movement of perception 
threading a fidelity of form through the eye of the arc of feeling 
surely a dialectics of nature must feature 
 
finicky bits of business 
memorizing zone one 
 
perhaps simply along this tideline of paragrammatic play 
the sedimentation of verbal phonemic graphemic traces 
 
where constraint is left to speak for itself 
our account being exactly what isn’t 
no single line emerges 
as we move 
(a pause, a rose, something on paper) 
dancing to the rhythm of cognition 
 
& not to solve difficulty to formulate meaning to paraphrase 
 
it’s all a matter of redress of rebalancing knowing where the frame is 
then that cough in an empty room 
 
as for Engel’s book of the same 
in crooked streets young voices cry 
rehashing tromboranga big hooks jagged rhymes 
 
shall we also launder dodge evade 
as advised by Mossack Fonseca my money is 
my poems are under the mattress 
 
picking a self off the shelf of personal identity 
a ready-to-wear little red number 
nothing quite so destroys post-modernist whimsy as brute reality 
a flick of the thumb 
what it was 
a whole new slant on bailing out 
 
at this point a whumpf of tinder ignites 







in these wee-hours nu-disco duos with stage invasions 
to good times & small talk at Hackney’s OSLO 
Zaventem’s missing man in a hat outlives radical Max passing on at 81 
 
you were there or not 
that’s what’s magical (as critical realism goes) 
forget the skimpiness of narrative across a frenzied night in Berlin 
the logistics are of making it 
Papusza in an old Tarkovsky movie 
 
where the subject has been exceeded 
misdirection from the outset 


















































[Happenstance:] Riff (self-edit) for pianist & two 
 
 
Outside Charly’s counting SWAG soak it up 
talk of forgotten things among the rich 
on the couch or a little flea-market barter 
Bertlmann steps off the pavement pink sock leading 
 
scansion tells us little 
the essential ingredient in any iced beverage is ice 
though short-changed is it possible your angry sentiment is deliverable with delicacy 
 
ignore the spiky polyrhythms 
let the FTSE take a dive 
given this day’s essay in chaos as stonking street drama 
in the wake of deconstruction let Antofagasta plummet 
they’ll still be racing camels in Divonne 
 
it is this late expression with its intermissions left blank 
tottering along the ledge of language in rag & bone mode 
ducking the logic of coercion that provides no explanation 
 
is this news that stays news 
weedy speech that lasts 
the urgent wave of verse 
 
let us enter that text-space with its non-local non-causal connections 
where the recognisable malingers between unreadable extremes 
disintegrates into sub-lexical acoustic noise 
 
this will be it 
 
Travis packing out Sauchiehall Street 
getting on a bit but still writing to reach you 
 
in a zone of itself a place translated 
where we all go into the subfusc 
heavyweight billing notwithstanding 
melody breaks out re-rendered 
 
under the thumb of the ergonomically inept 
make no claim take no credit 
a syntagmatic sleight of hand in a paradigmatic precinct 
wedged between 
 
while under a car park marked R(eserved) 
(& now the League) we grab it as it passes 
step out in denial of red lines crossed 
double yellow white no stopping nobody tells me 
Abbot insists as if tips to top up wages 
 
let’s X-ray the spine of our inquiry 
in a can or on a plate 
avoid the option of eyeball injection by Google 
 
while still flightless in Italy hardly a ham sandwich 
deep-fried cubes of cheesy tapioca 
never mind six degrees we are two stops away 
engrossed in the moment of long-form story-telling 
a one-act opera set in a toilet 






who dies well these days without Dignitas 
or on the wine dark sea between Tripoli and Calabria 
 
stuffed into somebody else’s old grey coat 
welcome to this flea-pit cinema vérité 
courtesy of KPMG Data Observatory my heat-map is raging red 
mental ad-blocking a way through Plutchick’s treadmill 
how do we even cope with 40 emotions 
 






















































[Happenstance:] To Begin With 
 
(of Awlad Shawarea, Cairo, 12.5.16) 
 
 
As if to those art school Roxy nights 
paper & print punkzines at the ICA 
gloss over the samplescapes 
the old routine paranoia 
we had a voice 
 
further down the line 
an occasional glance at a passing world 
a walk-on necessary to plot but insubstantial 
stand up & spit 
nothing can replace this 
 
by doodling as if spoken by wandering through  a rationality of sentences 
in a café 
on a train 
talking to a friend 
a juxtaposition is enacted 
 
take the stance of subject as panoptic 
of syntax as controlling interest 
shall we anticipate the delayed gratification of completion 
 
stalls are strung out in polyphony of indecision a chordal resonance of contradiction 
 
what marks are these 
as the formless present flows through which this personal pronoun stumbles 
one more variable among those equations of emotion 
consider how this ‘next to’ works in a world of alterity 
 
drop it get over it move on 
fake out of necessity 
get by 
else be toughened up by a different narrative 
tunnels in Gaza 
the swim to Lampedusa 
 
published April ’31 new edition January ‘71 
& speaking of formative influence she made me feel certain in seeking 
to create along paths other than it was possible 
 
Rembrandts could be faked in those days 
when opposition was everything 
risk the every day 
liabilities turned to assets 
 
write on through the rubble with an aesthetic of accumulation 
no logic links the figures 
more a flight of mosquitoes 

















Of cuts & dissolves framed in series detailing Frank’s thoughts 
 
digging in the rubble of impenetrable verbal surface 
this undercut this opposing note of counterfactuals 
if I shall as if they will 
where are the whens the befores & afters 
shifts signalled spatial temporal referential 
those melodic graphs of poetic perception 
with their hung out strung out articles & demonstratives 
the intimate conversations that invite participation 
 
discretion being the better part 
talking of forgotten things 
our Chinese friend with his present participles 
learns to name drop without naming 
(re-orientation is so good for the soul) 
 
but if too hip too square lost without a tribe ignoring the lot of them crank it up 
like on the ferry coming over 
 
the experience of pairing down outweighs the paired down 
deep image deep heat garbage in whatever we’re after 
 
to hell with the aesthetics of attention just go on your nerve 
spilling the beans into deaf lines 



































[Happenstance:] XXII (Kind Of Blue) 
 
 (to the loneliness that gathers / strangers) Maram Al-Massri (1997) ”إلى/ الوحدة التي تجمع“
 
 
Among those acquisitions of the ear 
pressures of the breath 
implanted in these particles of sound 
of scale measure taking the line 
as melody backed merges into a surface of canvas 
years in the making moments of listening 
 
IndieGoGo-funded & late out of the Curzon 
Westgate  St.Peter’s shoures soote beneath the trees of St Dunstan’s 
through a lighted window a glimpse of Jack poised over his radio 
 
we might spot a syntax loosely paratactic 
pile up qualifiers parenthetical clauses prepositional phrases 
stumble & fall into reality’s storyline even as it defies credibility 
 
it doesn’t take much to instil confusion 
a whole new world of excess & fear 
but other voices do do it differently 
 
to her right books 
 لحسن الحظ لدي ورقة وقلم
 تعطيني أكاذيبك
(fortunately I have pen & paper) 
(give me your lies) 
 
being unequal to that real itself 
what are we doing going on tour taking a trip to obscure destinations 
absurdly staged in a zip-front one-piece 
doing it differently no kidding (Slow Hand envy here) 
verse complete with transformative orchestration 
 
while Jack’s quiet duet is for chair & table  (Shaky alone on stage ‘71) 
words that make things name themselves 
So What takes flight 
 
having travelled this far (Austin Public Library 
Black Sparrow LA ‘75) 
keep flying 
it’s never been safer 
keep flying 
no one listens to poetry 
keep flying 
we’re all 1.1 degree Celsius above the 20th century average 
 
coda Lisbon airport early morning facetiming over coffee extraordinary you 
Khrushchev is coming to New York 
bucketfuls of European optimism in the Gulbenkian café 
















[Happenstance:] Best Ride Ever 
 
As if a Baconian frame frames it 
broken by the weight of being 
no glam 
down in subterranean Epic Dalston 
 
I’m hunkered down with my ⪆䠼 (qí shí old scholar JHP) box-set the yellow brick 
 
Tim is back 
with the hangover of all time 
among Parrot drinkers joined at the hip 
confirmation that nothing bad has happened to Greenland 
 
beyond a punch in the face a language to think in 
not every scholar signs away his soul 
the disturbing & dotty queasy & quirky mingle with the cannily pitched 
keep taking the tablets 
a cure for the delusional is your donation away 
in this state of radical emptiness 
as itself & on its own 
in the space we try to hold open 
it is the least said short of saying nothing 
precisely elusive 
singular questions are fed into typescript 
making the transition not my poem Mr Steinway’s 
but having been hung out 
what is it about alfresco drama that matinée in Regent’s Park 
which of many algebraic conundrums illustrates this emotional impasse 
while out to lunch with Frank in New York 
 
in doubting a continuous progression of insight let’s jump 
 
allusive in style (first half nerves) clues are laid 
key moments for the second 
the angularity of a Threepenny Opera 
 
at 2.15 in keeping time of squandered moments 
lines of melodic coherence in inexplicable syntax 
& sole witness of what is said 
I have a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the irreducibility of song 
 





















[Happenstance:] Spontaneous Particulars 
 
An unreliable self wakes picks up where habit last left off 




the pleasures of off-the-peg poetic opinion are now judiciously filtered 
 
feeling for a black box in the depths of literary singularity 
thumbing through spontaneous particulars (thnks t Burgin Books West 18th Street) 
imagining her telepathy thought in stitches possibilities of laughter laughter 
 
though swiftly unfollowed on Twitter 
ignoring exercise as educational intervention 
having sucked (as it were) on a Long Island iced tea 
& with no streamlined electro-glide (top E snapped & a cracked box) 
all of us are needed by those stars 
that wave 
other more authentic lives 
 
whatever the global workspace theory those ego tunnels just maybe 
may be there are tantalizing hints 
it’s just as well we primates prep for crises 
dropped without direction at Longyang Road 
 
if an example of X symptom of Y 
no point to it but the one 
we make 
(with or without a morning fog) 
use it or not your choice 
(that’s what they do the way they are) 
 
it’s a tough question 
































“Everyone wants to be Cary Grant. Even I want to be Cary Grant.” Archie Leach 
 
 
In delight of this pursuit referral 
call it a soft strip demolition of linearity by the line 
the taut wire the play of difference 
patterns of signification 
in this attentive waywardness 
with its encounters 
in few words if I should be plain 
much mischief not checked & exposed 
 
we had hoped to pass on all of this 
waiting again outside the double doors 
wanting that past to happen again but better 
 
no umbrage seems adequate 
 
but enough of insidious intent let us go 
confronted by the text’s irreplaceability we cannot bear witness for the witness 
 
beyond proto-scene mediate that spatial relation 
trajector exterior to covert landmark 
turn left at George Street over lunch inexplicably coded 
let us both configure & function 
watch for another cracking line-up of wickedly limber expat Jacobites 
exporting the Enlightenment 
 
trawling these coffee shops of Edinburgh for the right preposition 
in all that unpredictable & incalculable inventiveness 
the train finally in 
clocked on she still being ill-defined 
makes herself up again afresh for the Fringe 
with a first tattoo 
 
determined by words the brave let go 
as monks disguised on a ride 
& from a vantage point 
on a morning such as this 
as words might invent 
a shoreline upcoming tide sun bleached breeze 
walking barefoot (into that reality) 
where grasses engender their dance & the wind 
its gentle conspiracy (sudden as her curiosity) 
 
with that effacement of ego 
components cell-like assemble & divide mutate reconfigure 
knowing but not quite placing 
how it is 
right now here 
















Suppose it was not so 
stitched each to each 
sole witness of what was said 
‘Ere. I know exactly 
faint lines of background melody multi-tracked 
(our phone 415 from Bolinas we’d like to see you) 
 
each of us returns to try again even the over-coached 
feet under the table chipped cup 
knowing the possible is more important than the perfect 
 
as for that inherent & premeditated quality crucial to the rationale of literary evaluation 
That’s what you’re sayin’ to yourself, I know it 
contrapuntals bobbing & weaving 
the lisible turned scriptable 
bounce me back co-writer of the text 
permit the fickle & quixotic intrusion upon learned scrutiny 
let run the montage of syntactic & semantic discontinuity 
calm & cuddled love in her gear You wicked lot 
 
what needs fixing gets fixed 
by an inspired if sometimes accidental trick 
details may disappear into details 
through each fissure in the subject 
the more the meaningless is probed the less nonsensical 
 
that which we are we are The sort of people that get me a bad name 
amid the intermittent pulse of silences 
whatever the null result the augmented reality with its tagged data 
this is the place 
 
f. L cognitio cheap wine on a discount shelf 
poems double rectified 
each closed bottle its own ecosystem 
 
nothing changes everything changes 


























[Happenstance:] On Friday, with 80. 
 
 
In the lyric moment to resist 
between a here & there moments that compel attention 
 
branded bewildering & bonkers decoherence in continual play 
units of discourse wander about tracking a life 
 
complicit with the intermittent listener 
from the Falstaff by Pound & Knotts Lanes 
such circuitous mapping proceeds by contiguity 
through the unreal city by Thesis to Mrs Jones’ Kitchen 
 
mind grapples takes its chance keeps its head as best it can above water 
 
under a street lamp a choice of particulars 
at first short & simple – about Jack 
until details do disappear into details 
& Jack’s work as neither beginning over & over 
 
nor appearance but reappearance 
as above Palmyra’s broken skyline 
a Perseid high point follows a shift in the debris stream 
 
we are eight ledger lines above the stave 
hardwired to trigger for nostalgia 
being where & seeing what 
who most resembles & which 
one minute gone (that timer) 
each thing finds its place with another 
in succession that draws a turn of page 
 
even without the juddering handheld observations in pulsating meter 
for some a desirable patina accumulates while others gather only dust 
 
still we don’t have to like it all 
bounced between affiliations with no time to pick holes 
under a rolling boogie scrubbed & scuffed 
a sprawling grunge of semantics trapped in whiskery arpeggios 
 
the poem fumbles its opportunity Earth overshoots. 
 
Under the same sky with barrel-bombs: Abu Majed, Ahmad Mujahid, Ayman abu Al- 





















[Happenstance:] By Itself About 
 
This simplicity with the light 
the wet street an impatience to be there 
begin again be in that place 
 
conversations tangential meetings discrete 
within a walled garden roofed with vine 
morning air 
(go ahead explain yourself) 
/ɡlæs/ & glass 
the sign that cannot explain nor even name 
which leaves its watermark 
(Banksy without a point) 
 
coffee unwinds in the cup (closed system of relations) 
that irreducible minimum means 
 
in cupboards kitchens pubs train journeys 
with automatic adjustment of focus by context 
strange but may be 
 
while screaming into traffic 
hold tight 
it’s only a poem 






































[Happenstance:] Addendum – Poetry as Word-System 
 
 
ROOFTOPS RIGEL SITS ABOVE & FIRST BELOW A QUARTER MOON 
a blockchain for our chatter secretes the meaning 
yet against the drearily literal by action word or gesture only the one exists 
(back in the ‘70s we all matched Stein’s verbal art to Cubist painting) 
again & again but not| all these slippery terms| our odd uncertainties that test consistency 
you read of no coherence questioned by contradictory clues 
AMBIGUITIES IMPOSSIBLE TO RESOLVE 
shall we point or go about our business 
ordinary vocab | verbal planes| no pulse to put your finger on 
 
From Middle English weyfaren, originally in participle form weyfarand, from Old English 
weġfarende (“wayfaring”), equivalent to way + faring. Cognate with Danish vejfarende 
(“wayfaring”), Swedish vägfarande, Icelandic vegfarandi (“wayfaring”). 
From Middle English wei, wai, from Old English weġ (“way; path”), from Proto-Germanic 
*wegaz, from Proto-Indo-European *weǵʰ-. Cognate with Saterland Frisian Wai (“way”), West 
Frisian wei, Dutch weg, Low German Weg, German Weg, Danish vej, Swedish väg, Norwegian 
Bokmål vei, Norwegian Nynorsk veg, Latin vehō, Albanian udhë. 
From Middle English fare, from the merger of Old English fær (“journey, road”), a neuter, + faru 
(“journey, companions, baggage”), feminine, from Proto-Germanic *farą, *farō (“journey, fare”), 
from Proto-Indo-European *por- (“going, passage”). 
 
Sound six emphatic beats by a tripping & a counterturn 
embedded diphthongs in hard stops & aspirants 
whose pots underscores this vats FROM IAMB TO IAMB 
IF ONLY this were all| but words as even & the only 
to not pretend| to take| their usual| & among them| or more accurately 
code can just as easily be 
& when (after all again) for that matter much 
we can accordingly gracefully (thE TRICK OF| LET Me not) what seems to be 
supports this (or the other) reading 
OBSERVE THAT THE POEM MOVES 
 
 
Other each around orbit in holes black two; exist binaries hole black that known is it. Another one 
into spiral and energy lose both, radiation gravitational of emission the given. Horizon event single 
a with one into coalesce suddenly two the and point breaking to pushed is relativity general, 
spiralling of stages later the in. Universe visible the in stars the all in light the all than more 
potentially, staggering is merger the in released energy the. Light of speed the at Universe the 
across propagate which, spacetime of curvature the in ripples, waves gravitational into dumped 



















[Happenstance:] Her Words His 
 
 
Few we are & fall from each other 
dust on the shelf as dust 
among the self-effacing typed scraps photos black & white 
of string & tape 
(Honeysuckle Weeks who was lost is now found) 
 
of deeds dates documents 
this scholarship of particulars within a thicket of close commentary 
enough 
 
beyond reasoned discourse mute contention 
life in the cadence & shape of line 
 
it is the seeming contradictions 
displacements of faulty memory 
that lightness in the options that belies what lies outside the box 
 
in transposition we refigure the word 
as soundtrack of the time 
ride that bus to Cambridge Station 
archive Boltanski’s own heartbeats 
 
imagine we establish a corridor & keep our word 
 
in this & only 
of what only can be sung 
rearrangements of equal status neither peak nor trough 
for the wave that waits 
 
































[Happenstance:] 15. ibid., 25 
“It’s in the linkages.” Tolstoy 
 
Breath stutter  logic locks plug to socket 
 
off screen a circular saw that strains 
to make this radio rewrite clearly 
 
in a mind steeped & dyed that flows between what is & through 
 
of breakers & a crescent strip of beach 
pronouns tripped 
picked up by perception & put back 
 
across fitful tracings taking this from that 
muddied & muddled in putting the out in & back again 
 
words work because 
& only 
as if an eloquence of wind of rain those trees 
 
distinctions elude the blurred & abandoned 
Friday night in the Five Bells 
a day rethought unbalanced by irrational optimism 
such non-existent bias betokens assent 
& of what accuracy the world 
making that turn to language 
 



































[Happenstance:] Monk Playing Umbrella 
 
 
Irascible gestures apart 
as if slang defines a tribe 
between ecolation promession & resomation 
a handful is left 
of the intransigent 
(plus a little hydroxyapatite residue) 
call it late style 
leaving the contradictions 
looking fore & aft 
alert to those hasty presumptions 
ten strings & a goatskin 
with reservations unresolved doors left open the single emotive note 
it is a gritty retelling 
at once scrupulous & pledged to slow down 
isolate 
a test which entails 
as on a sea steering the sea pulling 
this ambiguity of direction 
in a text as transparent as a Voynich tome (circa 1912) 
clock cloud timer are now set 
whether it is or not 
simply 
 
of so many exquisite so rare so young delicate eyes & fingers 
 
what’s said in a bar stays 
compressed & vital truths as clues 
 
as if by breeze through the house 
a thin mist comes up valley 
among conjectured Eastern hills 
an umbrella of oiled paper under a quiet rain 
 
outside the parameters of propositional form 
grammatical 
philosophical 
we have (perhaps)(or not) this (speculative) inseparability 
 
























[Happenstance:] Not I 
 
To & about us being 
alone shall we find a thinking that 
comprehends 
 
it will have happened texts for nothing at a speed of thought 
while that which is always a breath away 
 
in difficulty 
of course it’s personal 
(every word) I pass you in the street 
when it comes to the line 
the marvellous play on the nerves spills out 
 
under the inauspicious too wise to hope 
sceptical of false poses 
witness to the best now in retreat 
 
where evidence engenders the idea where is your evidence 
 
in simple matters whether 
why else 
in a serious world come home to roost 
hunt the snark 
it all comes down to you 
 
wandering across that field of possibility 
falling back on benign violation 
wherein the implication 
within the seed 
a world in a grain of proposition 
 
Trump gets an easy ride 
(About Aleppo. And what is Aleppo?) 
it’s a whydunnit 
predictably ridiculed while scoring big at the box-office 
best not to over-think these things (or not) 
 
in Water Lane with Sam we plot 
imagine our once again imagining 
(what social maturity might mean) 
what means beyond a narrow notion of lucidity 
shooting the breeze 
of the linguistic instrument 
of what a mind might make within our grasp 
 
endlessly dissatisfied by demand & adjustment 
confronted with such pains & pleasure 
what are the lies evasions in smoking out the phoney 
 
let us articulate the provisional 




conjure a logic of how not why & whether plausible 
this local language common lore in conversation 
(go on) 
 






[Happenstance:] topian notations 
 
Waylaid by feints & reversals 
breezing along it’s easy to forget 
 
any old five clue cryptic in dub funk verse 
with a spreadsheet to follow the plot 
 
who tells the truth on line 
& never just one answer  line by line 
 
time to sit still 
take note of place moment mind’s particular 
 
bundled up in weight & measure without mimicry 
thought’s early imprint in syntax that duplicates a process 
a rain that breaks 
 
jack up your pots 
three seeds each in a frost-free store 
no way of knowing what weather 
 




So here we are (adv. n. prn. v.) doing something else 
brief but intense 
which sight of a single word has prompted 
 
in contributing one additional facet 
uncomfortable at best lost 
in translation (& 




In brief a flash crash fat-finger error stops tripped 
whether with a single stylus or a rake 
lines broken leave their trace 
our passing through this tangle of the world 
 
crossing on the corner of Hawks Lane 
making a morning 
of a world which weaves itself through us 
 
out of a past that gnaws into now 
a guiding hand 
guide line for what may yet 
 
it is these deictic gestures that fix the mark 
depiction in notation turned to script 
where we are apt to forget the luminous detail 
 














Not exactly & yet 
we do know 
Magrelli’s notebook of words in the dark 
the morning’s quiet road down to the shore 
 
might poetic intervention counter a mad world 
(rejigged Hawking calculations perhaps) 
 
Hey George brave young man whada’ya think? 
 
anything you ask we asked you answered 
coming back to that tied to the world coming to a moment 
 
with oxytocin levels through the floor stuck with the lesser getting even 
even Bob’s gone missing (didn’t anybody think to ask) 
 
knowing the knowing from doing 
in the air in the text as by word of mouth a moving edge 
 
down familiar streets 
unable to find a way home brave old man 
piling up pieces of paper 
 
can’t you tell from this chatbox 
that every smartpoem is now under pressure 
random access memory prices are rising 
each dissatisfaction a cliché 



































[Happenstance:] All About 
 
 




knowing this the pen moves on 
1. direct meeting 
2.not remaining 
knowing other 3. remaining 
 
a door that swings 
 
shall so few carry such burden (jnana yeshe gnosis) 
 
the shock & stroke of it 
 
where Marlowe gets fresh credit 
terracotta in pale cool shadow 




we all seek the sculptor’s note 
bobbins balanced as birds on a perch 
 
having the pieces 




waiting in the rain 
 


































super-Mooning the local hour with a Lumix 
taking again that night train 
post-Moorgate Metropolitan from Marcin Wasilewski 
busting through the week’s madness 
 
in our concurrent flights from reality 
a deliveroo of the frantic with truths off the peg 
it’s cheap as chips this off-radar premium mixer 
a Moscow Mule remake of vodka ginger-beer & lime 
 
toss out a bottle to the hapless helpless track 5 platform 12 
(wipe a hand across your mouth & laugh) 
we are the incomplete the unfinishable 
following the footprints of the Hadzabe 
with our multiple parsings & resoundings of the rearranged & retraced 
 
reboot with a pumped-up pulse of thought 












































By steady progression of syntactic order 
wandering & still 
we begin each case with a number 
the thing itself 
as between figure & ground distinctions dissolve 
 
most confusing are the stars 
two bright nails beside a Moon  a line rises falls across a circle 
 
unable to locate you with certainty I wait 
ash & willow at a river’s edge frame & sill  carafe & cacti in multiple pots 
dial we discover on a spool what is the end 
I think I shall refuse to cohere 
 
as if by trial & error 
elements which make up the object fail to take its shape 
 
our negotiations are complex 
stripped trees re-aligning in the wind 
putting uncertainty into the distance (construal theory if not myopia) 
as you hesitate placing your cup precisely before speaking 
green point not to red but to point again 
 
this getting along with 90% accuracy 
prefrontal cortical executive guesstimates 
it’s all simulation 
 
talk not of logics in the brain to make choices 
give me the chronic unease of the cheery soul 
a muddied river running full 
































[Happenstance:] Original Acetate Copy 
 
Wired up connected 
every suggestion a suggestion 
call it neuro-talk (aka neuro-truistics) & of anarchy in the UK 
as Jo Corré burns his punk memorabilia (all five million quid’s worth 
tho’ not a patch on Drummond Jura ’94) 
that’s the way at first light 
of the authentically logical as the absorbing puzzle 
 
maybe the plots mislead 
other thought slips in by the back door 
in such composition by explanation 
every move a rearrangement 
forget appearance notice the manner of reappearance 
you will see no evasion here 
the writer’s heart is on the flyleaf back flap page 52 line 21 
why expect other 
 
at certain expendable points the demarcation of planes is checked 
wandering in her ways 
direct questions of feeling receive no answer. 
 
* 
In just doing it sanitised sucked out 
bubble-punk squalls dream of indie-pop to alt-rock 
is it false news fake poems outsourced for the savvy 
grown up glitter making a comeback finely milled over bigger specks of sparkle 
 
where Kiefer’s White Cube bad teeth collection (betting on a burning or an auction shortly) 




The fact is not just any voice can be displaced 
words without 
heard but baffled subverted 
by a text of this & that but not 
 
try jumping the gap a bungee free-fall off a bridge of expectation 
between A & the apple or B & the orange 
our language of inquiry proceeds 
by songs of degrees 
poetics of indeterminacy 
an east wind nothing more 
than that which may be logically we go when it departs 
 
these moments that shape 
you ask what mattering was like 
go back observe the hesitations 




From which instant it seems I am my brain 
as if this bizarre attachment were mere cortical function 
 
can we conjure a credible case 
make it & it is 









[Happenstance:] Banish Learning, No More Grief. 
 
 
When lost go back to point one 
(hang on a sec the tape’s stuck OK go again) 
feeling it out back in the band 
finding the bum note that’s the trick 
 
always this possibility of quiet over disquiet in a complex dialogue of pauses 
something unsayable opens up & lets through 
use me quyet without lett or stoppe 
just us musos hanging out 
 
intention’s the limitation Cage & all that to find a speaking sound 
such as making the simple awesomely simple 
 
& like a painting’s point of entry 
what catches the eye a finest trace tiny crack 
helpe me to seke 
try friends & curious people 
what’s that it’s a plan to exhibit for after you finish no before I start 
 
of those long smoke-tinted days 
having the mind of a fool the very way of thinking a world 
to be still hearing 
sounding 
specific to its nature 
as if this was & that not rather than but trusting to good verse  
 
perhaps by rule of thumb or luck  (OK we’re done with rehearsal) 
 
we shall feel it (passing here Zukofsky went) 































[Happenstance:] It’s Alright, Panjo. 
 
 
Partial & particular 
this impress 
on permanence of paper for printed library materials 
each commodity peddled by tone diction scissored syntax 
 
imagine a 3-D printing of poetic truth 
place to place moving as a random walk minus the random 
leaving room for only (more) thought 
deliberation’s discontinuity 
hardly a match for social media 
 
yet neither signpost nor blueprint 
entering our field of reference 
both vague & vagary made tangible 
out of a 589 nanometre fog 
we cannot tell 
character & plot now gone 
leaving a serial music of shifting viewpoint 
(Duchamp’s figure heads for the stairs) 
 
of the indefensible while perfectly reasonable & no justification for a refusal to think 
the observer pans away 
screenscape receding 
as we risk crossing that line & intervening 
 
is there still a place for slow-core minimalists 
currency in the elektrobank for knotty riffs & acid blasters with melodic pep 
 
might the boards we tread still save 
































[Happenstance:] Still Making Matters 
 
 
Here’s the thing 
it’s a mismatch (despite what’s said & done) I admit it 
& why not 
not that I would mislead you whereas 
 
without syntax cadence takes over 
inflections of moments that matter 
modulations of the embodied 
 
Gabryska’s body (tbl#30 chk#21) 
sways gently to Bechet does she also wonder what is 
this thing called love (Salle Pleyel ‘52) 
gut’s grief that lies long hidden 
 
among fibrillations of phrase that make a life 
where the incompatible rubs up against the irrefutable 
it’s the differences that engage 
in plotting stop to stop 
 
no doubting determined 
daily by chance in populist times 
might poetics be as politics by other means 
 
immersed in a collective racket of continual surprise 
let’s be happily bracketed off 
out of the loop 
necessarily involving error & habits of misrepresentation 
a shape shift of epistemology without portfolio 
 
how did we do today 
(10% off if you use this unique code) 
 
it’s a map but not the map 































Say what you like 
if it happens it happens 
nothing is out of category (whatever prototypical planet you call home) 
perk up 
trawling Skoobs for energies of ambiguity 
chordal patterns serial scannings permutations of attention 
 
no amount of heady stomping in tearaway DIY punk can compensate 
whatever brokerage of time & place 
recorded mixed mastered it’s emotional not technical 
 
not unreasonably worried 
these become our economies of engagement 
fiddling with a passage in hand 
undermining main clauses 
 
by semblance & resemblance multiple monologues begin to converse 
yet how is it possible such resonance so long in the mind 
 
with no squeak in the word spool 
why not speed check 







































[Happenstance:] Her Brief Hours 
 
 
Spin networking the graph of day 
node to node syntactic bits that please 
it’s the edges that resonate rough winds untrimmed 
 
your disappearance up the street as lacuna left into Westgate 
where traces persist & such language 
of perception fools no one 
 
tweaking these cognitive mechanics 
Logical Form as forgiving engine gets us home somehow 
whatever bewildering negations 
 
damped down in differing ways your figure still fading endures 
 
shift or zoom I’m easy 
stumbling about this cluttered array of resonant space 
to every star (you are) that bark 
 
blobs to a granularity of each against a bounded background 









































[Happenstance:] If Talk This 
 
 
Ease it back 
mindful of orientation 
shared attention 
in any machine for thinking 
the vigilance of reader against writer may be rarely matched 
 
& of that rain on glass operator as tram ticket the loading of inconsequentials 
being all about density against disposition 
 
bumbling phonoaesthetics apart 
whose attentional blink will blink first 
in this game of poetic chicken 
 
half a second’s blind spot blurs us into indistinction 
measures of a life mostly missed 
 
try a three-part repetition followed by a fourth iteration that breaks the pattern 
emerging from the embedded in the relative clause 
elements of oncoming disruption 
 
along perception’s scale rain now runs in the gutter 
where we cross transitional moments in inappropriate footwear 
caught out lulled by predictable edges 
daytime starlight bounces off a wet street 
 
an end-point of every vector being its sense 
I have left the final two lines 
absolutely it’s a listening proposition 
why not 
rooting through an unreal time improvisation 
picking out the right errors 
 
of all the bars in all the world 




























[Happenstance:] Sit Crooked, Think Straight 
 
Back of Jewry Lane by the Sally Army drop-in 
a street dance of posture gait gesture 
as with vocal qualities of pitch tone timbre 
 
it’s a text piece for three voices 
of the embodied shaping subject 
call it an easy psychophysical tempo 
between a couple of drunks & a referee 
 
after four measures of the first & so on writing instalments 
(actors per line forty-three or less) 
transcripts of talk scramble across breathings swallowings 
 
no answer to such questions 
as if one plus one plus one doesn’t add up 
 
but being Thursday it is the sort of thing that happens 
feel free to infer meaning 
take that medicine 
Lit Crit talk heavy on the Crit 
(minor cut & paste surgery might fix it) 
 
while the boys in the Choc Café are patching up their world 
 
it is a syntax still until you ask 
how can I know what’ll be said 



































[Happenstance:] Addendum – What Seems 
 
HERE| Neolithic soul drone collectives get a hearing| 3 fans (3 blades each) out of sync | THE PULSE 
THAT PRESSES ON| fiddle cello digital| in the pocket of living & breathing| 
 
Now| space as amorphous container disappears| a fabric of neighbouring relations| GONE THE INERT 
FLOW ALONG WHICH EVERYTHING UNFURLS| forget the place IN & the succession IN| we are simply 
counting interactions| a billion distinct dances| Intrinsic To The World| 
 
‘istorin|The writer wished to re-signify history as story in order to recover the legitimacy of personal 
experience of finding out for oneself. This would then constitute one individual human cosmos (the 
‘kosmos inside’ any of us) among all other human cosmoi. 
 
Visceral Poetics (Veg Box Café) 
Overdrive Harpists  (Mrs Jones’ Kitchen) 
Violin Anarchists (Water Lane Coffee House) 
 
These mutations can more 
productively be explored as recalibrated throwbacks to a multifaceted and prior cosmology. 
 
COMPOSITION SIGNED WITH INITIALS & DATED ’27 
Provenance: Max Moos, Geneva; a gift to the present owner. 
Literature: Lamberto Vitali, Milan 1977, vol.II, no.638. 
Telex: 24454 SPBLON-G The highest bidder shall be the buyer at the hammer 
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Speaking Beyond Words: George Oppen’s Late Poetry 
as an Exploration of Cognition. 
 
Introduction: The Happenstance of Oppen  
Blowing A Phrase1 
 
“No limit to the possible permutations […] and that is precisely why poetry is so valuable.”                          
                                                        Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692) 
                                                                                             
I came to George Oppen first through Robert Creeley, having read Creeley’s Poems 
(1950-1965)2 a couple of years after its publication. This reached me through 
Compendium bookshop in Camden Town, along with Zukofsky’s collected shorter poems, 
All (1923-1958),3 but I knew nothing of Oppen at that time. I read Creeley’s A Quick Graph: 
Collected Notes & Essays (1970)4 twenty years later, which in turn led me to Creeley’s 
‘Introduction’ to his George Oppen Selected Poems (2003)5 and thus to Oppen’s work. 
Around the same time, Eliot Weinberger’s American Poetry Since 1950 (published in 
1993)6 struck me as the first anthology to do justice in gathering together those 
innovative American poets I most admired up until that point in the twentieth century. It 
included an otherwise un-anthologised Oppen. Weinberger would go on to ‘Preface’ 
Michael Davidson’s Carcanet edition of Oppen’s New Collected Poems (also in 2003).7 
Importantly for my thinking towards both the creative and the analytical components of a 
possible PhD, Creeley’s selection of Oppen included Oppen’s essay ‘The Mind’s Own Place’ 
and ‘Twenty-Six Fragments’, as well as a chronology of Oppen’s unusual life which began 
to intrigue me. In his 2003 ‘Introduction’, Creeley also highlights the fact of Oppen and 
Zukofsky working “from the premise that poetry is a function of perception” – as Oppen 
puts it himself in ‘The Mind’s Own Place’: “the act of perception” [my italics]. Creeley also 
paraphrased William Carlos Williams in referring to Oppen’s “complex ‘thinking with his 
poems’”; and “Oppen is trying all his life to think the world, not only to find or to enter it, 
or to gain a place in it – but to realize it, to figure it, to have it literally in mind.” 
 
With a background in astrophysical research, I have long been familiar with the 
experience of thinking out a problem through mathematical calculation. The thinking is 
done through the mathematics; the latter is not a subsequent reiteration of the former 
but rather its means of materialization. I realised that that was what Oppen was doing 
with words in his later poems, and that this accounted for their apparent oddity; they                
tend not to be about an obvious single subject, nor to present a completed or closed end         
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product. They are Oppen exploring on the page both his being and thinking through his 
language. Oppen thereby offered a link with the interest I had in certain cognitive and 
neuro-scientific inquiries in our own time. The first decade of the twenty-first century had 
seen concepts from cognitive studies in linguistics and psychology emerging from the 
professional journals: ideas such as embodied cognition, conceptual metaphor, and image 
schema, along with myriad neuroscientific observations on brain activity and its relation 
to experiential response or behaviour, each with implications for Oppen’s kind of writing 
and my own which explore those transitions between experience, meaning, and language. 
The cognitive exercise in which Oppen appeared to engage in his late writing also 
presented additional correlations with an earlier life of mine, in which I had studied what 
was then called ‘movement psychology’ under Yat Malmgren at the Drama Centre in 
London (1969-71).8 This was an analytical transposition for actors of the work of Rudolf 
Laban and William Carpenter, retrospectively redolent of ideas now associated with 
embodied cognition, being an analysis which explored the links between motor-sensory 
experience and the meaning-language interface, a quintessentially late Oppen 
preoccupation . 
 
The question of connection between my own and Oppen’s late work is thus partially 
explained in that shared motivation. However, I made the decision that in [Happenstance:] 
I would avoid too obvious a stylistic link to Oppen in order to avoid the criticism of 
imitation or simplistic derivation, let alone pastiche. In spite of the preference for the 
short intense lyric as a form in the poems I had written immediately prior to beginning the 
[Happenstance:] series, and a fondness for the fragmented line and the syntactically 
challenging – all of which had attracted me to Oppen in the first place – I nonetheless 
opted for something in longer form, superficially conversational, while aiming for 
language that is relatively tight and deliberate at the phrase level, targeting a balance 
between spontaneity and deliberation.  For subject focus, I would take the research 
process itself, a plotting of the research preoccupations in the middle period of the PhD, 
when my reading of Oppen (poems, notes, correspondence) had segued into my reading 
about Oppen (critical commentary and selected literary theory: Heller, Taggart, Nicholls, 
Perloff, Middleton, Clark). This reading ran in parallel with my continued reading in the 
cognitive sciences and their correlations with the literary field (for example, Andrea Tyler 
and Vyvyan Evans on the cognitive semantics of prepositions; Peter Stockwell on cognitive 
poetics). Much of this material in language and ideas would be played with in 
[Happenstance:], and some of the unexpected political madness of 2016 also made its 
inescapable appearance. Oppen’s political stance was always left of centre. His affiliation 
with the communist party before 1939 put him at odds with the post-war political climate 
and, as described in Mary Oppen’s account, drove George and his family into a 
decade-long Mexican exile.9 In the more liberal climate to which he returned and in which 
he flourished as a writer  in the 1960s and 1970s, he continued to be politically 
anti-establishment, evident in his direct participation in the anti-Vietnam war movement, 
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much of his correspondence, and the social empathy readily identified in such writing as 
‘Of Being Numerous’. Being left of centre in my own political views, while [Happenstance:] 
is not a political commentary, yet my disappointment at the anti-Jeremy Corbyn climate of 
late 2015 and throughout 2016 in the British media undoubtedly makes an oblique 
appearance. Also, the anti-European politics with its paranoia against diversity and 
multiculturalism that culminated in the 23rd June 2016 Brexit vote, and the isolationist, 
populist, self-interest in the USA culminating in President Trump’s election in November 
2016 also inevitably take their place in the writing. The only significant break in my 
composition of the [Happenstance:] poems came in the weeks following Trump’s election 
when, frankly, a recovery of positive energy took a little time. Through all of this also runs 
the intractable chaos of the Syrian civil war, the barbarism of Daesh, and the misery of the 
migrants, and [Happenstance] references each of these in a measured way. 
 
From the start, for [Happenstance:] I chose a journal-esque format for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, given the necessary cohesive argument of the dissertation component of 
the PhD towards which I was working, my instinct was to run a more flexible creative 
component in parallel. There is a relief and a pleasure to be had in ‘writing as writing’. I’ll 
return to the distinction between ‘series’ and ‘sequence’ in this context in a moment but, 
given the formalism of the convention that is the academic dissertation, the reality of 
day-to-day experience that I chose to reflect in the creative component follows Lyn 
Hejinian’s echo of William James: “in the transitions as much as the terms connected.”10 
The ‘incomplete’ and open contrasts with the ‘complete’ and closed and, just like the later 
Oppen, it’s the open-ended that seems to me most ‘alive’, to most readily engage the 
attention so critical to the reader’s experience. That centrality of ‘attention’ to the 
mechanics of the writing and reading experience is something I consider more closely in 
the dissertation in reference to Oppen’s own work.  Given the opportunities for inclusion 
of all conceivable varieties of language material in my intended poetic journal, I 
nonetheless sustained throughout what in retrospect appears a rather conservative 
format stylistically. While playing with more obtuse forms as it were ‘on the side’, I chose 
to include only three short examples as ‘Addenda’, almost as intermissions in the 
[Happenstance:] flow, pointing perhaps to future possibilities. 
 
As a series of journal-esque entries at a rate of approximately one each week, the length 
and duration of each poem was then delineated by simple practical constraint. Within 
that, I adopted three principles in which I framed the writing. Firstly, that there be a 
balance between spontaneity and deliberation, having defined for myself a spontaneity of 
tone that would be conversational in its inclusion of everyday language, alongside a 
deliberation that requires precision and concision with no extraneous use of language. 
Secondly, that the phrase and typed line relationship be conventional, essentially one 
semantically (and usually syntactically) coherent phrase per line. Thirdly, however, that 
neither syntactic nor semantic convention need connect each line, indeed the sense 
66 
 
gleaned will depend in part on the discordant juxtaposition of those phrasal components. 
This is part of the desire to open not close semantic possibilities throughout 
[Happenstance:].     
 
Being conversational in a manner derived from my rereading of Jack Spicer, Frank O’Hara, 
and Paul Blackburn, the open field format also felt appropriate. As Tyler Doherty puts it in 
For the Time Being (a selection, history, and critique, of the poetic journal genre): “Not 
that these pieces aren’t carefully crafted – they clearly are – it’s just that the act of writing 
isn’t seen as preparatory to something else. In a very real sense, there is nothing else. This 
is it.”11 Paul Blackburn’s ‘Journal’ poems from the last years of his short life presented me 
with an open field format that was both spatially relaxed and potentially concise. 
Nonetheless, while Blackburn’s ‘Journals’ fit the more usual diary-based poetic journal 
template, my own focus remained on writing directly out of the research material I was 
exploring as much as any day-to-day reflection.   
 
Oppen’s late work focuses extensively on the one or two-word unit or, at least, the 
minimal group of words, rather than the larger-breath prosody characteristic of Blackburn, 
O’Hara or Spicer.  I concentrated most on concision and precision of language at the 
phrasal level. Oppen’s example of deliberation in language selection would be mine also 
but my prosody, my voice, would seek distinctiveness initially through composition with 
units at this phrasal scale. I hoped to use my scientific background in order to comfortably 
mix the discourses of literary and scientific scholarship with the conversational and the 
personal, the social, the political, as they arose, but the attention was on the ‘writing as 
writing’, that is of language and prosody following its own nose, drawing liberally from its 
mental surroundings, rather than constrained by much consciously predetermined 
direction. In matters of concision and precision one can argue that my own 
scientific-background proclivity for accuracies  in a ‘fake news’ environment , is itself a 
political  gesture . Oppen’s late writing  also attracts  me because  of its struggle  to be 
accurate , also a political  response  to a world in which Oppen identifies  a debasement  of 
language  and therefore  thought . What  Oppen  attempts  in recording  his motor -sensory 
experience and its relationship to his imagination and intellect is itself also to be seen as a 
resistance  against  what  he felt deeply  to be the overwhelming  odds  of experiential  life 
against  the individual ’s ability  to grasp  it. Oppen ’s desire  for non-rhetorical  accuracy  in 
identifying  the actuality  of the world  conflicted  in practice  with his political  imperatives 
during  the 1930 s and led to his abandoning  poetry  at that  time . Oppen  would  remain 
absolutely opposed to all vacuously rhetorical writing throughout his life. A journal-esque 
record  of ‘what  (actually ) is’ in the  mental  landscape  also  runs  counter  to much 
contrivance  of rhetoric  and that has been my aim in [Happenstance ]. As Peter Middleton 
has put it , there’s nothing wrong with assertions but “affirming them without reserve is”.
12 So it is that I’ve sought to balance the propositionally assertive with the speculative, 
as did Oppen, and his grumble over ‘poems with too much point’ resonates with me. Life 
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isn’t like that, and in so far as I enjoy writing that reflects realistic aspects of life, I tend 
always to favour question over answer, perhaps also the inclination of a scientific 
disposition. I therefore sought to pursue the inquisitively incomplete across a range of 
scales, building from phrase to couplet to stanza to poem to Series. Middleton’s 
discussion of the speculative poetic proposition came to loom large among my interests 
and will emerge again in the dissertation.13 
 
Another link to Oppen is that [Happenstance:] is a ‘discrete series’. I take a series to be a 
succession not a development; in mathematical terms it is a summation, an accumulation 
of effect. It is in the Poundian tradition of juxtaposition without connectives, what has 
been called the ‘ideogrammatic’ poetic tradition.14 Oppen’s own Discrete Series of 1934 
makes that point. Each component in the series is free-standing. There may be 
correlations and cross-connections one can make in reading and shuffling the component 
poems but there is no intentional ‘sequence’. This was my objective. The temporality of 
succession in a ‘journal’ is one inescapable narrative but it is not a straightjacket if the 
temporality remains low key. So, for example, none of the poems in [Happenstance:] are 
dated. It is not a sequence in which a deliberate, we might say ‘organic’, thread leads 
linearly from A to G to H and so on. As with Robert Duncan’s Passages, for example, 
another clear series in contrast to a sequence, there is no necessary beginning, middle, or 
end to a series such as this.  
 
As for reading [Happenstance:], we have open form. This classically offers a score in which 
line length guides the breath, space indicates the pauses, and indentation suggests the 
relative emphasis or perhaps tone. Apart from explicitly showing the alternative of “make 
each line / cut itself” (a quote from Jack Spicer) in ‘This One That’ (the second poem 
of [Happenstance:]), there is generally one coherent phrase per line. This deliberately 
presents an intelligibility of successively coherent lines, characterised perhaps as resonant 
fragments although often in dissonant assembly, and which intelligibility may or may not 
be, at times, illusory. Uppermost in my mind, as I’ve already mentioned, are the pleasures 
of the speculative, albeit balanced by the occasional assertion. As for pace in reading, the 
deliberation  of Oppen’s late work reminds  us that slow reading  frees up the spaces 
between  words  and lines that allows the mind with all its memory  and imaginative 
invention  to enter into the moment , to bring much more to the words spoken than may 
be immediately  apparent . The  spaces  between  lines  in [Happenstance :] are  also 
deliberate and ubiquitous , as are variants in the manner of Blackburn in which quadruple 
spacing between  [Happenstance :] phrases echo the ‘starred ’ separations in some of 
Blackburn ’s work . In the attention -grabbing process that is writer  signalling  to  reader , 
these devices are  used  selectively.   
 
The 3rd century BCE Chinese scholar Mencius suggested: “Words that speak of things 
near at hand but with far-reaching import are good words.”9
 
In his use of ‘near at hand’ 
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words, Paul Blackburn is often deliberately ‘off-hand’, his apparently casual record of the 
day in fact too often rather contrived. This is less so in his later work when living a more 
resolved life with wife and child, and subsequently in facing life with the inoperable 
cancer that eventually killed him, but it is the everyday quiddity of what surrounds him 
that he does record and which intention he shares with Oppen. Through a much sparser 
lexical and syntactic deliberation, Oppen records that ‘whatness’ of being around him. 
Oppen wrote to friend and fellow Objectivist Charles Reznikoff: “Write/in the great/world 
small”16, which (I agree with Tyler Doherty) implies ‘small’ meaning “a humble willingness 
to let things (finally) alone and think with (not for) them on their own terms.” Lyn Hejinian 
also refers to the difference between ‘knowledge’ and ‘acknowledgment’,10 and it is in the 
latter that Oppen presents us with the world, reminding us that the world is, not telling us 
what the world is (again to paraphrase Doherty’s interpretation). I hoped to pitch my own 
deliberation of language and tone between the two, Blackburn and Oppen; recognising 
that the more abstract subject material of [Happenstance:] is necessarily largely removed 
from the ’thinginess’ of later Oppen’s raw experiential material, while also more ‘serious’ 
in scholarly intent and degree of ‘intellectualisation’ than Blackburn’s usual conversations.  
 
The research process by definition is an exploration. The writing of [Happenstance:] 
evolved as an inquiry out of its own times, places, and preoccupations, without excessive 
preconception. The analytical component of this submission will show Oppen’s late 
poetry equally arising as his own pursuit of what Middleton has called that “poetic right 
of experiment and inquiry”10; for, as Lyn Hejinian puts it so clearly: “The language of 
poetry is a language of inquiry [my italics]”,11 and nowhere is this more evident than in the 
late work of George Oppen. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
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Introduction: ‘At the nail’s point’ 
 
1.1 Old Salt Survivor1.1 
 
He said “I try to describe the sense of existence.” Rachel Blau DuPlessis 
 
In the thirty-two years since American poet George Oppen’s death in 1984, scholarship 
across a range of key Oppen issues has been undertaken by Peter Nicholls, Michael Heller, 
Rachel Blau DuPlessis, and John Taggart, to name just a few of the principals. As Rachel Blau 
DuPlessis recently put it (on the occasion of the 2008 centenary of Oppen’s birth) in the 
context of recollections of her personal relationship with George and Mary Oppen: “Peter 
Nicholls emphasizes Oppen as the isolato. Oppen is viewed as a singular, heroic, struggling 
figure in dialogue with philosophers and critical theorists”, while she remembers him also 
for “the sociality […] his relations with others (as dramatized in the letters), the intense 
familial connections.” As she says, for her: “It’s odd to be at a moment when one may have 
different Oppens — it appears as if a purely spiritual one may be forming too (a sort of 
Michael Heller, John Taggart kind of Oppen), only grazing lightly on the philosophical and 
resisting the political/ internationalist.”1.2 In this dissertation, I wish to suggest a further facet 
of Oppen for our cubist portrait, through a strand of Oppen’s poetics of inquiry evident in 
his later work. This later poetry was, to quote Peter Nicholls, a “poetry of being”1.3, immersed 
to a significant degree in the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. It was also a “poetry of 
conjecture” (to steal a phrase from Charles Altieri referencing the distinctly different 
conjectural stance of Robert Creeley).1.4 Oppen was, in his generation, a rare example of a 
poet much concerned in later life with the root process of understanding experience and its 
translation into language, equal to and perhaps more than his preoccupation with 
conventional subject content, even though he wrote his fair share on the subjects of fear, 
death, poverty, injustice, and belief, in his last three collections (Seascape: Needle’s Eye 
1972, Myth of the Blaze 1975, Primitive 1978).1.5 Other poets of the post-WWII generation 
(Oppen himself straddling both the before and after) certainly took an interest in the 
modernist issues of form and process as much as content but none seems to have focused 
on what we would now term questions of cognition quite as determinedly. The post-WWII 
poets were all, however, inheritors of what Peter Middleton has called that “poetic right of 
experiment and inquiry”1.6, a right first claimed for poets by Ezra Pound in his pre-First World 
War London days, but a philosophy hardly explored by subsequent poets until Charles Olson 





thinking’ in his work was undertaken within an ontological and epistemological framework 
that is readily recognisable from a 21st century perspective – ours being one in which the 
cognitive sciences conjure fresh evidential insight and theoretical conjecture on a regular 
basis. Where cognitive studies and poetics meet may be ground in which new conceptual 
and aesthetic possibilities for poetry will emerge. At its simplest we have to ask whether 
Oppen’s discoveries as recorded through his poems, notes and correspondence, remain valid 
in the light of modern day cognitive sciences and, if so, what they might teach a 
contemporary poet such as myself. 
 
 
1.2 Clues To The Labyrinth1.7 
 
“The net exists to catch fish.” Zhuangzi 
 
The American poet, essayist, personal friend and long-time critical champion of George 
Oppen’s poetry, Michael Heller, has written: “Poems and poetries no longer successfully 
enter into our lives as wisdom…but as occasions and registrations of being wise or unwise, 
lucky or unlucky, within time and event. Our poems require a resemblance to 
instantaneously gathered ‘sensibilia’, contradictory and competing gestalts, perspectives, 
apprehensions in time”1.8. In short, poems seem to arise out of a moment’s complex mix of 
thought, meaning and language, and not least the understanding we have of what we are 
and of what we may be capable of knowing and expressing. Understanding the nature of 
that consciousness and its associated cognitive process has been addressed in the 20th 
century by philosophers of mind and experimental psychologists, and increasingly in the 21st 
century by an ever-widening range of cognitive- and neuro-scientists. The very notion of the 
individualized consciousness and its relationship to its world continues to be redefined. 
There has been both congruence and disagreement over issues of attention, perception, 
memory, and the links to language; of personal identity and the self; of the unconscious and 
the preconscious; of metacognition; and the validity generally of dualistic and reductionist 
analyses of individual experience set against more phenomenological perspectives. 
Hypotheses of embodied cognition, conceptual metaphor, image schemas, and what have 
been called languages of thought, have a direct bearing on what poetry might be capable of 
encapsulating and of precisely how personal meaning melds into the thought that translates 
into language. Just as literary scholarship has long felt comfortable in identifying a 
philosophical or psychological context to a literary work, so now it is appropriate to glean 
insight and information from the available cognitive sciences as we comment on and, in this 




This, of course, involves an inter-disciplinary approach. In this, we may be moving outside 
professional comfort zones. Nonetheless, given the literal primacy of a PhD in ‘Poetry: 
Practice as Research’ remit with its explicit identification of a modernist inheritance of 
poetry as inquiry1.9 – this could be considered both an unavoidable and a welcome step. The 
languages of distinct academic discourse can be very different and, indeed, depend much on 
a background grasp of fact and convention, more than one can bridge in a short dissertation 
such as this. But while supplementing the essential factual argument with appropriate 
subsidiary notes, I shall endeavour to integrate the different traditions of literary scholarship 
and scientific analysis as seamlessly as possible in my discussion, mindful always that my 
study is a literary one whose raw material is the scholarship arising from a close reading of 
Oppen’s late poetry, his own correspondence, notes, and commentaries upon it, and the 
critical opinions of leading scholars. 
 
 
It became a Modernist cliché, but is nonetheless fundamental for that, that ‘process’ – 
indeed, the experience of process – is as significant to many a poet as product. As Oppen 
himself said: “We don’t really know what Reality is made of”1.10 but “clarity means, among 
other things, to know how the words come to meaning…to experience how the words come 
to meaning”
1.11.  Process  for  Oppen  meant  more  than  the  mechanics,  the  modernist  
techniques of putting words together on the page. He dug deep into the process of how his 
own language seemed even to relate to his experience and what that experience meant to 
him. If we are to tread between the particularity of the arts and the generality of the 
sciences, there is a balance to be struck. One of the critics of what has been seen as an overly- 
reductionist approach among many contemporary neuroscientists to the study of 
consciousness and cognitive process, John Briggs, has championed the role of meaning in 
poetry “as an on-going process and perception rather than meaning as the conclusion of 
knowledge”1.12; and of poetry thus “moving the mind beyond its conceptual confines [my 
italics]”1.13. We may also be reminded of writer and essayist Brian Phillips’s remarks in the 
face of post-modern critiques and what, as a result, he called “taste’s instability” in our 
contemporary poetry culture, and “the uncertainty that pervades our aesthetic 
experience”.C .C 4 Phillips was led to the following conclusion: “I have written as though the  
problems facing the poetry culture were a long way off from the aesthetic difficulties facing 
individual writers, and I think this is true in the sense that the issue of what kinds of aesthetic 
experience are conceptually possible [my italics] precedes the issue of what kinds of aesthetic 






Defining that ‘conceptual possibility’ and how mind might move beyond the ‘confines’, as 
revealed by research in the cognitive sciences; its relationship to poetic potential (that is, the 
potential for so-called poetic, rather than scientifically verifiable, knowledge); each of these, 
through the example of George Oppen’s late poetry, are the core objectives of this study. 
My thesis is that Oppen’s poetic preoccupations indeed both extend and prefigure 
ontological and epistemological discussions in his own time and the decades that followed 
his death. As a result, I believe his late poetry presents us with creative inquiries at the edge 
of conceptual possibility that were not only radical in his own day, but are poetic 
explorations that remain cogent half a century later. 
 
 
1.3 First Taste 
 
“Let us not mince words – the marvelous is always beautiful.” André Breton 
 
“In a lively little work called A Dissertation Concerning the Perfection of the English Language 
and the State of Poetry, published by Leonard Welsted in 1724, Welsted argues that the 
beauties of poetry are “rather to be felt, than describ’d”; that they lie “too retir’d within the 
Bosom of Nature” to be explained by “mechanic Laws”. But he insists at the same moment 
that poetry is objective, is “a Science of Reason” differing from the other sciences only in 
that, in order to perceive its truth, one must be endowed with a special perceptive power – 
which he calls “Taste or a Faculty of Judging””. The quotation is from an article of 2007 in 
Poetry, the magazine of The Poetry Foundation (Chicago), by writer and critic Brian Phillips. 
Phillips reflects on the notion of ‘taste’, defining its role in the contemporary vocabulary of 
aesthetics as that which “allows us to feel the beauties of poetry and to glimpse their hidden 
order at the same moment; it allows us to unite the subjective with the objective in a single 
perceptive act.”1,15 He is emphasizing a juggling of dual aspects, whether surface and sub- 
structure in poetic form, or of individual versus collective perception. The notion of ‘taste’ 
in the aesthetic sense in fact seems inherently contradictory: “Spoken of as a kind of personal 
preference, taste seems to imply an impenetrable subjectivity, our acknowledgement of the 
obscurity in which our likes and dislikes originate…[yet] spoken of as a kind of collective 
preference, taste itself becomes the norm”1.16. Phillips is concerned over the notion precisely 
because it was one of the few conceptual yardsticks by which aesthetic judgement has been 
applied both individually and in some kind of collective sense. In our contemporary context 
we would, however, question its usefulness as a critical measure with any kind of objective 




the language of aesthetics marks the historical moment when mental processes were first 
coming under the analytical scrutiny of the Enlightenment. 
 
“In its role as [a] concept describing aesthetic preference”, taste began to “glimmer into 
steady existence” around the start of the 18th century, at a moment when the idea of 
aesthetic value was undergoing significant change. Phillips argues there was a challenge to 
“classical precepts and God-derived hierarchies as the key to studying beauty”1.16. He cites 
writers such as Hutcheson, Hume and Burke, influenced by the empiricism of Locke, who 
“began to speculate about the actual operation of the mind in the midst of aesthetic 
experience”. No longer was the question: what are the qualities that make the artwork 
beautiful? The new way asked what qualities of mind made the artwork appear to be 
beautiful. “Beauty experienced a rapid inward turn.” In 1712, when Joseph Addison wrote 
about “the pleasures of the imagination”, Phillips suggests the idea was considered strikingly 
new. In contrast, by 1757, he argues that David Hume was repeating a familiar axiom when 
he wrote that beauty “is no quality in things themselves; it exists merely in the mind which 
contemplates them” and “each mind perceives a different beauty.”1.17 Phillips quotes Kant 
who, in the Critique of Judgement (1790), even wrote that if an experience “is [only] beautiful 
to me”, it cannot be considered an aesthetic experience at all because the personal 
restriction annuls the idea of the beautiful. But the 18th Century seemed not prepared to 
give up the conviction that there was some fixed point, some common element of our 
aesthetic experience that, as Phillips says, “would make it possible to discuss the attributes 
of aesthetic value as though they existed outside our private experience.” Do we not equally 
share the feeling that beauty transcends ourselves; that it is indeed something universal? 
Certainly this conviction underpins Romanticism, and the personal lyric is ‘nat dede’ precisely 
because this conviction remains.1.18 
 
 
Phillips’s thesis is that what arose in practice was an intellectual compromise, pragmatic        
but based on a fuzzy demarcation which remains to this day. The idea of ‘human nature’       
operating in  essentially the same way, then that similarity could give aesthetic judgement



















 mental  order  whose consistency from one mind to the next would give it an abstract 























 suggests  that  writers such as Hutcheson and Shaftsbury felt able then to speak of a “sense 

























as they would for, say, sight. The mind might perceive beauty as the eye perceives colour 
or the ear
 
pitch. Beauty could remain subjective, as a sensation, a phenomenon of 
perception; but it
 
would also have an objective existence, because the sense was assumed 
to operate in the same way in everyone, thereby retaining a presence outside the 
individual self. The idea of
 
subjective perception having an objective existence takes us 
immediately to the modified
 
‘objectivism’ which the later Oppen will explore. 
 
In our own time, we consider ‘beauty’ as just one among a number of aesthetic criteria by
 
means of which we might delineate the pleasures that poetry offers. The perhaps difficult to 
define notions of interest and pleasure surely remain the twin pillars of our enjoyment of 
poetry, persisting in the face of what Philips describes as “the uncertainty that pervades our 
aesthetic experience”1.14 in contemporary poetic culture, and even as ‘pleasure’ itself as a 
sensory-motor-cortical response responding through a rich chemical cocktail in the brain is 
increasingly subjected to scientific analysis. To stretch claims of understanding and of 
knowledge to logics beyond the analytical typical of scientific study is to court accusations  
of imprecision. Nonetheless, a persistent modernist and post-modernist hypothesis has 
promoted the notion of ‘poetic knowledge’ as a legitimate extension to that identifiable only 
through scientific procedure. The validation of such subjective experience will be part of our 
discussion to come. 
 
 
If we are able to accept that conceptual possibilities are determined by the cognitive process 
as it links experience to meaning to language, we can suggest that it does so nowhere more 
incisively than in the concision and precision of poetry. Oppen’s collection of 1975, Myth of 






of itself carrying 
 
‘the principle 




itself ( (but maybe this is a love 
poem 
 








of the self nor the racing 
car nor the lilly 
 
is sweet but this 
‘Who Shall Doubt’ NCP 259 
 
No full-stop closes this lyric. Within the mild complexities of syntax and semantics, the later 
Oppen is juggling with the actuality of experience of which consciousness is the gatekeeper, 
while also brimful with intense emotion towards the sheer beauty of that experience, which 
translates as all the more intense for being so sparingly expressed. In such a poem we are 
witness to that very difficulty that arises, and on which this study will hinge, where 
conceptual possibility meets linguistic challenge as experienced by both writer and reader, 




1.1 Rachel Blau DuPlessis, ‘Oppen from seventy-five to a hundred, 1983–2008’. Originally prepared for SUNY, 
Buffalo: George Oppen Conference, delivered April 24, 2008 (Oppen’s 100th birthday). In revised form, delivered 
at the University of Edinburgh, Oppen Conference, November 15–16, 2008. Published in Jacket 36 (2008) 
http://jacketmagazine.com/ 36/open -duplessis.shtml; “old salt” survivor, paragraph 17. 
1.2 Rachel Blau DuPlessis, Jacket 36, paragraph 74. 
1.3 Peter Nicholls, George Oppen and the Fate of Modernism (2007), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2. 
1.4 Charles Altieri, Self and Sensibility in Contemporary American Poetry (1984), Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 103. 
1.5 George Oppen, New Collected Poems, ed. Michael Davidson (2003), Manchester: Carcanet Press Ltd. 
1.6 Peter Middleton, Physics Envy (2015), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 13. 
1.7 Peter Nicholls, George Oppen and the Fate of Modernism (2007), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 120: “clues 
to the labyrinth of [Oppen’s] own thinking.” 
1.8 Michael Heller, Conviction’s Net of Branches (1985), New York: Spuyten Duyvil, 98. 
1.9 Duncan MacKay, ‘Eliot’s Scientific Tendencies’, PN Review 230 (2016), vol.42 no.6, 25. 
1.10 George Oppen, ‘Fragment No.3’, Selected Prose, Daybooks, and Papers. ed. Stephen Cope (2007), Berkeley & 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 232. 
1.11 George Oppen, ‘Fragment No.9’, Selected Prose, Daybooks, and Papers. ed. Stephen Cope (2007), Berkeley 
& Los Angeles: University of California Press, 235. 
1.12 John Briggs, ‘Reflectaphors: The Implicate Universe as a Work of Art’, Quantum Implications (Essays in Honour 
of David Bohm) Chpt 5. Eds. Basil Hiley & David Peat (1987), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
1.13 John Briggs, ‘Where’s the Poetry? Consciousness as the Flight of Three Blackbirds’, Advances In Consciousness 
Research 37 (2001), John Benjamins Publishing. 
1.14  Brian Phillips, ‘Taste In Poetry’, Poetry (Sept 2007) Chicago: The Poetry Foundation, 11. Interestingly, in 
Robert Creeley’s Preface to Louis Zukofsky’s A Test of Poetry (2000 edn.) Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University 
Press, viii, Creeley quotes Ezra Pound: “Damn your taste! I want if possible to sharpen your perceptions after 
which your taste can take care of itself” – an amusingly pertinent remark in view of Oppen’s late preoccupations. 
1.15 Brian Phillips, ‘Taste’, 3. 
1.16 Brian Phillips, ‘Taste’, 1. 
1.17 Brian Phillips, ‘Taste’, 2 
1.18  There is a question in relation to Oppen and the notion of ‘transcendence’ here. The American critical 
tradition looks to the transcendent in poetry that goes back to a particular interpretation of Thoreau and is traced 
as evident, for example, as a pillar of Wallace Steven’s aesthetic through to the work of John Ashbery. The pre- 
Enlightenment experience of the sublime, and the revelatory belief thereby instilled, is challenged by the 
emergence of Kantian rationality. For all of Charles Olson’s referencing of the scientific, for example, it can be 
argued he simply seeks the transcendent experience embodied in the historical and geological landscape. In 





Station of the Metro’) rather than the fuzzy imagist reincarnation under Amy Lowell’s umbrella. In other words, 
he was heir to the concision and precision but most particularly to the ‘thinginess’ of things. Oppen doesn’t lose 
this. While his return to writing was more a restart from a significantly different perspective, and his later work 
which this dissertation considers offers quite distinct characteristics to the central body of work of the preceding 
decade, that attention to things in themselves remains inescapably at the core of Oppen’s ontology. Oppen is a 
rationalist in the post-18th century tradition in which transcendent revelation plays no part. Oppen makes no 
acknowledgement in the written record of the fundamental distinction between ‘dualistic knowing’ and ‘non- 
dualistic knowing’, the latter being the philosophical ground of the transcendent. Nor does he relate it to the 
phenomenological corollary of ‘knowing as being’ as an intellectual concept. Nonetheless, the former distinction 
is implicit in the dual self he picks up from the Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain and the latter he absorbs 
from the phenomenologies of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Certainly the sublime experience is central to 
Oppen’s experience, yet not for its transcendental implications. He is rather firmly in the dualistic-knowing camp 
with, perhaps, an unspoken longing for non-dualistic knowledge out of which it emerges. The ‘thinginess’ of 
things is fantastic and barely communicable in itself; the cumulative effect of those things is the wondrous 
summative and synergetic object which is the cosmos with the poet as part of it; but Oppen gives no credence, 
as far as the later poems are our evidence, to belief in any thing or non-thing beyond nature, no metaphysical 




















































“If we still possessed the word ‘is’, there would be no need to write poems.” George Oppen 
 
George Oppen’s return in the late 1950s to “a meditation on the nature of poetic thinking”2.2 
that, in Peter Nicholls’s words, would determine the whole shape of his subsequent poetic 
career, began in significant part with his finding a book on aesthetics by Jacques Maritain 
called Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry. As Mary Oppen recalled: “When we were first 
thinking of approaching coming back to the United States, and George was approaching 
beginning to write again, we picked up, at I suppose the American Library in Mexico, 
Maritain’s book, and we were immensely impressed and we discussed it a lot.”2.3 As Oppen 
wrote in a letter to his cousin, the painter and writer Ethel Schwabacher, in 1962: “There 
seems to me no problem for an artist more difficult than that of separating the brute ego, 
the accidents of the ego, from the self which perceives. Maritain says something of the sort, 
and I agree.”2.4 Nicholls has argued that Maritain’s text “provided [Oppen] with many of the 
core ideas of his mature poetics”2.5, and Oppen used a statement from Maritain to preface 
his return collection of poems, The Materials (1962): “We awake in the same moment to 
ourselves and to things” (NCP, 38). We can focus on the fact that Maritain made a key 
distinction, with which Oppen seems to have agreed, between a ‘creative self’ and the ‘self- 
centred ego’2.6. To quote Maritain: “at the root of the creative act there must be a quite 
particular intellectual process, without parallel in logical reason”2.7. His conception is of 
poetry as “an activity of the intelligence which is fundamentally distinct from that of ‘logical 
reason’”2.8, placing its origin in a “preconscious” carefully distinguished from an “automatic” 
or Freudian unconscious.2.9 In Nicholls' s words: “Maritain attributes to art the expression  
of that ‘radiance or clarity’, generated by the ‘illuminating image’, which liberates us from 
the ‘autonomous’ unconscious which, he says, is ‘deaf to the intellect, and structured into a 
world of its own apart from the intellect’”2.10. ‘Clarity’ was already a key word for Oppen 
given his Objectivist inheritance, and he would refocus on its significance in this second 
phase of his writing life. Charles Altieri identified the limitations of the pre-WWII Objectivist 
stance in the following terms: “insisting on objectivity establishes a pressure that easily leads 
to collapsing the energy of poetry into an energy of description, with no room for the full 
play of human emotions.”2.11 In 1969, Oppen himself referred to his then development as 




of vision.”2.12 Since: “Whatever may be doubted, the actuality of consciousness cannot be 
doubted” and “consciousness in itself, of itself carries the principle of actualness,”2.13 words 
we have already seen echoed in ‘Who Shall Doubt’ (NCP, 259). What developed was what 
Altieri called Oppen’s “phenomenological poetics”.2.11 
 
 
In 1981, Marjorie Perloff wrote: “The very titles of Oppen’s volumes […] express a concern 
for cognition: the poem, Oppen implies, is the only way to reconcile one’s disparate and 
contradictory perceptions of the external world, for here the recurrence of sound can 
mitigate against the undecidability of experience.”2.14 In the same essay collection, Norman 
M. Finkelstein suggests that “Consciousness, rather than mere perception, grows in 
importance” in Oppen’s writing as it evolves.2.15 He quotes from ‘Route’ in the Of Being 
Numerous (1968) collection (“Tell the life of the mind, the mind creates the finite”, NCP 199), 
adding: “As the poetry comes into full maturity, the objects of experience are subsumed into 
the subjective consciousness, even as consciousness, at the beginning [Discrete Series, 
1934], seems lost among objects.” This, for an Objectivist, he asserts, is “a process [that] has 
come full circle.”2.15 Equally important to ‘the creative self’ for Oppen would be Maritain’s 
sense of “poetic emotion” being not a “thing which serves as a kind of matter or material in 
the making of the work”, but as “form which, being one with the creative intuition, gives 
form to the poem, and which is intentional, as an idea is, or carries within itself infinitely 
more than itself.”2.10 For Oppen, this new found inspirational attention to an origin for poetic 
thinking, and even perhaps a process for poem making, must have resonated with his earlier 
aspirations (those which for him had foundered over the political imperatives of the 1930s, 
which the Imagist-inspired Objectivist poetics seemed unable to accommodate). 
 
 
Maritain writes: “creative emotion, losing its original state, objectivises itself in some 
respect”.2.16 Nicholls argues that the idea of objectification is Maritain’s “bulwark against 
mere imitation, on the one hand, and abstraction, on the other”, enabling Oppen to “discern 
a kind of ‘materialism’” in the “instantiating power of ‘Things’”2.17. According to Nicholls: “All 
of Oppen’s subsequent speculations about the nature of poetry and the poetic world would 
stem from [the] process of ‘awakening’ as a very special kind of ‘knowledge’, one for which, 
as Maritain put it, ‘there is no goal, no specifying end’, and which aspires to the condition of 
‘onotological simplicity’, following the example of the child ‘who seems simply astonished to 
be and condemns all our interests and their futility’”2.18. Although Oppen came afresh to 





between his earlier aspirations and the new found perspective that Maritain offered. With 
this, Oppen was brought to a radically fresh engagement with meaning and language. As he 
wrote at the time: “[I] must get back to what does exist…the language which can confront, 
can stand […] [as if] a poem may be devoted to giving clear meaning to [just] one word”.2.19 
 
 
2.2 Origin & Function 
 
“Back into the mind of my times.” Gary Snyder 
 
We will reflect in due course on current understanding within cognitive psychology of 
‘meaning’ as a mental construct based on ‘coherent organized knowledge’, prior to the 
attachment of verbalized (natural) language. In reflecting first on the earlier insights into 
cognition that were emerging in Oppen’s time, we ought also to consider the dominant 
hypothesis  on  the  origin,  acquisition,  and  (most  pertinent  to  the  objective  of  this  




The most influential school of linguistic theory over the past half century has been founded 
on the work of Noam Chomsky, long-time Professor of Linguistics at Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology. He championed the view of a ‘universal grammar’, literally the structure of 
relationships within which language will hang, as innate (arising from the genetically 
governed development of a child both pre- and post-birth) rather than its being acquired in 
childhood as a learned behaviour. Chomsky’s challenging of the ‘behaviourist’ school of 
psychologists, represented by figures such as B.F.Skinner, was part of the linguistic and 
anthropological hypotheses that came to underpin structuralist thinking in the late 1950s 
and 1960s. The same conference (in September 1956 at MIT) at which Chomsky 
deconstructed the established behaviourist theory of linguistics as simply a combinatorial 
statistics which had considered each word in a sentence as generated from the previous 
word (noun causing verb causing noun, for example), also saw the birth of practical ‘artificial 
intelligence’ (based in computational code that translates the language of philosophical 
logic, making possible the solution of complex problems) by Allen Newell and Herbert Simon; 
as well as George Miller’s identification of the limits of short-term ‘working’ memory (a 
maximum of seven bits).2.20 With these innovations, what became known as the ‘cognitive 
revolution’ (although not named as such until 1969) took off. We’ll consider the evidence for 
George Oppen’s possible awareness of these developments, as they emerge coincidentally 






In considering the origin of language as a distinctive characteristic of homo sapiens, 
Chomsky’s simple assertion is: “I cannot think of a coherent alternative to the idea that 
[evolutionary genetic] mutations take place in individuals, not communities, so that 
whatever rewiring of the brain yielded the apparently unique properties of language … 
would therefore have taken place in an individual, and only later been used among 
individuals who had inherited this capacity.”2.21 The evidence suggests that with climate 
change about 4 million years ago, our forest dwelling primate ancestors were edged on to 
the savannah. By 3.5 million years ago, Australopithecus was walking on two legs. By 2.5 
million years ago another upright ancestor, Homo Erectus, was additionally putting its hands 
to demonstrably good use making stone hand-axes. Whatever the potential advantages for 
such a social, hunting, tool-making, population that language might have conferred, there is 
no evidence in the angle of jaw bone to suggest necessary changes in larynx position, nor 
brain and spinal cord development necessary for the more sophisticated control of breathing 
required in speech. These changes only become evident in Homo Sapiens, appearing just 
some half million years ago. Current research has just a few hundred AMH (anatomically 
modern humans: the sub-species Homo Sapiens Sapiens) emerging from north east Africa 
about 195,000 years ago.2.22 
 
 
Language acquisition was among the issues addressed beyond linguistic academic circles to 
the wider intellectual community in Chomsky’s essay collection Language and Mind, 
published in 1968. It seems highly likely that Oppen would have known of Chomsky not least 
as an anti-Vietnam War activist with a growing political profile from the mid-1960s on. Up 
until mid-February 1967, the Oppens were living in New York and engaged in selected anti
-
 
War activities (for example, the march on Washington in February 1966).  Chomsky  
published his essay “The Responsibility of Intellectuals” in a New York Review of Books 
special supplement on 23rd February 1967, which attracted much attention, and which he 
expanded during 1968 into book form as American Power and the New Mandarins, published 
in 1969.2.23 Taking the idea of language function further, to quote Chomsky again: “If the 
rewiring of the brain… took place in an individual, not a group …, then interaction must have 
been a later phenomenon. Language would have evolved first as an internal object, a kind 
of language of thought [my italics], with externalisation (hence communication) an ancillary 
process…There are ample reasons why having a language of thought would confer 





denied to others. If that advantage is partially transmitted to descendants, at some later 
stage there would be opportunity for communication, and motivation to develop a means 
of externalising the internal language of thought – a process that might not involve evolution 
[further genetic mutation] at all; perhaps it was a matter of problem solving using available 
cognitive mechanisms. This is, of course, speculation, like all talk about the evolution of 
language. But it is the minimal assumption… The conclusion, quite plausible I think, is that 
while language can surely be used for communication (as can much else), communication 
probably has no special role in its design or evolution.”2.24 In a further succinct restatement 
by Chomsky pertinent to Oppen’s poetic objectives: “The quality of language that makes it 
unique does not seem to be so much its role in communicating directives for action or other 
common features of animal communication, but rather its role in symbolizing, in evoking 
cognitive images [my italics], in moulding our notion of reality and yielding our capacity for 
thought and planning, through its property of allowing infinite combinations of symbols and 
therefore mental creation of possible worlds [my italics].”2.25 
 
 
2.3 Mind’s Place 
 
“Who’s that?”  Jack Kerouac 
 
In Oppen’s case, Chomsky’s positing of language’s role in the ‘mental creation of possible 
worlds’ comes sharply into focus. Oppen had a very particular concern to burrow down into 
the experientially and conceptually ‘possible’, and therefore also its obverse, the 
‘impossible’, and then into the transposition of meaningful experience into language. In his 
short essay ‘The Mind’s Own Place’, Oppen wrote that: “the emotion which creates art is the 
emotion which seeks to know and to disclose”2.26 He then puts his own individual mental 
pursuit of ‘knowing’ and ‘disclosing’ into the context of his wider poetry culture. He refers 
to the origin of modern American poetry beginning “with the determination to find the 
image”, which he also calls “the thing encountered” and “the thing seen every day whose 
meaning has become the meaning and color of our lives”. In reaction against the “rhetoric 
of exaggeration, of inflation”, he asserts that verse “was to the modernists a skill of accuracy, 
of precision, a test of truth”. He quotes from Denise Levertov’s poem ‘Matins’, which begins 
with the words “The authentic!” and goes on to define the events of a domestic morning: 
the steam rising in the radiators and the family breakfast, to the moment when, the children 
being sent to school, “cold air/comes in at the street door”2.27. These are “as poetry intends”, 
both “clear pictures of the world” and opportunities “to make it possible to grasp” and “to 




1963. In Daybook II:I, “papers bound into a small makeshift book”2.29, dating from 1963-66, 
Oppen also writes: “I do not think that a poem can be filled with meaning by being filled, like 
a bag or a jug, with words”2.30. Oppen is coming at language from a perspective in which “the 
structure of meaning is that which restores the words to clarity”2.30. The meaning precedes 
the language which in major respects then fails to catch it. “The word is the burden [Oppen’s 
underlining], the words are the burden, of the line which it must [‘bear’, he crosses out, 
replacing with…] lift [his italics] up into meaning”2.30. While assessing these possibilities and 
impossibilities inherent in language as Oppen found them in the mental creation and 
expression of possible worlds, we will explore current research opinion on the nature of 




From a 21st century perspective, in examining the link between Oppen’s thought and 
language as he described it, we can adopt what linguists today would consider both a 
cognitive and an experientialist approach. Cognitive linguists Andrea Tyler and Vyvyan Evans, 
for example, refer to their study of prepositions as: “It is cognitive in that we assume that 
meanings do not match up with a mind-independent objective reality. Rather, ‘reality’ is 
determined by the nature of our bodies and our neuro-anatomical architecture, as well as 
the physical world we inhabit. Hence the meanings encoded in language relate to and reflect 
our conceptual system, which constitutes our ‘representation’ of reality.”2.31 Equally, the 
approach is experientialist, since “we acknowledge that our representation of reality is 
contingent upon a world out there, which in turn is meaningful, precisely because it, and our 
interactions with it, have non-trivial consequences for our survival.”2.31 Tyler and Evans 
explore the semantics of selected English language prepositions, examples of some of those 
‘small words’ that Oppen took so seriously and to which we will be returning; in their case, 
examples of prepositional small words that reflect our conceptualisation of spatial relations 
in language. This is an insight to which we will return in more detail when considering the 




The symbolic representation of reality which is our ‘conceptualisation’ of it, having 
Chomsky’s likely evolutionary origin and the individual advantage of mental creativity we 
now take for granted, is now also embedded in shared externalised language and cultures 





phrases, whether spoken or written, are embedded in larger lexical segments as well as 
linked through myriad connotative allusions to the wider world, in other words they are 
contextualized. Cognitive linguists would say that “language itself radically underdetermines 
the rich interpretations regularly assigned to naturally occurring utterances.”2.32 Therein, of 
course, is the later Oppen’s dilemma: “utterances serve as prompts for the elaboration of 
cognitive structure, which includes the interlocutors’ knowledge … and their prior 
experiences of the world, including their prior experience with language.”2.32 Oppen wants 
to express what can seem deeply inexpressible in his own experience and share it with his 
reader. He is therefore obliged to stay within intelligibly normative language forms while 
stretching those limits of a shared grammar and syntax beyond the norm in order to find 
additional, communicable, semantic possibilities. Every time we come to a close-reading 
analysis of later Oppen poems, we might recognise in Oppen’s work that which Tyler and 
Evans refer to as a ‘principled polysemy model’ in the study of meaning, “the way 
meanings
 
are systematically extended”2.33 and “the nature of semantic polysemy networks
”2.33 so
 
engendered. The methodology both identifies primary semantic senses among 
multiple
 
possibilities and distinguishes between “senses which are instantiated in 
memory and those
 
which are constructed on-line for the purposes of local interpretation 
of a lexical item as it
 
occurs in context.”2.34 We can read an Oppen word-phrase-sentence, 
acknowledge its varied
 







begin to appreciate the possibilities of interrelationship in a 
network of additional reference
 
and allusion to which the simple signifiers can only 
prompt – knowing that, for Oppen, this
 






coming up in the fields we learned those
 
rural words later we thought it was ocean the flood
 
of the ocean the light
 
of the world help me I am
 
 












‘The Natural’, NCP 281
 
 

































conventional whole, there is an opportunity for the wayward, the semantically off-piste. 
Small clues are suggestive not conclusive. Assertive propositional answers are absent on the 
partial scale. This is what Oppen offers us by cutting up even his short phrases into bits, the 
one-word or two-word lines, the suspended line endings, the pauses in the spaces between 
words and between lines. If we read his poems slowly, giving attention to the isolated words 
and partial phrase, to the semantic possibilities which have room in the spaces to emerge in 
our memory and imagination, an apparently slight assemblage of, say, thirty words becomes 
a gateway to substantial experience beyond the immediate horizon. 
 
2.4 I Have Seen My Own Cranium2.35 
 
“Reality leaves a lot to the imagination.” John Lennon 
 
We can look more closely at the conceptual nature of meaning in linguistic semantic studies, 
if we accept ‘meaning’ to be the " conceptual structures encoded in language." 2.36 It is then 
no  longer  tenable to assume meaning refers directly  to  the  world.  Language  references  
concepts which themselves arise from re-formulated percepts – a percept being a mental 
construct that follows a sensorimotor experience or perhaps an internal emotional response. 
The percepts are the raw data, the stimuli, from which our brains conjure conceptual 
structures. It is our cognitive processing which constructs the patterns and organization we 
call reality, and which mediates between the external world and our perception of it. These 
are changes to “the organization of our perceptions, by mental operations to which we do 
not have conscious access.”2.37 As linguist and philosopher Ray Jackendoff puts it: “We have 
conscious access only to the projected world – the world as unconsciously organized by the 
mind.”2.38 An interesting contemporary description of this from the evidence of cognitive and 
neuroscientific studies is ‘global workspace theory’, a model which proposes a "momentarily 
active, subjectively experienced" event in working memory, the "inner domain in which we 
can rehearse telephone numbers to ourselves or in which we carry on the narrative of our 
lives. It is usually thought to include inner speech and visual imagery."2.39 As for language, 
“Semantic structures [meanings] are conceptual structures established by linguistic 
convention – the form which thoughts must assume for purposes of ready linguistic 
symbolization. Thus, semantic structure is conventionalised conceptual structure.”2.40 We 
may ask: if the conceptual determines the semantic, then, as poets juggling the semantic 
structure of language, may we not in turn, by feed-back, influence conceptual structure in 
the receptive reader? Changes to one might surely contribute to redefining the other and 







By the final decade of his writing life, Oppen’s questions seem naturally to arise out of his 
uncertainties. As Eliot Weinberger puts it in his Introduction to the New Collected Poems: 
“[Oppen] no longer had any answers, and struggled with the precise articulation of his 
uncertainties.”2.40 Uncertainties about what? For the Oppen of the 1970s there are certainly 
the conventional anxieties, even fears, which accompany advancing age – the opening poem 
of his last collection, Primitive (1978), is an obvious example with its “sad and hungry // wolf 
walks in my footprints” (NCP 265). The Selected Letters alone show something of the detailed 
assimilation of experience at the biographical level, which by the 1960s and 1970s included 
continuing social and political concerns (such as anti-Vietnam War and Civil Rights issues), as 
well as intellectual and literary debate. However, aside also from reflections on his traumatic 
wartime experience and post-war political exile, Oppen is preoccupied in his later writing 
with the relationship between outer and inner worlds, what today we would term questions 
of cognition, which lie at the root of what it is to be a reflective human being. While the 
following chapters trace the cognitive issues in relation to Oppen in more detail, it is clear 
that Oppen’s inward turn which led first to the writing he would call ‘Needle’s Eye’ arose in 
significant part from the emotional upheaval which followed his being awarded the Pulitzer 
Prize in May 1969. I have therefore traced the biographical facts and emotional impact as it 
resonated in Oppen through his correspondence and have included this as ‘A Simple Realism’ 
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‘It’s there. It’s true.’3.1 
 
3.1 Ask the Typewriter 
 
“How are the poem’s possibilities to be released?” The Enthusiast 
 
Oppen’s late ‘poetry of conjecture’ is focused, as we shall see, on speculative proposition 
rather than assertive argument. In 1984, the year of Oppen’s death, Charles Altieri was 
writing in just such conjectural terms of the poet Robert Creeley’s work, and we might apply 
aspects of that analysis to the later Oppen in being “an appeal to locate the place of poetry 
and poetic logic in the dialectical possibilities that arise when we reflect upon our own 
processes of thinking and writing.”3.2 The difference in Oppen’s case is that his attention is 
largely focussed on his responses, both emotional and intellectual, to an impinging external 
world, rather than the inner emotional landscapes characteristic of Creeley. This is to 
simplify both poets, of course, and we shall explore the subtleties of Oppen’s approach, but 
the basic point is that Oppen, Objectivist to the end, never loses his interest in the sensory 
nature of ‘external’ material experience. Three years earlier, as already mentioned, Norman 
Finkelstein had also written specifically in connection with Oppen’s mid-career collection 
This In Which (1965), of Oppen’s poetry as “an astonishingly fruitful outgrowth of 
Modernism”, that being a movement almost obsessively concerned with ‘process’ and a 
resistance to ‘closure’.3.3 As an outgrowth, Finkelstein identifies in Oppen’s work “the object 
of the poem [that] allows for subjective statements while simultaneously calling for a 
scrupulous  interrogation  of  the  subject  that  deigns  to  speak .”  This  is  Oppen ’s  test  of truth, a   
  poetry  “resolved  and  not  resolved”.3.4  As  Oppen  described  it  himself:  “The  nouns  do 
 
refer  





























































Finkelstein puts it, a poem might “[call] attention to the distance between reality and 
language” which
 


































of these, sensory experience to mental meaning and thence to linguistic expression.  



















































































faith is predicated upon what he conceives to be ontological and epistemological verities, it 
is still merely a matter of faith, of the belief that the ways in which we know and describe 
the world correspond to what actually is.”3.7 Such assertions that constitute knowledge, for 
all their acknowledged limitations, nonetheless are free to be speculatively notional. In 
making sense of experience we may find more than one possibility for ‘what is’. We may 
have a spectrum of possibilities between direct assertions regarding experience and  
tentative assertions that experience equally engenders. To match language to this spectrum 
from fully to partially coherent conceptual structures that contribute to knowledge, 
especially where we hope to keep more than one ‘simultaneously’ open to consideration, 
brings us to such literary devices not only of the ‘luminous detail’ and le mot juste but of the 
unresolved metaphor and the speculative proposition, the latter being so evident in Oppen’s 
late work and to which we will return. 
 
 
Michael Heller recalled first meeting Oppen and his wife in New York in 1967.3.8 In a 
subsequent exchange of letters Oppen talked of “the act of writing” as all that should  
“and can sustain discussion”. This echoes Zukofsky’s ‘writing is writing’, and Heller and 
Oppen discussed “the absence of prescription, the refusal to impose a stylistics or 
mode…[placing] the poem back, nakedly, with its maker”.3.9 Who or what is this ‘maker’ that 
makes a poem? In Oppen’s words: “Is it a poetry that one writes? Don’t answer/ Is it a poetry 
that one writes? alright: one’s typewriter and one’s desk could answer this.”3.10 Before 
considering Oppen’s use of any literary device such as the speculative proposition, let’s be 
sure that current thinking in the cognitive sciences tallies with the overview that Oppen 
seems to assume of ‘percept-to-concept-to-expression’, in a conceptual world that at least 
correlates with ‘what actually is’, as a valid model of the ‘maker’. 
 
 
3.2 Grounded Cognition & Simulation 
 
“The man who cannot visualize a horse galloping on a tomato is an idiot” Andre Breton 
 
Brain imaging studies have revealed that saying just one single word causes a unique pattern 
of neural activity to ripple across the cortex.3.11 Particular words will ‘light up’ particular areas 
of the brain. For example, “screwdriver” will typically activate the motor cortex which is 
heavily involved in controlling bodily movement. It is difficult not to draw the conclusion that 
the word is triggering memories of handling a screwdriver in that part of the brain. This is 
known as embodied cognition and the kinaesthetic is but one modal area (the others being 





pre-linguistic conceptual, and verbalized, languages) “seem all to be interconnected.”3.12 
While ‘embodied’ cognition is the commonly used term, researchers in the field prefer the 
term ‘grounded’ reflecting the fact that cognition can be grounded in other ways (for 
example, by simulation, social interaction and the environment) in addition to bodily action. 
Grounded cognition emphasizes that conceptual processing relies heavily on modality- 
specific simulations to represent ‘experience’ and that the same type of representations 
underlie both perception and conception.3.13 The rather static ‘concept’ label has thus been 
relabelled by some researchers as ‘simulator’ and is envisaged as a distributed neural 




The notion of simulation in fact lies at the core of grounded cognition and takes us even 
closer to what we might call the representation of meaning. The premise is that the 
conceptual system of any individual brain contains all of that person’s knowledge of the 
world. In reductionist terms, it represents components of experience: settings, objects, 
people, actions, events, mental states, properties and relations. These are, as yet, mental 
representations that precede transcription into natural, and therefore shared, language. 
Nonetheless we might feel the substructure is echoed in Oppen’s use of natural language 
which has been described as “raw and unformed”; his language “pared down to the most 
basic essentials: what can be said poetically by other poets in five words, Oppen will say in 
three.”3.14 And as for what he ‘knows’, for what holds ‘meaning’ for him: “His view of the 
world that surrounds him is presented through the most basic elements from which that 
world is made up: grass and trees, stone and rock, sea and ocean, sunlight and shadow.”3.15 
There is little reason to suppose a gross distinction exists between the mental representation 
of the concept ‘stone’ that is implied by the natural language signifier that is ‘stone’, while 
we also recognise the gross approximation that is the signifier ‘stone’ when we reflect on 
the details of one individual example against another. Since the underlying mental 
representations are ‘symbolic’, conceptual knowledge supports a wide variety of cognitive 
operations on those representations including: categorization, inference, the manipulation 
of propositions, and the “productive creation of novel representations”3.13 – in other words, 
the ability to speculate and imagine through new combinations. These basic operations then 
support the spectrum of more complex cognitive activities that includes high level 







In the case of language, as the outward product of underlying structure and process, the  
essential ingredients of any theory of language based on empirical evidence include symbolic 
operations, statistical processing, and grounding. The requirement for symbols is self- 
evident and, for dynamic operations between them, unavoidable. The statistical distribution 
of word senses has been shown to contribute to ambiguity resolution during syntactic 
analysis.3.16 Indeed, statistical distribution of argument structures and their instantiations 
have been shown to contribute to sentence processing.3.17 And then grounding is shown to 
be central to comprehension since, to comprehend a text, research shows we construct 
simulations to represent perceptual, motor, and emotional content. The motor system 
influences cognition as cognition influences the motor system. The sense is of a conceptual 
system that doesn’t just record inputs, it interprets. Interpretation requires as a prerequisite 
the ability to ‘categorize’. Categorization means the alignment of individual perceptions to a 
bank of memorized experiences. Interpretation then supports the production of inference, 
taking cognition beyond perceptual input. So it is interpretation as a simulation that supports 
the formulation and manipulation of propositions, where a proposition is a representational 
structure      enabling the recognition of distinctions.  In short: “Interpretation  is  productive, 
supporting the construction of complex conceptual representations from simpler ones.”3.18 
As an experience occurs (e.g. sitting down on a chair), the brain captures states across the 
modalities and integrates them with a multimodal representation stored in memory (e.g. 
how a chair looks and feels, the action of sitting, introspections of comfort and relaxation). 
Later, when knowledge is needed to represent the category ‘chair’, multimodal 
representations captured during experiences with its instances are reactivated to simulate 
how the brain represented perception, action, and introspection associated with it: “The 
presence of simulation mechanisms across diverse cognitive processes suggests that 
simulation provides a core form of computation in the brain.”3.19 The outcome is part of the 
rich creation of possible worlds evident in Oppen, a writing through of the precision of his 
pro-active imag(e)-ination. The grounded cognition hypothesis is well established and, 
arising from it, cognitive linguists have proposed an ‘image schema’ basis to mental 
processing in moving from experience to the manipulations of meaning and language. It is 
therefore instructive to consider image schemas and their relation to the speculative 












3.3 The Poetic Proposition 
 
“The line may find it impossible to mean just what it says.” Peter Middleton 
 
 
A simple assertive proposition such as ‘the cat sat on the mat’ becomes simplistically more 
speculatively propositional in ‘the cat may have sat on the mat’, which is but one point on a 
spectrum that could include a variety of cats which may or may not have sat on any particular 
mat, all the way to the cat in question being both (or is it neither?) dead and alive but 
hovering in a superposition of states in a Schrodinger box, which might or might not even 
have a mat in it. Peter Middleton has referred to the retreat from assertive propositional 
form in the later Oppen: “Opacity and semantic uncertainty…is not only disruptive in the 
zone of reference, it also fractures intentionality, propositionality, affirmation, and 
truthfulness, features of language use which are notoriously difficult to conceptualise and 
hence contentious within literary theory.”3.20 A detailed examination of Oppen’s relationship 
to Hegelian philosophy and the ‘speculative proposition’ in relation to the opening poem of 
Seascape: Needle’s Eye, has been made by Peter Nicholls3.21, and commented upon by 
Middleton.3.22 Without offering a précis of those studies, I wish to emphasise a couple of key 
points. Robert Duncan’s criticism of Oppen in the 1960s (part of the reason that his and  
Donald Allen’s revisionary anthology New Writing in the USA (1967) failed to include him) 
was of “a tin ear and a slow foot”, insufficient to offset his asset of “earnestness”.3.23 If there 
was “too little music, too much assertion”3.24 in Oppen’s poetry of that decade, a time when 
Duncan concedes that there were inescapable social and political opinions for any thinking 
individual “to bear witness to”3.25, by Seascape: Needle’s Eye (1972) the sonority and subtlety 
of meaning were in better balance, and the propositions less assertive and more speculative. 
 
 
Peter Middleton has made reference to a brief commentary on Oppen by Language poet 
Charles Bernstein in which the propositional features.3.26 In Middleton’s terms, Bernstein 
objects to “resolution by the closing statement” in which “a proposition … makes claims on 
the reader.” Oppen’s avoidance of this in his later poetic practice is partly through the use 
of what Bernstein calls a ‘hinge’: “a special use of the line break or carefully managed varying 
interval hovering between cut and continuity that crucially forgoes the propositional 
wrap.”3.26 Middleton reminds us that “hinges are devices for controlling the opening and 
closing of spaces”; while Oppen “may not be engaged in the opening of the field”, he does 







We might note the example of the opening poem in Myth of the Blaze, ‘Latitude, Longitude’ 
(NCP, 237), a title suggestive of taking bearings, identifying one’s position, defining place, 
with its closing proposition indeed as that which “defines poetry”, no less. The proposition 
might seem assertive and yet Oppen draws back to something more tentative through his 
‘hinge’ technique. The proposition opens: “…if we could // find all / the gale’s evidence …” – 
if we could, what then? – “what message / is there for us in these / glassy bottles…”.The 
answer seems clearly unambiguous: “the Encyclopedist was wrong”, except Oppen writes it 
“the Encyclopedist // was wrong…”, with a double line break casting momentary pause in 
the reading, momentary doubt of the apparent absolute. Nonetheless, “was wrong” is 
followed immediately on the same line by “was wrong”, repeated seemingly for emphasis 
or is it as hesitant question; and then straight into why: “was wrong many things / too foolish 
/ to sing / may be said…”. The Encyclopedist gathers facts but draws no principle from his or 
her collection; putting his or her evidence in those glass bottles, those poems, as the 
lepidopterist pins butterflies and puts them in their neat rows under glass. “What message 
/ is there for us…” – Oppen answers it is not mere collection. What then is it? Does he know? 
What he does know, or what he strongly feels, is “many things / too foolish / to sing”. Is it 
foolish to sing? What things could be so foolish, too foolish? Or is it so clear, where “many 
things” is followed by a line break, with “too foolish” then standing alone, almost as a 
question; and then “to sing” thrown out also in its own small line. Why? Is there a necessary 
conventionally syntactic thread here, or do the breaks between, the separations, the ‘hinge’ 
between each assertion, imply something more, something far less certain than the 
superficially propositional statement? While too foolish to sing, they yet “may be said…” is 
a prosaic assertion of a prosaic alternative. Read prosaically: “many things too foolish to sing 
may be said” is a straight assertion of the effectiveness of the Encyclopedist’s methodology 
– of course so much may simply be said and why not? And yet “to sing” stands out and sings 
in our ear, so that when Oppen concludes with “this matter- / of-fact defines” we are left 
wondering whether it is what “may be said” that defines or the singing that is the matter of 
fact and which itself does the defining – for the facts prosaically spoken may define the 
activity “poetry” by inclusion, or they may actually define it by exclusion, putting the poetic 
outside those ‘matters- of-fact.’ Perhaps wisdom sings while all that is merely ‘said’ is foolish. 
 
 
It’s interesting to note that Oppen pursues the very questions he has set up in the first poem 
in the opening of the second in this collection (NCP, 238). It is not a coincidence that so 





and not ‘tell the world’ but “tell while the world // speaks”. Through the prosaic noise of a 
world speaking, what is the poet’s identifiable signal? What it certainly is not, in the mind 
of the later Oppen, is “an advanced form of rhetoric.”3.27 In full, he says: “the poet’s business 
is not to use verse as an advanced form of rhetoric, nor to seek to give political statements 
the aura of eternal truth”.3.27 Propositional assertions become claims to eternal truths too 
easily in egocentric verse. As Middleton comments: “Statements in themselves are not the 
problem; affirming them without reserve is.”3.26 What Oppen offers is aspects of 
reservation. So what Middleton refers to as Oppen’s lacunary poetic structure, with its 
blanks and hiatuses, successfully distances writer and reader from the conventions of 
prosaic syntax and the assertive propositional forms that such syntax delineates. In Nicholl’s 
words, therefore: “Oppen’s new [1970s] work might be read as a search for ever more 
extreme ways of recovering that ‘is’ of being by freeing language from the closure of 




3.4 Poetic Singularities 
 
“my piece of being” George Oppen 
 
Nicholls goes on to describe this preoccupation in Oppen’s late work as “the grammatical 
conditions of poetic singularity,”3.29 meaning the conditions in which a reader might identify 
poetic isolation from outside contextual, let alone overarching, cultural reference – part of 
Oppen’s desire  to  express  his  own  exclusive  direct  experience.
3.30a
 Oppen  seeks  to  step  
outside what literary critic Timothy Clark identifies as the “general narratives (à la 
Lyotard)”3.31, the metanarratives characteristic of modernism. Interesting that Oppen’s 
explorations predate the identification by Lyotard in 1979 of what he called the 
“postmodern …incredulity  towards  metanarratives"3.30b  –  those  many  ‘language  games’  
identified, not least, by Wittgenstein. The postmodern, poststructuralist, question which 
Lyotard put concisely is: “Where, after the metanarratives, can legitimacy reside?”.3.30 For 
Oppen, the answer in his writing of that decade had been in the speculative identity that 
was himself as poet in relation to the poem made, assembled in what Veronica Forrest- 
Thompson on the opposite side of the Atlantic was concurrently referring to as the product 
of poetic ‘artifice’.3.32 
 
 
Occasional intertextual references apart, Oppen’s later work leans mostly on his direct 
apprehension of sensory experience and its relationship to expression, both immediately 




distinguished in Oppen’s thinking from any ‘stream of consciousness’ or ‘automatic’ writing 
– he is far too deliberate a poet for that – nonetheless, it is the ‘process’ of translating 
experience into language that determines both the form and the dominant content of the 
poems themselves. To characterise this in literary theoretical terms, separate from any 
specific stylistics analysis, is to clarify a working methodology in a post-structuralist stance 
in which we cannot trust language systems to convey particular truths, therefore any truth 
is unreliable (even those we deliberately construct). In semiotic terms, we cannot trust the 
sign = (signifier + signified) formula; there is too much uncertainty in that sign-signifier 
relationship. So language systems are thoroughly inadequate for exchanging ‘meaning’; 
which leaves us only with a conceptual instability that Jacques Derrida called ‘freeplay’. This, 
of course, represents a move away from assertive or didactic forms in literary language as 




If the Oppen of the early 1970s is writing on that cusp of the structuralist/post-structuralist 
transition in literary and cultural conversation, and unconsciously reflecting elements of 
both analyses, the ‘singular’ interpretation of his work seems no less valid. Literary 
singularity as it arose as a concept in the work of Heidegger, Gadamer and Blanchot, is 
considered to be (in Clark’s words): “a mode of singular inventiveness in language, one 
which, while necessarily based on given conventions and rubrics, may at times exceed being 
understood in terms of any pre-given norms of understanding or morals. Its singular and 
untranslatable texture may render literary language an ‘event’, i.e. something that cannot 
be fully understood theoretically, but which, by engaging the reader in its specific 
performance (word by word or line by line in the unfolding text) comes to project the reader 
suitable to it in ways that could not have been foreseen. It may also, if only in a small or 
fleeting way, transform the person who ‘understands it’, and may be capable of 
transforming the conventions and understanding which made up its initial readability.”3.33 
If we were to ‘define’ the later poetics of George Oppen, this element of self-containment 
would surely contribute. His poems undoubtedly have what Gadamer and Blanchot would 
call(post-structurally)uncertain status as modes of knowledge,3.34 evident in the ambiguity 
and author-acknowledged ‘unreliability’ of their language as signs. However, they also 
express what Derrida would call a claim (a ‘truth-claim’) in the structuralist manner to be 
saying something valid beyond Oppen’s own culturally-conjured conscious persona.3.35 





and language of expression, as a mental coherence and a ‘truth’ worth exploring, a truth 
about human experience shared with others. The construct that is 21st century cognitive 
psychology in fact makes the same assumption. 
 
This dissertation is neither an exposition of post-structuralist thought nor an analysis of 
Oppen’s later work from any one literary critical theoretical viewpoint. I have taken Marjorie 
Perloff’s sceptical but scholarly stance regarding literary criticism, in which affiliations too 
often “draw on theoretical/historical paradigms rather than on actual literary works. […] I’ve 
always felt sceptical toward such allegiances – largely, no doubt, because the adoption of a 
theoretical model always puts the literary work in a secondary position – a position where 
the poem can be no more than an example of X or a cultural symptom of Y.”3.36 The ‘singular’ 
nature of Oppen’s later work seems to me to offer positive, if singular, knowledge, in the 
sense that it explores aspects of an objective mental reality that is less well-served by textual 
explanation through other critiques, such as historical placement or politics of identity. This 
is not to say that it’s not of its time – riding the wave of a cognitive revolution, albeit 
unacknowledged – nor entirely without aspects of aged, white, Jewish, male, bourgeois, 
identities we might ascribe to it. But the artefacts that are Oppen’s later poems are in many 
ways singular in themselves and my literary critical methodology is to treat them as such, in 
the manner of a scholarly, if somewhat reductive, scientific analytical approach through 
which we may identify interesting parallels with the discoveries of cognitive science. As 
Martin McQuillan put it in 2005 T “theory  has now  entered  the  mainstream  of         
humanities;”3.37 however, theory in the context of the humanities and literary criticism in  
particular is exactly that – theory as hypothesis, as interpretation, which will always be 
limited essentially to opinion, however well-informed that opinion. Such hypotheses are, in 
comparison with those of the natural sciences, unfalsifiable, and therefore forever lack a 
confirmed generality that typically turns hypothesis into, at least provisional, fact. Belief 
systems and the knowledge or ‘truth-claims’ that underpin them are all positioned on the 
spectrum having extreme subjectivity at one end and absolute objectivity at the other; 
structuralist and post-structuralist standpoints must also take up their positions variously on 
that judgmental scale. However, the positive point that recommends all interpretations, 
whether all-encompassing schools of thought or more localised scholarship on aspects of 
interest, is that they assist in our understanding and appreciation of a literary work. 
 
 
While the disciplines of cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics that we are considering 




we should be mindful of the fact that the dominant methods of literary criticism in our own 
day (those that define works in terms of their cultural politics) typically aspire also to offer 
broadly deterministic (albeit unfalsifiable) interpretations – everything written being 
‘determined’ by the conditions of its making. To treat something alternatively as ‘singular’ is 
to see it as, in Clark’s words: “irreplaceable, sole witness of what it says, an example only of 
itself, and thus ‘free’ in the sense of not being fully intelligible in the broadly deterministic 
categories which strive to explain all in terms of social location.”3.38 As readers we are also 
free to challenge assumptions and render interpretations. The singular case, the ‘particular’ 
which is the focus of all literary creations, is always potentially exceptional. As Clark puts it, 
echoing Hannah Arendt, the uniqueness of every individual offers the ‘capacity to create 
new realities’3.39, and “for every new reader … it is still a first time.”3.40 Beyond the 
speculatively propositional phrase we may have the speculatively propositional poem as an 
assemblage of speculatively propositional components, a technique I have explored in my 
own [Happenstance] series. Indeed, in late Oppen, it is often at the scale of each poem, 
‘discrete’ in the series which is always an Oppen collection, that the speculatively 
propositional presents itself as a device. In the words of Language poet Lyn Hejinian, writing 
in 1990, “words work” only because “people agree on what they mean”.3.41 This is the 
inherently arbitrary nature of language, identified early in the 20th century by Swiss linguist 
Ferdinand de Saussure, and a central tenet of French structuralist thinking of the 1960s and 
1970s. If “anything made of words – including a literary work – is socially constructed and 
socially constructing”3.42, there is a generative capability within it, and this is where Oppen’s 
aspirations for his own poetic process lie. It’s presumably also where he hoped his readers’ 
interest would be grasped. Oppen challenges himself to identify chosen meanings from a 
polysemic reality, but he doesn’t wish to restrict the possibilities of detail that memory might 
conjure in a reader, nor limit his own wealth of allusion that, of necessity, he must distil into 
single words. At times he identifies a precise subject but reaches for the words that might 
express it. At other times he seems uncertain of a precise subject because his response to 
his experience is complex and multi-faceted. In that case the language, however precise the 
words, at a phrasal or stanzaic level is more complex, multi-dimensional rather than linear; 
it reaches out to offer multiple possibilities. Rachel Blau DuPlessis, as witness, has described 
Oppen in action: “Hunting. George searches the orts and scraps for a palimpsested poem in 
the dark house and comes into the soft kitchen mumbling in one or another line no this won’t 
do so that the contestation enters cadence; poem articulated and questioned he disappears 









3.5 The Cognitive Context 
 
“ [a] literary equivalent of the scientist […] not the entertainer”  George Oppen 
 
Oppen’s poetry of the late 1960s and 1970s was written at a time when early cognitive 
studies ranged across aspects of psychology, anthropology and linguistics, and the nascent 
fields of artificial intelligence, computer science and the neurological sciences. Coincident 
with Oppen’s later writing, as philosopher Peter Strawson expressed it in 1969: “the 
semantic and syntactic rules or conventions [that determine] the meanings of sentences” 
was the dominant research project in linguistics.3.44 For Chomsky, the objective was further 
“to discover the principles of universal grammar that lie beyond particular rules or 
conventions.”3.45 In emerging cognitive psychology the concern was, as Jerome Bruner put 
it, with the “effort to establish meaning as the central concept of psychology […] Its aim was 
to discover and to describe formally the meanings that human beings created out of their 
encounters with the world, and then to propose hypotheses about what meaning-making 
processes were implicated.”3.46 Oppen’s struggle with his own experience (how to 
understand it and how to express it) can almost be seen as his informal contribution to these 
evolving fields of study. In this, Oppen on his mid-life return to poetry, fits into a second- 
wave modernist poetry context, one characteristic of which was that the more self- 
consciously innovative 20th century poets were readily receptive to scientific influence, not 
merely as content but as research process. Ezra Pound had initiated this interest (from his 
own 19th century antecedents, such as Walt Whitman and the painter J.A.M.Whistler) by 
identifying the ‘exploratory’ practice of science and the ‘provisional’ nature of its knowledge. 
Both these facets could be transferred to poetic practice, without any necessary regard for 
scientific subject matter. Between First and Second World Wars, plenty of English and 
American poets were influenced by scientific facts, ideas, and language,3.48 but perhaps only 
Pound seemed seriously to pursue an explicit research project in his Cantos. It took Charles 
Olson’s rediscovery of the research principle after WWII, to be taken up by others such as 
Robert Duncan, before Middleton’s ‘poetic right of experiment and inquiry’ took flight. Over 
two decades later, by the time of Oppen’s last published collection in 1978, it would be the 
Language writers initiating texts assembled as questions and tentative answers in the 






“the language of poetry is a language of inquiry”3.50, a poetry having “rigor, patience, 
thoroughness,”3.51 descriptive terms strongly characteristic of George Oppen’s later work. 
 
 
Beyond the conjectural nature of his poetic inquiry, it is clear that Oppen was working in an 
intellectual climate in which scientific information was readily available and very much ‘in 
the air’, as Pound had earlier in the century referred to such influences.3.52 We have no way 
of knowing the extent to which Oppen was or was not in any sense a regular reader of such 
journals as Scientific American, a journal that Peter Middleton has used as “an authentic 
glimpse of unfolding scientific research … as it happen[ed]” in his recent study of mid-century 
Cold War American poetry.3.53 However, Middleton does identify direct referencing of this 
journal’s contents by some of Oppen’s fellow poets: Charles Olson, Robert Duncan, Ed Dorn, 
and Jackson Mac Low, specifically during the 1960s.3.53 He also argues for its significance in 
“create[ing] a context for poems” by Gary Snyder, Amiri Baraka, and in the specific case of 
‘Of Being Numerous’ of Oppen himself. Middleton refers to Oppen “being as curious as Mac 
Low, Duncan, and Armantrout about what the scientists were publishing about their 
work”,3.54 and references Oppen’s 1960s’ Daybook comments on the ‘epistemological 
naivety’ of student understanding of the ethics and politics behind the various knowledge 
discourses, including the scientific; as well as Oppen’s Daybook criticism of a generally 
inadequate recognition of the etymological distinctions between terms such as ‘reality’, 
‘nature’, and ‘physical existence’.3.54 In September 1965, a Scientific American special issue 
focused on social scientific responses to problems of city living (e.g. land use, transportation, 
services). Referring to Oppen’s ‘Numerous’ poem in the 1968 collection, Middleton argues 
for Oppen’s interest in exactly these sociological issues, with his attention to Hegel’s 
‘speculative concept’ (the speculative proposition) as a “counter [to] a positivist sociology as 
well as a rigidly Marxist one. Philosophy was a form of social theory for him [Oppen].”3.55 
Through the example of the ‘Cities’ edition of Scientific American, Middleton relates the 
“preoccupations of Oppen’s poem” as “a reminder of just how attuned Oppen was to the 
intellectual debates of his time.”3.55 Having identified “strong verbal resonances” between 
the poem and one particular journal article, as well as the journal’s “pervasive use of terms 
that appear in his poem”, Middleton acknowledges that we don’t know “whether Oppen 
read the cities issue …, whether he heard about its contents from friends or family, or 









While acknowledging the fact that we have no evidence of a direct Oppen-Scientific 
American link in regard to his post-1968 work either, it is interesting to note that September 
1972 saw a special issue of the journal focused on ‘Communication’ (including cellular, 
animal, verbal, visual, IT, AI, social, political) written by a range of distinguished academic 
figures. Included was an article by John R. Pierce in which Chomsky’s work and its influence 
on linguists and psychologists was featured, as was discussion of the “mixture of surprise 
and the search for meaning in a familiar context” that underpins “our [linguistic] straining 
towards some …extraordinary context or meaning”, even illustrated with a “computer- 
produced ‘poem” by Marie Borroff – a poem “not so much out of this world as enticingly on 
the fringes of it.”3.56 The closing paragraph of another article, this one by linguist and literary 
theorist Roman Jakobson, entitled ‘Verbal Communication’, carried the by-line: ‘The ability 
of human language to convey an infinite number of messages and to form and develop new 
concepts is based on the unique and universal properties of the verbal code’. Jakobson goes 
on to argue for the value of the ‘connotative’ qualities of language (over the purely lexical) 
and the final paragraph includes the following: “the analysis of grammatical transformations 
and of their import should include the poetic function of language, because the core of this 
function is to push transformations into the foreground. It is the purposeful poetic use of 
lexical and grammatical tropes and figures that brings the creative power of language to its 
summit.” Whether Oppen read any of this or even ‘tuned in’ to any conversation arising from 
it while holidaying on Little Deer Island, Maine, or when back in San Francisco in the late 
summer of 1972, we’ll probably never know; yet it is, coincidental to his preoccupations, in 
the intellectual air. 
 
 
What we do know is that Oppen dipped in and out of texts which, with particular reference 
to their influence on his later poetry, included the philosophical works through which he 
explored his own poetic experience. In a letter to Michael Heller in November 1975, Oppen 
makes clear: “yes: read quite a bit of Merleau-Ponty […] More moved by Maritain […] and 
Heidegger.”3.57 As  already  mentioned,  Nicholls’s  ‘Appendix  A’  summarises  the  Heidegger  
readings and in Chapter 5 of The Fate of Modernism he also considers Oppen’s debt to Hegel. 
To date, we have little information on Oppen’s reading of Merleau-Ponty. On the issue of 
Heidegger’s texts in particular in which Oppen took an interest, Michael Heller makes the 
point which  Nicholls  reiterates,  that  Oppen  “read  not  for  omnivorous  knowledge  of  a  subject
but to find a passage or even a phrase which would show him an opening or a way  out of 





Heidegger himself, Oppen was often fascinated by a single phrase or sentence which seemed 
to promise illumination, and possible access to another world of thought.”3.59 
 
 
To summarise our emerging thesis: Oppen’s late work is in part an exploration of cognition 
– not a record of his reading or thinking about cognition, but his process of writing poems 
itself as a research study, a working through, a thinking through of cognitive questions in 
relation to the experiences that meant most to him. One question we are asking is whether 
Oppen’s understanding as recorded in both his prose and poetry is valid in the light of 
modern day cognitive science, and therefore whether we can read Oppen as both a 
genuinely contemporary voice (as opposed to that of literary historical interest only) and as 
a source from which to extend our contemporary poetic aspirations for conceptual renewal. 
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‘On the sea, steering, the sea pulling’ 
 
4.1 The Moving Edge 
 
“The thing in the mind before the words.” George Oppen 
 
In a discussion of the Seascape: Needles’ Eye collection, Peter Nicholls identifies the 
significance of the ‘needle’s eye’ to Oppen as the poetic representation of ‘the intelligence 
[that] comes to rest’4.1; and then ‘the complex elegiac register; the fear of ageing; the sense 
of being a survivor; the ‘intermittent rejections of poetic language’ and 
‘eloquence’[rhetoric]; before considering “a certain ‘candour’ which is in turn allied to a form 
of verbal opacity.”4.2 In Oppen’s view: “The peculiar attribute of words is that they spring 
spontaneously in the mind, they flow continuously in the mind. They provide, if not hope, at 
least opacity.”4.3 Nicholls identifies the “unexpected association” of ‘candour’ with ‘opacity’ 
but suggests it is “indicative of Oppen’s attempt to make a resistant verbal texture the 
register of the world’s ‘impenetrability’.”4.2 He continues: “To be ‘candid’ is to allow the 
words to speak for themselves with a minimum of authorial intrusion.” For Oppen no 
“histrionics”4.4, no rhetoric, no “staging”4.5 As for the opacity, the impenetrability, an 
‘impoverished’ language (NCP, 220) according to Nicholls “can approximate” the world.4.6 
The experience in Oppen’s understanding of cognition precedes the words that flow in the 
mind: “Poem [ ] the thing in the mind before the words [my italics] [ ] to be able to hold it 
even against the language.”4.7. He avows a “wordless sphere of the mind”4.7 from which the 
prefigured ‘poem’ emerges most closely into language when syntactic and grammatical 
constraints are ignored in favour of the “less smooth, less bound”4.8, producing a written 
poem that coheres most closely to the ‘thing in the mind’ by being “not ‘too perfect’”4.8 The 
“transparency” akin to “inaudibility” (of “social tone”) which Oppen refers to in seeking “the 
simplest language”4.9 may seem at first sight at odds with the ‘opacity’ of the world. 
However, Oppen refers to “the white space of the paper becom[ing] part of the poem”4.10 in 
which silence becomes a ‘transparency’ as, in Nicholl’s phrase, “the means by which to 
disclose the real.”4.11 Oppen’s ontology and epistemology (cognitive and experientialist as 
we have described them) emerge clearly through these discussions, as the percept to 
grounded concept to symbolic correlate are seen as emerging into language. 
 
 
At the heart of the act of reading a later Oppen poem, the reader is confronted by a 




pastime as analogy, be with a following wind, an oblique wind or a head wind. In other 
words, start to finish may not lead us along any prosaic, landlubber’s, metalled highway. The 
components of the poem are likely to present multiple semantic and musical possibilities 
from which the reader is free to draw a variety of semantic senses, especially since Oppen 
favours ‘postulation’ over ‘argument’.4.12 The absence of punctuation, the broken lineation, 
the collagic juxtaposition of words and phrases, added to what Peter Middleton calls “the 
diminished reference” and frequent “unintelligibility”,4.13 allows a freedom to vary one’s 
reading (visually and orally). Variations prompt both sensory and semantic alternatives. The 
relationship between the way one reads and what this prompts in our recollections of time, 
place, thought and emotion, as well as the factual or the imagined – the ‘subject matter’ of 
understanding and allusion – is at times barely amenable to analysis given Oppen’s opacity, 
yet is itself a real-time experience to each of us. To read is to think and feel while the world 
that is conjured, however initially ‘incoherent’, however speculative, belongs exclusively to 
the reader in that moment, never to be repeated in the same way. Oppen said, in a letter to 
John Taggart in September 1974, “I have of course – as you have too – some reserves about 
a doctoral thesis which must seem to absorb the poem into itself, into the thesis. For the 
poem is of course not that, the poem is the moving edge, whereas the doctorate knows no 
time and the substance cannot live.”4.14 No poem is set in stone. Each reading is in the 
variable context of a lifetime of circumstance that constantly changes. The poem moves with 
us at the edge, the front, between an immediate present and an immanent future. To dissect 
is to partially anatomise, to identify the structural skeleton but without the flesh of living 
action or the electricity of nervous engagement. The language patterns of Seascape, Myth, 
and Primitive, are first and foremost interesting and pleasurable to read whether or not one 
‘gains’ a ‘satisfactory’ meaning or somehow ‘fully coherent’ interpretation, in any particular 
reading at word, phrase, or larger composite, level. 
 
As readers who are conscious of contemporary insights arising from cognitive psychology 
and cognitive linguistics, we could explore a ‘cognitive poetics’ reading of Oppen’s poetry, in 
the manner typified by such texts as Peter Stockwell’s Texture (2009). At its simplest, for 
example, in deciphering the complex possibilities of such writing, we might consider the 
‘image schemas’ identified in recent years as hidden within, for example, the simplest 
prepositional signifiers. These are the smallest of Oppen’s small words, with cognitive roots 
now envisaged as deeper than that of which Oppen was aware. Take the second of ‘San 
Francisco Poems’ in Seascape: “On the bed in the white room” presents Mary Oppen’s body 




are spatial particles with ‘containment’ associations, one ‘bounded’ the other perhaps not. 
Containment schemas, it is thought, are learned early in life by children putting in and taking 
out, pouring, filling, inverting, emptying, themselves entering and leaving spaces; these all 
establish a distinction between entities (including oneself) that can go inside, be contained 
within, another distinctively separate entity (so-called trajectory-landmark relationships) – 
a dualistic concept of action and motor-sensory relation, a symbolic representation initially 
independent of a language label. When the poem continues in line 9 with “Turn inward”, we 
have a conceptual metaphor in which the containment schema has been translated from a 
concrete to an abstract context in which “Her naked eyes” metaphorically look ‘inside’ the 
vessel of mind or imagination or self. Line 21 “Tamalpais in cloud”, and line 24 “Local 
knowledge/ In the heavy hills”, return us to the concrete (or as Oppen would say the 
‘material’) world, even though the containment nature of in is stretched in both cases. In the 
first the reality of interaction between Tamalpais and cloud is simplified to a straight ‘surface 
separation’ distinction between the two. In the second the abstract ‘local knowledge’ is 
placed ‘within’ a hilly locality, an abstract within a material as conceptual metaphor. 
Whereas mist sitting “over” farmlands in line 22 is a simple spatial particle ‘orientation’ 
schema, the loose waves that “move landward” in line 25, and the trees that bend “along 
the length of coast” in line 28, defining position and direction, add a dynamic sense. Oppen 
again adopts a familiar containment-base use of in for lines 23 and 25 where both waves and 
trees are “in the wind” and “in the continual wind”, respectively. The point is that the 
relationship between definable experience, definable requiring just such dualistic 
relationships between discrete entities (however arbitrarily delineated, such as ‘wind’), 
initially material, subsequently available to abstraction, lie at the root of percept-to-concept 
and signified-to-sign cognitive processes. 
 
 
A basic tenet of cognitive linguistics is “that the meaning associated with an individual 
lexeme is conceptual in nature. That is, the meanings associated with words are instantiated 
in semantic memory not in terms of linguistic or semantic features, nor as abstract 
propositions, but rather meaning prompted for by symbols […] [which] constitutes a 
redescription of perceptual information, at some level related to sensorimotor 
experience.”4.15 In the sensation of handling a small sailing boat (“George on the sea, 
steering, the sea pulling”)4.55 the experience translates first into symbolic representation of 
component parts and dynamic relationships between them. We might imagine a 





(‘motion’ concepts) – push, pull, twist, roll, rise, fall etc – between them. The translation 
then into language (the poem functioning as, in Oppen’s words: “process of thought”4.16) is 
Oppen bringing the embodied experience out into the choice of language, the dynamics of 
the phrasing, “the shape of the line”.4.17When Oppen speaks of the “test of truth”4.4 as “To 
slow down, that is, to isolate the words”4.18 he recognises“we know of an actuality[…] 
prior
 
to that which is consciousness’ self-knowledge.”4.19 As Rachel Blau DuPlessis puts it: “
The
 
poem is then George on the sea, steering, the sea pulling: the poem changes force and 
weight at every word but moves continuing forward. The syntactic sense then of a tension- 
filled linearity, not an argument to exercise or control the force and gravity of the pulls but 
rather to honor and allow them to be propelled by the intensity of the vectors. [ ] And then 
he took [the tiller] back. He showed me — this is sailing. This is the ambiguity of direction; 
this the gravity of forces.”4.1 The embodied echoed in the writing is deliberate in discarding 
the “deluge  of  speech”,4.20  the  “clatter”  and  “chatter”4.21,  the  poetic  “histrionics”,4.1  




Of course, we reduce in order to understand. We diminish: this is the reductive process, 
subdividing an integrated whole into spatially and temporally arbitrary parts – the bee from 
the flower – losing our sense of the interconnections and the dynamics along the way. The 
understanding that this presents is inescapably a partial and rather static one, the parts 
being typically deemed intelligible through the linear, prosaic, syntactic structure of 
incremental analysis. The reality that Oppen seeks to glimpse in linguistic reconfiguration is 
the poet’s unique opportunity. By subverting the prosaic he reminds us of the reality of 
experience beneath the words, the partiality of prosaic knowledge, the possibility of a fuller 
‘poetic knowledge’ to be realized through the page. Peter Middleton has reminded us that: 
“Fragmentation, disjunction, parataxis, collage, diminished reference, unintelligibility, or 
‘lacunary structure’: modernist poetry boasts its proximity to the leading edge of modernity 
by displaying visible disruptions of normative linguistic structures. Torn, unfinished 
sentences whose suspended incomplete syntax produces unresolved semantic uncertainty, 
and orphaned sentences with no adjacent narrative or sequentially implicated sentences 
and hence unintegrated into larger textual communications, appear everywhere in 
modernist and avant-garde poetry from The Waste Land to contemporary magazines such 
as Jacket.”4.13 These are the devices that seek to break beyond detached knowledge into the 





4.2 The Danger of the Chess Board4.21 
 
“Like others, I have pondered notations.” George Oppen 
 
In discussing subject-predicate syntax or the speculative proposition, what applies to the 
grammarian’s sentence applies equally to the poet’s phrase. In identifying Oppen’s 
increasing preoccupation with what we have already referred to in Nicholls's words as “the 
grammatical conditions of poetic singularity”, Nicholls highlights Ernest Fenollosa’s study 
The Chinese Written Character as a Medium for Poetry as “an important intertext.”4.22 Ezra 
Pound edited the essay from Fenollosa’s manuscript which is critical of the generalising and 
impersonal tendencies in the Western language tradition. Philosopher Theodor Adorno 
called this ‘identity thinking’, in which the abstract concept seems to displace the uniqueness 
of all individual experience. Classical Chinese poetic language, on the other hand, is 
immersed in what has been called “the physicality of the pictographic script”4.23 (almost a 
phenomenological consciousness at work, certainly a grounded pre-conscious), using its 
characters to label nouns and verbs only. There are no personal pronouns, prepositions, 
conjunctions, except on rare occasions. In what is essentially a flow of descriptive images, 
the reader gleans sense from custom, finds nothing missing but the subtleties that were 
deliberately inferred, and with space left for the reader’s imagination to fill.4.24 As Nicholls  
points out, Fenollosa emphasised what he felt to be the contrived conversational function 
of pronoun use, its misguided egocentricity, and his preference for the Chinese engagement 
with the verb as the subjective voice of phenomena.4.22 Encased in subject-predicate 
relationships, the “activities in things” (for example, the tree that ‘greens’ itself) is lost to 
objectification and cause and effect distinctions. Nicholls discusses Oppen’s relationship  
with Pound’s rhetorical and solipsistic poetics (not to mention “totalitarian ethics”) which 
seemed to evolve as a misdirected response to Fenollosa’s ‘natural’ grammar, in contrast to 
“an accident of man as a conversational animal”.4.25 Where Fenollosa asserted that “the verb 
must be the primary fact of nature, since motion and change are all that we can recognise in 
her”4.26, Oppen chose not to adopt the resulting syntactic ideal with its linguistic and 
conceptual rigidity. It is interesting that Oppen’s adherence to the noun as much as the verb, 
as central to poetic language, is true to Pound’s original notion of the ‘image’ as energetic 
vortex and conceptual knot with both fluidity and focus. Oppen criticised Pound’s 
“argument” as “game of thought”, conscious that “the danger is of the chess-board: on 
which everything has already been named.”4.21 To quote Nicholls: “It may seem odd that 
Oppen should fault the elliptical and fragmented modes of The Cantos for being an 





poetics and Pound’s. At issue are not merely the argumentative habits of the older poet’s 
work and the hectoring tone of the late stages of his poem but, more importantly, what 
Oppen sees as a tendency there to closure and solipsism. The two are, for him, closely 




Peter Nicholls identifies in detail the more important counter influence of philosopher 
G.W.F. Hegel on Oppen4.28, especially Hegel’s notion of the inseparability of the thinking 
process from its content. We can ask how the phenomenon of the ‘speculative proposition’, 
in which Nicholls notes that Oppen took a deep interest from his reading of Hegel, might be 
seen to clearly engender a move of “the mind beyond its conceptual confines”. Peter 
Middleton has referred to a commentary on the preface to Hegel’s Phenomenology by 
Yirmiyahu Yovel in which Yovel calls speculative propositions “rather rare and enigmatic”.4.29 
They don’t pop up in conventional prosaic syntax or ‘mainstream’ poetry, since 
grammatically correct forms typically present description, argument, and comment, the 
natural language of both reasoned analysis and conventional representation. As described 
by Gillian Rose, the speculative proposition, in contrast, starts with “an empty name, 
uncertain and problematic, gradually acquiring meaning as the result of a series of 
contradictory experiences.”4.30 As Middleton expands this: “the poem can enlist the reader’s 
labour to develop meaning gradually through a reading back and forwards.”4.31 As Yovel then 
puts it: “no single sentence can capture the process of speculative thinking.”4.29 Indeed the 
sentence, by definition, being subject and predicate (inescapably commenting) cannot avoid 
assertive propositions. Middleton suggests that as a “single statement” the speculative 
proposition cannot exist (“effectively non-existent, though perhaps hovering on the far edge 
of possible existence like the snark.”4.31). Where such a singular proposition which is hardly 
a proposition at all, has yet to become “a passage of writing”4.31, it is what Yovel calls a ‘lever’ 
or ‘means of transmission’4.32 to “open the way to an extended process of further 
thought”.4.33 “The speculative proposition heightens the sense of dissatisfaction we get from 
the subject/predicate proposition, and urges our thinking to go beyond it – not to another 
form of proposition but to the complete process of dialectical thinking, which no single 
sentence of any form can express.”4.32 
 
Integral to the syntactic-semantic relationship, as Middleton makes the point, for any 
proposition made in verse “the prosodic form in which it is stated will be an integral part of 




may be changed while the core proposition remains constant. The particular attraction for a 
poet such as Oppen is “that a poetic statement is not an open or shut proposition whose 
truth can be evaluated at once. Inside the speculative poetic proposition is the potential for 
endlessly drawing out, or making explicit, all sorts of implications contained within its 
seed.”4.34 As Middleton also notes, in Nicholls’s analysis of Oppen’s poem ‘From a Phrase 
of
 
 Simone Weil’s and Some Words of  Hegel’s’,  which  opens  the  Seascape:  Needle’s  Eye  
collection, “the reader is invited to ‘follow the lines of association that the poem most clearly 
offers’”.4.35 Without reiterating Middleton’s analysis, we can note he makes the point that 
“these suspended phrases [he references ‘interrupted predicates’ and ‘unconsolidated 
propositions’] invite readers to attribute such intimated statements to the poem while 
making evident that the onus is on the reader to justify this attribution.”4.35 Middleton refers 
to the apparent series of “self-corrections” by Oppen in this poem, and how “we are still left 
wondering how we might offer even the most approximate paraphrase of what is being said, 
because the absences of grammatical closure leaves us with only an impression that a 
statement is being prepared”.4.35 
 
 
Initially, Middleton seems not persuaded of the efficacy of speculative propositional form. 
Early in his analysis he cautions: “But the poet would be forgetting that this may be a 
snark”4.34 and (quoting Lewis Carroll directly) “the Snark was a Boojum”.4.31 He subsequently 
uses Eliot’s Prufrock to voice “the problem of the poetic proposition” as “It is impossible to 
say just what I mean”, which he transmutes into “the line may find it impossible to mean just 
what it says.”4.36 Of course, if we confine ourselves as poets in meaning only what it is 
possible to say, we are staying within the constraints of the conceptual status quo, rather 
than pushing at its edges. Whatever legitimate reservations we might have over the 
particular example that Middleton selects from Oppen’s work, we ought not to deny the 
potential of the speculative form, especially used selectively alongside the more usual 
predicates, in stretching possibilities. Where Middleton is, however, persuaded is in the 
poem as “a song of inquiry” (in his case through the example of Wordsworth’s Prelude) in 
which “the inquiry (or research) is taking place at the site of the poem.”4.37 A preference for 
the assertive proposition is, of course, the basis of analytical reasoning. Quoting Simon Jarvis 
on Wordsworth, Middleton recognises that where existing philosophical (in the sense of 
‘natural philosophy’ i.e. scientific) “vocabularies break down” in poetry, “contradictions and 
antagonisms are revealed”4.37 and “the possibility of new thinking is glimpsed”4.37. For Jarvis, 





cautious qualification ‘a kind of’ signals that these are tentative claims, and also that we 
might want to extend our concept of what constitutes cognition if we are adequately to 
understand the nature of the reasoning […] since cognition, strictly speaking, although it 
encompasses all kinds of knowing, excludes volition [consciously willed choices] and affect 
[felt responses].” He continues: “The possibility of ‘new thinking’ […] matters because it 
pushes beyond what is known, and this why it is so disappointing that [Jarvis writes] ‘the 
criticism of aesthetic artefacts is understood as salutary demystification’. Critique loses sight 
of the possibility that the literary work might also be able to contribute to the work of 
concepts, reasoning, and observation, and collaborate with the world of critical inquiry, 
rather than being solely subject to its gaze.”4.37 
 
 
Middleton then references the account of Susan Stewart in which she asserts two significant 
traits of poetry as “states of extreme intensity in which judgement disappears and the desire 
to see the unseen”, referring to this as characteristic of ‘Orphic poetry’. This, of course, is 
precisely not Oppen’s way. Oppen is the most deliberate and ‘judgemental’ of poets in 
selecting every word he uses; there is no question of judgement disappearing. In addition, 
Oppen would doubtless assert that far from a pursuit of the unseen (the transcendental to 
which we have earlier referred in note 1.18), his attention is determinedly on the observable, 
that material reality very much before our eyes. That’s not to say that we couldn’t 
accommodate Stewart’s “endless play between the senses and abstraction” in discussing 
Oppen’s work, or perhaps “the necessity to express in visual terms”, but we must reject 
“going beyond the confines of material experience”.4.38 In discussing Jarvis’s detailed analysis 
of a  passage  from  Wordsworth’s  Prelude,  Middleton  qualifies  his own  concern  over  the  
speculative – while affirming his focus as critic in “making explicit” a given text – identifying 
the subjective nature of attributing intentionality to a writer. Where Simon Jarvis associates 
‘philosophic song’ with the aspiration “to obstruct, displace or otherwise change the syntax 
and the lexicons currently available for the articulation of such experience”4.39, Middleton 
points out that “talk of syntax and lexicons returns us to the problem with cognition, the 
over-valuation of a certain type of propositionally-based knowledge”.4.40 As he suggests, 
Charles Altieri hits the nail rather better on the head: “there are needs, drives, and felt 
modes of attentive interest, connection, and satisfaction that seem inchoate and inarticulate 
and so not dependent on the forms of understanding provided by a specific culture”.4.41 For 







Peter Middleton was writing in 2010. Having looked at the relative extremes of non-assertive 
propositional form in selected poems of Robert Duncan and Susan Howe, Middleton 
suggested that literary critical study is in a “process of reassessing its commitments to certain 
understandings of language, reasoning, and mind that for several decades provided 
epistemological and ontological axioms whose role as guarantors of argument tended to be 
overlooked, and whose authority was therefore hard to engage with, let alone challenge.” 
In other words, notwithstanding the contributions of Wittgenstein (‘pseudo-statements’), 
I.A. Richards (‘pseudo-propositions’), Gerald Graff (a critique of the ‘heresy of paraphrase’), 
Paul de Man (distinctions between grammar and rhetoric), Charles Altieri (‘assertions’ and 
‘cognitive intensity’), Middleton makes clear that there is no current theory that offers 
analytical enlightenment “about how to conceptualise the relation between linguistic 
fragmentation and propositionality.”4.43 Whether the stylistics approach that is cognitive 
poetics will contribute to such a theory remains to be seen but I have taken a closer look at 
its approach in Appendix Two: To Each Other We Will Speak. 
 
 
4.3 You Could Call It Youthful Or You Could Call It Old.4.42 
 
“On average, people with Alzheimer's disease live for around 8 to 10 years after they start to develop 
symptoms.” The Alzheimer Society 
 
 
It is not my intention to discuss aspects of post-Seascape Oppen poetry that have been 
covered elsewhere. Nicholls, for example, notes that “questions of survival and mortality  
were uppermost in the poet’s mind”4.44 and he closely examines these as subject content in 
Oppen’s later poetry in the final chapter of his book.4.45 What concerns me here is the 
syntactic structure through which, as Nicholls also puts it: “Oppen managed again to find  
that ‘first light’ in which the world might still be encountered as if for the first time.”4.44 There 
is in Oppen’s final poems, most evident in Primitive, almost a reversion to what we might 
term a ‘language of thought’, profoundly detached from everyday language. The poems are 
not a burst of words from the unconscious but a very deliberate, in that characteristically 
intensely deliberate way of Oppen’s, emergence into the light of a coherence struggling to 
be. Whatever symbolic language constitutes and functions as pre-conscious thinking, it must 
find a way to transcribe an approximation of itself into the natural language of conscious 
thought. This is the place of Oppen’s obsession. Oppen would speak in 1975 (the year of 
Primitive’s publication) of “the motion, and the emotion that creates language […] that I 





of experience, speak to experience, the cadence, the sound the form”4.47. To Robert Duncan 
(who was responding to poems in the Collected Poems published that year) he writes: “You 
were saying the recent poems are incomprehensible? I don’t really think so. And was not 
thinking of that which cannot be said in language – of that indeed silent however unwillingly 
[…] do, however, think of that which cannot be said except thru poem. Nothing very wild 
about this: the line-break is as much a part of the language as the comma the period the 
paragraph?”4.48 He goes on: “it is true there has been a remarkable silence about those 
poems. And R Blau [Rachel Blau DuPlessis], whose opinion I also respect, wrote simply that 
they made her dizzy. Bit troubling, yes. But I thought I was simply pointing to things – and 
clearly enough or accurately enough Perhaps not […]I point: it is true I don’t think 
everything has already been named.”4.48 “My spontaneous feeling is that I look.”4.49 As for 
this language of thinking: “a form of doodling --- going backward and forward in a poem that 
won’t form”4.50, where “meaning/ is the mind among/ things indeed/ that is/ lived […] the 
poem that won’t form. Probably the poem knows best.”4.51 Oppen is always trying to peer 
through and beyond an excessively self-conscious steering of a poem in the making, while 
engaging his characteristically deliberate attention to the focus on words and prosody as 
they seem to emerge of themselves. 
 
 
The poems which would be published as Primitive didn’t start life easily. In late 1975 Oppen 
was writing to Harvey Shapiro of not having publicly read his own work anywhere since June 
1973, “unable to bring myself to do so […] AND trouble with my work, unable to be sure of 
it.”4.52 It’s an interesting echo of his post-Pulitzer retreat from ‘recognition’ (charted in 
Appendix One): “I fall down dead in the role [of David, let alone Goliath] […] even the 
miniscule ‘recognition’ of the last few years […] it’s too much for me --- it’s not the drama I 
can sustain. Just can’t do it. I really am in trouble with this damn neurosis, trouble with my 
work […] But this neurosis in fact was my escape from the poor little rich boy, and the basis 
of my adult life I have to protect it, let the Shrinks fall where they may.” 
 
It seems clear that the poems Oppen was writing at this time that would appear in the 
Primitive collection might legitimately be associated with the early onset of Alzheimer's that 
would come to seriously impair Oppen in a few short years. The same letter to Harvey 
Shapiro speaks of some obvious health difficulties4.53. However, to glance at the  
letters in the Oppen archive of the next few years to realise that Oppen’s mind remained 
active and stimulated by his many correspondents in spite of a failing short-term memory, 




Press who published Primitive.4.54 We would be mistaken in failing to recognise Oppen’s final 
work as a legitimate progression, rather than some symptomatic aberration, within that 
post-Pulitzer context of his reflections on experience and language that we have been 
considering in detail. Oppen writes to his niece a few months before the completion of the 
Primitive manuscript: “Yes, I think you are right: a change in the tone in the new poems – I 
no longer have time, time, time to force the meaning, the statement on the reader. Time to 
argue. I must trust him, her, to know where we are. To TRUST himself, herself: to TRUST me: 
to say yes. To say yes, we know, we are also here ‘possibly more youthful,’ you suggest. It 
may be. You could call it youthful or you could call it old. To complete the circle.”4.42 
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‘Speaking into a wind’ 
 
5.1 The Instant of Meaning5.1 
 
“All the spoken of and the numbers (i.e. how to form them …” George Oppen 
 
When we look at Oppen’s often “densely encoded”5.2 later poems there are undoubtedly 
recurrent subject motifs, including anxiety, fear, guilt, the indifference of “earth turning, that 
great // loneliness” (NCP 265), and the self as ‘survivor’. In other words, there are aspects of 
conventional subject coherence that present themselves for ready interpretation, even if 
they may sit alongside, or within, a less than obviously assertive syntactic surrounding. The 
focus of this dissertation is less on the subject material than in the exceptional, speculative, 
prosody through which Oppen seeks to speak, since this is his thinking in practice, the 
process made manifest whatever its semantic guise. The human brain is a great pattern 
finder and as receptive readers of Oppen’s late work we may in some way be able to come 
close to what lies almost below what is articulated, feeling the pattern of meaning beneath 
the words. In late Oppen poetry the speculative and the unresolved move us through 
successive lexical steps, momentary haltings for reflection on a solitary word, a broken 
phrase, a torn couplet. We think we understand “…the nerve // the thread / reverberates // 
in the unfinished // voyage…”(NCP 265). We do understand, but it’s the ‘music’, in fact the 
total of prosodic effects (intonation, stress, tempo, rhythm, pause) that communicates 
beyond semantics. What then are the blunt mechanics of this speculatively propositional 
style in a late Oppen poem that emerges with its polysemic suggestiveness? 
 
 
5.2 Syntax: f. Gk σύν syn together & τάξις táxis an ordering. 
 
Firstly, we have the simple absence of syntactic constraint: “I try to avoid all this grammar,” 
said Oppen5.3. “I half-hear, in the poems, where the transition could be less smooth, less 
bound by syntax”, such that the poem is “not too perfect”. For example: 
 
awaiting the 
light to speak 
of the present which is 
life to say to say to point 
to requires a vividness music a 
sound Swim for what wood 
what iron what plastic what ink 
of the poem will come 
ever here to this 






This succinct late lyric was unpublished in Oppen’s lifetime5.4 but it incorporates a number 
of key facets of his speculative syntax. A prosaic reading, in which a pattern of conventional 
grammar is identified, would find the first ‘stanza’ (lines 1-6) as pivoted on the active verb 
‘requires’, with ‘awaiting the light to speak of the present’ followed by the supplementary 
clause ‘which is life to say to say to point to’ on one side of the fulcrum, and ‘a vividness 
music a sound’ on the other. This is a simple structure requiring only a semantic 
interpretation along the lines of you can’t say what you want to say until some aural prompt 
comes along. The second ‘stanza’ (lines 6-10) equally can be identified in conventional terms, 
opening with an instruction or invocation to ‘Swim’, followed by the reason – essentially, if 
you don’t search it out the poem certainly won’t come to you. The whole point of Oppen not 
writing a poem such as this in a conventional manner is because he doesn’t want us to read 
it as we would if obviously patterned in prosaic grammar. His choice of lineation, of cuts to 
a phrase, of the hanging adjective or adverb, the accentuated spaces, speak to a re- 
evaluation of each component as we proceed. The result is that we read, in this poem for 
example, ‘awaiting the/ light to speak’ as just that, with a moment to ponder (‘awaiting’) and 
then of confronting the possibility of light speaking, before we meet ‘of the present which 
is’ with its suggestion of present immediacy. The impulse that Oppen exploits is our habitual 
separation of semantic sense where lines are separated. Therefore, we look to the separate 
potential meanings of light speaking and an immediacy of the present moment before we 
refer back and merge the two lines into a light that speaks of the present. This is how the 
poem proceeds. As we move from word to phrase to line, at every turn we are offered the 
possibilities of alternative interpretation, even though a prosaic skeleton of the whole in this 
case can be identified. Of course there are images, not least the jetsam of wood and plastic, 
the shore and the sea to be swum, seemingly clear analogies – but the iron? And why not 
the ‘ink of the poem will come’ rather than ‘what ink will come ever’? Oppen means to hang 
his thought on this prosody, those intonations, tones, stresses, rhythms of how the poem 
reads, blending sound with sight as well as sense, and ‘To say to say to point /to’ is a metrical 
device conveying its own ‘extra-semantic’ component. “Each word,” Oppen said, “is a stance, 
each word is also a question never answered.”5.5 Michael Heller called this Oppen’s “micro- 
management” of words,5.6 “a poetics of the word”, far from what Oppen himself referred to 
as the alternative “instant archaeology” of words immediately tamed to concepts and 
categories before their freshness and strangeness can be experienced5.7. Instead, this is 






Given syntactic structure at the heart of our semantic knowledge, this all but pre-linguistic 
algorithm of a poem is the reality of an emergent consciousness. 
 
The result is that Oppen invokes an intensity of reading experience in which question and 
answer, speculation and assertion, clarity and opacity, ebb and flow before us. We are drawn 
into the process of translation precisely because the language is only part understood, the 
‘point and purpose’ of the poem less than immediately intelligible. “I would like to get to the 
first moment, the crucial moment in which one has not yet formed terms, and has for the 
moment stopped the noise in one’s head.”5.8 In other words, before the pre-linguistic has 
congealed into recognisable signified and signifier and before that mental clutter of a brain 
that churns out parcelled and packaged ‘thoughts’ in endless strings – good, bad, useful, 
useless (not to mention the clutter of cultural, historical, and literary, association attached 
to each) revs up. “Words cannot be wholly transparent. And that is the ‘heartlessness’ of 
words” (‘Route’ 4, NCP 194). The transparency Oppen really seeks is the direct sight as if 
piercingly through the word to its experiential source. Once the conceptual network has 
become word, it takes on all those associations that separate it from its original stance. 
Oppen wants “the first moment”. He believes “each word must have some reason for 
existing in itself “ [his emphasis]. Since the separation of word from its associations is an 
unattainable ideal, as Heller puts it, Oppen uses syntax to both “strategically emplace a word 
at the same time as it is being isolated and forced to bear not only the polyvalent meanings 









of distances terrible 
path 
 
thru the airs small very 
small alien 
 
on the sidewalks thru the long 




of the streets leading 







5.3 Enjambment: f. OFr enjamber to straddle. 
 
The line in poetry can be as syntactically end-stopped or abruptly incomplete as any printed 
text. Oppen’s later poems show predominantly the latter, making use of frequent 
enjambment out of which there is no easy resolution of sense. By definition, enjambment 
presents “the mixed message produced by the pause” and “the delay in meaning that creates 
a [semantic] tension”5.10 Michael Heller asserts, in consequence, that: “One feels the word- 
by-word adventure” in these poems in which neither poet nor reader is “quite sure where 
the poem is going”.5.11 It is “something the poet must have felt as his thought and his 
observations intermix themselves in its construction. Every word in the poem is likely to 
reveal new depths or aspects of itself.”5.11 The style is a “word percussive”5.12 one in which 
words take precedence over phrase; words are not “[subsumed] within the larger phrase or 
sentence”.5.12 As Oppen put it: “I do not know why. Perhaps we may call it music. The word, 
the right word, it seems to stand outside of us…I suppose it is music. There is a mystery: the 




speak if they speak the estranged 
 
unfamiliar sphere thin as air 




cold little pin unresisting 
small pin of the wind and the rayne 
 
in the fields the pines the spruces the sea and 
the intricate 
 
veins in the stones and the rock 
of the mountains wandering 
 
stars in the dark their one 
moral in the breeze 
 
of wherever it is history 
goes breaking the courses and breaking 
 
High seas of history… from ‘The Little Pin: Fragment’, NCP 254. 
 
Oppen admitted to “piling up pieces of paper to find the words”.5.14 Repeats, re-soundings, 
re-contemplations, are common to his work. His manuscript pages in the archives of the 




phrase stuck on to pages, with the smears left by old rubber cement and scrawled-over 
passages….”5.15 Words are recast into different arrangements; fragments “even whole 
sections” of poems are repeatedly “rearranged and retraced”; and they appear in Oppen’s 
successive work, “…all taken together forming snapshots in time of Oppen’s constant moving 
and remaking of the poem’s language”.5.15 Oppen wrote: “if word A must be next to word B
,
 
GET it there”,5.16 and “I try one word and another word and another word, reverse the 
sequence, alter the line-endings, a hundred two hundred rewritings, revisions – This is called 
prosody: how to write a poem. Or rather, how to write that poem.”5.13 “If one revises and 
revises and revises – perhaps weeks and months and years and cannot revise, then there is 
something wrong with what you are trying to say. The ear knows, and I don’t know why. It 
is, perhaps, partly as we hear it in the voice – no matter how one attempts to manipulate his 
voice. All must speak, and speak in its own voice – every ‘and’ and ‘but’ – the word is – The 
word in one’s own mouth becomes as strange as infinity – even as strange as the finite, 
strange as things. Primarily and above all and note by note the prosody carries the relation 
of things and the sequence: the poet learns almost everything from his own verse, his own 
prosody.”5.17 
 
5.4 The Intransitive: f. L intransitivus not passing over. 
 
Talk is cheap. Words in common conversation become debased by imprecision, by 
disconnection from the experience they signified to each of us on first encounter. As Nicholls 
describes it in referring to the word ‘is’: “We do not possess the word ‘is’ in the full plenitude 
of presence, and we are in that sense forever plagued by a lingering sense of anteriority, of 
perceiving what-is-not in the splendour of its disclosure but in a degraded state of already- 
having-been”5.18 Heller has made the point that Oppen often invokes children in his poems, 
as if to represent consciousness not yet exposed, unaware, unaffected by language’s 
“debasements ”.5.19 We will  look  at the total  immersion  in impinging  experience  of the 
child in due course.5.20 Heller has observed that Oppen’s radical use of syntax “while 
bordering on the
 
disjunctive effects of much experimental poetry never quite loses, never 
seems to want to
 












syntactic leaps “disrupt discursive thought”, especially sequential thought “
set in motion by
 







frontier of “differing linguistic modes”, Oppen seeks to “lead us through 
our subtle evasions
 
and duplicities into clarity”. He asserts that Oppen’s poetry “is a 
constant movement of such
 
moments of clarification. They carry us from the unknown to 





In short, as John Taggart puts it: Oppen builds “tentative structures that  
remain tentative”.
5.22
 Incomplete sentences are the stuff of poetic invention. To the 
grammarian, elements will be missing, or they will say the element is ‘latent’ in the 
construction. The phrase may be described as elliptical. “Any utterance is in some sense 
incomplete…”5.23 There is always something which the speaker might in principle have said, 
or might in principle have said more precisely, had it been necessary. The ‘idea in my head’ 
– inherently dualistic: thing (idea) ‘inside’ thing (head), not to mention possessive thing (‘my’ 
self): language and the semantics that underpin its normal structur are both the product  
and the determinant of our conceptual understanding. As a result, correlations too easily 
become conceptually causal connections in a subject-verb-object dominated syntax, and too 
readily promote exclusively linear, sequential, dualistic assumptions. One clear syntactic 
step away from a prosaic recuperable form is the use of intransitive verbs. Nicholls makes 
the point that, in contrast, the use of transitive verbs “can only endlessly reaffirm the 
subject-object dualism which, in Oppen’s view, it is poetry’s function to overcome”.5.24 
Nicholls goes on to quote an Oppen complaint: “The fact that things and people BE. This is 
the major subject of thought and feeling. It is almost impossible to say to most readers. They 
regard the verb as all but meaningless, perhaps because it is intransitive: it is not an action 
of one thing on another”.5.25 As Heidegger succinctly put it: “Being is not a product of 
thinking…Thinking is an occurrence of Being”.5.26 What Oppen really seeks is: “The fusion of 
subject and object where all is acted upon”5.27: 
 
…I don’t know how to say it 
needing a word with no sound 
 
but the pebbles shifting on the beach the sense 






the wells the poem begins 
 
neither in word 
nor meaning but the small 
selves haunting 
 
us in the stones and is less 
always than that… from ‘If It All Went Up In Smoke’, NCP 274. 
 
 
The pebbles themselves are shifting; it’s what pebbles do, to themselves; to be a pebble is 




(NCP 268); “of things in us burning […] Tyger still burning […] in the night sky burning” (NCP 
270); “of rails in the night” shining (NCP 271); and of “waking who knows” (NCP 273). The 
intransitive seems to open up wider conceptual possibilities. 
 
 
5.5 Masonry: f. OFr masson, maçon stone mason. 
 
Another syntactic trick Oppen uses is to stack noun-upon-noun and phrase-upon-phrase 
without transitive or intransitive verb intervention at all – what Taggart has called “stone 
mason poetry”5.28: 
 
In back deep the jewel 
The treasure 
No Liquid 
Pride of the living life’s liquid 
Pride in the sandspit wind this ether this other this element all… 
 
from ‘A Phrase Of Simone Weil’, NCP 211. 
 
Taggart asserts: “The advantage of near-verbless poetry is solidity”, but notes there is the 
risk of its getting “stuck”.5.29 Oppen escapes getting stuck in a “voiceless box” by his insistent 
bringing to bear “as much pressure/compression” as possible, “so that the image may be 
revelation – a problem or situation literally revealed in its parts and their connections, but 
not necessarily ‘resolved’”. He concludes that a verb would “hurry” this process too much 
and precipitate “the image’s weight to fall” too soon5.29; and to close, to complete, its 
assertion. Nicholls also makes the point that Oppen viewed smoothness and rhetoric as 
routes to “an illusory success in fluency and certainty”.5.30 Oppen sought: “To slow down, 
that is, to isolate the words. Clatter, chatter is extreme rapidity of the words”.5.31 The overall 
impression from Oppen’s poetry is of a plain-speaking but complex one. There is suggestion 
and intermittent description; there are the speculative statements; there are unanswered 
questions. But there is neither rhetoric nor literary ‘histrionics’: “Rhetorical, it means a 
flowing of speech, it means a deluge of speech”.5.32 Far better “to make the words hit rock 
bottom, to find words that will lie in bedrock, not suspended in a mesh of syntax”.5.33 The 
aim is to reveal thought in Nicholl’s terms “as embodied in the irreducible spatio-temporal 
‘thereness’ of the poem, with its phonic echoes and silences, its syntactical shape and 
typographical layout”.5.34 Oppen’s fascination with the ‘little words’ can be said to show “that 
this in which the thing takes place, this thing is here, and that these things do take place”.5.35 
As Nicholls points out, the “studied repetition of ‘this’ …points up that word’s status as the 
‘canonical deictic’”5,34 (that is: ‘context’). It points, it shows, it is demonstrative. The ‘taking 





an idea, but to record the experience of thinking it”, writes Oppen.5.36 As Nicholls says, this 
is Oppen’s final “objectification” of the poem, “as thought becomes present to itself as 
‘being’”6.34, with “thinking…that requires the poem”.5.37 
 
 
It is evident today from published studies already mentioned (such as Andrea Taylor’s and 
Vyvyan Evans’s The Semantics of English Prepositions  and  Peter  Stockwell’s  Texture:  a  
cognitive aesthetics of reading) that the study of meanings we invest in, and glean from, 
language can be closely linked to cognitive and psychological theories of embodied learning 
and image schema at the root of human conceptualization. Examining the semantics, syntax  
and current usage of even those smallest of words that Oppen so valued  reveals  the  
subtleties of our spatial (‘locational’) conceptual mappings of experience and understanding. 
The syntactic arrangement of the smallest combinations of words both echoes and “prompts 
for meaning construction”.5.38 The ‘semantic polysemy network’ (the mix of meaningful 
components) is taken to model an individual’s lexicon “in terms of a radiating lattice 
structure” reflecting “a mental co-ordinate system”,5.39 but firmly based in “the complex  
interaction between real-world experience and conceptual processes which create and 
organize this experience in meaningful ways”.5.40  




5.6 Space for the Mind 
 
“What seems linear suddenly goes spatial.” Michael Heller 
 
An obvious facet of Oppen’s ‘mechanics’ and patterning is the placing of words on the page. 
Heller refers to Oppen’s “spaciousness” and the later poems “looking as though they have 
been shredded or blown apart, scattered across the page, gathered into seemingly 
dismembered clusters of text”5.41. For him the “wide irregular areas of white space suggest 
the dictation of someone speaking into a wind” – an image which he identifies as a favourite 
in Oppen’s work. In his turn, Taggart finds “gaps of white space” which he regards as 
“silence”.5.28 He writes: “A gap is a flaw, is the space of the mind, is somehow the essential 
thing about persons, the essential human thing”.5.42 A gap is a flaw “as it disturbs, disrupts  
the syntax of a line or the overall pattern of anything”.5.42 As our earlier consideration of  
perception and its ‘attentional’ dependence suggested, in tune with the holistic notions of a 
descriptive Gestalt psychology, we are accustomed (Taggart asserts “nearly desperate in our 





against that out of a desire always to question. Indeed, his devices syntactically evolved 
during his writing life from the momentary pause of comma, then dash, then ellipse and 
ultimately in the late work to the full-on silence of spaces. “I take gaps to be Oppen’s signs 
for the space of the mind, the space made by the mind, the space made by the mind for 
itself”, and “such a space allows for consciousness”,5.43 or we might suggest an emergent  
pre-consciousness. “When space is not silence, the matrix of silence, it is chatter, noise”.5.44 
Further Daybook entries include: “the world stops in silence but is illuminated”, and 
“temporary pauses, stops – moments of vision”.5.45 Words represent the opacity of 
experience, spaces the clarity. For Taggart, almost paradoxically “the poems are kept in 
motion by the gaps and lack of end punctuation…not allowed to come to rest…the process, 
a constant encounter with uncertainty is never over, never allowed to come to rest”.5.46 We 
have earlier commented that the brain generates thoughts in the form of ceaselessly 
sporadic assemblies of concepts, ‘processed and packaged’ in verbal guise, but in effect noise 
from which we learn to select particular signals. Neuroscientist Susan Greenfield describes 
consciousness as learning to selectively sustain particular dominant neuronal 
‘constellations’. Oppen also observed that words flow continuously through the mind,5.47  
and Taggart asserts that “steady deliberation” stops language.5.48 The neuroscientific 
observation is that brain activity (in the so-called ‘default mode network’) increases when 
not focused on specific tasks5.49 – flexible rather than direct attention seems the key to 
generative (‘creative’) thinking. How appropriate therefore that “by the use of gaps Oppen 
provides a sanctuary space for the mind against the constant weight of being… provides us 
with temporary pauses, which make a counterpoint of silence against the opacity of words, 
the poem’s words, a counterpoint against the pull of syntax”.5.48 There is a correlation 
between this personal and poetic inclusion of silence in Oppen and the reflective focus of a 
zennist-style management of consciousness – a meditative methodology on the flow of 
existence which Oppen chose not to relate to his own writing, although ‘in the air’ of the 
1960s and 1970s, and which is surely a deep presence in the ‘meditative thinking’ of Maritain 
and Heidegger.  
 
 In speaking of the Seascape collection (1972), although applicable equally to many poems in
 Myth of the Blaze (1972-75) and Primitive (1978), Taggart comments on how many of the
 poems “close very quietly”. It is as if Oppen had seen so much and “knowing the odds against






































5.7 Prosody: the pulse of thought5.50 
 
“repeating the spell […] throwing down […] bits of bone and stone” Michael Heller 
 
If we put all of Oppen’s devices together: the broken lines, the fragmented phrases, the 
enjambments, the isolated words, the carefully placed spaces; and to them add the aural 
possibilities of stress, pitch, and intonation; and add to this the semantic uncertainties and 
multiple possibilities mixed in with scatterings of those small, more-certain words; we have 
what Oppen referred to as his prosody, the poem’s prosody, that poem’s prosody. If we are 
to believe that the pre-conscious language of Oppen’s thinking is somehow reflected, if not 
literally manifest, in his verse, emergent through its making, we must acknowledge that none 
of the above components can express anything other than a speculative correlation between 
pre-verbal concept and natural language label, but that the integrated whole of prosody 
might just give us an intuited sense (for which read ‘prior to conscious articulation’) of what 
lies behind. By way of illustration, we can acknowledge that Oppen loved his small-boat 
sailing and spent weeks, often months, on the water in almost every year of his adult life 
apart from the Mexico years. He wrote little directly ‘about sailing’, and yet we can surely 
detect that experience so essential to his life reverberate through the prosody of many 
poems as a direct reflection of his embodied cognition. By way of example, we might 
describe the pre-verbal embodied experience of being at the tiller, hand on wood, hand, 
arm, torso, feeling the push and pull of wave and trough, the pressing and pausing of wind 
in the sail, the lifting and falling, everything of wind and water that surrounds and impinges 
in all the ways that those words imply; the experience is felt and identified unconsciously so 
that the hand on the tiller can ease the boat smoothly, obliquely, through both in an 
unspoken, unconscious, call and response of boat moving upon, riding, the sea; rhythms and 
sensations evident in the cadence of subsequent word and line. Feeling the nature of the 
poem before it comes to words was central to Oppen’s late writing process.5.51 He knew also 
a poem was done only when he felt it to be so and not before. This is not an objectively 
analytical process but an intuited one. Intuited because he sought a sense, for which read 
‘motor-sensory’ (indeed ‘embodied’) attuning as close as he could possibly make it to the 








The choice of word as sound, even feeling, may precede its semantic sense in selection. A 
juxtaposition of two words determines a meter of the moment. A composite assembles. The 
favoured rhythms of phrase could directly reflect a physical experience, the embodied 
memory, such as of being under sail. Do we not find a particular suggestion of going and 
pausing, rising and falling, for example, in: “her long quiet hands/ sometimes it seems// 
almost strange it seems// sometimes the almost fifty years/ has been a dream I hear 
sometimes those others// voices voices … [‘Mary’, NCP 350]? The language of Oppen’s 
thinking is surely imbued with a ‘music’, a prosody, which feels right to him precisely because 




the chess game 
 
the checker game 
in which the pieces 
 





under the sky. 
This is the sky. ‘The Poem’, NCP 348-9. 
 
In poems such as these, the sense we understand is as much through the sensation of our 
physically reading as in the semantic calculus of each line: 
 
for sometimes over the fields astride 













of becalmed ships and the violent men 
 
and women of the cities’ 







It is this harmony between pre-conscious and conscious made manifest which strikes us as 
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‘Well, nevertheless, nevertheless.’ 
 
6.1 We Make Our Meanings and They Mean 
 
“Let us take up this creative doubt from another angle.” Michael Heller 
 
In October 1974, Oppen wrote in a letter to critic and poet David McAleavey: “This merging 
of the poetic and the philosophic: their epistemologies are inseparable […] (their ontologies 
inseparable. Their ethic indistinguishable) […] tho the letters of the alphabet become 
gibberish well, nevertheless, nevertheless, we make our meanings and they mean.”6.1 Let 
us refocus on our earlier phrase: the ‘forms of understanding’ – the ‘intelligibility’ that Oppen 
as poet is trying though the pressures of ‘partially articulate states’, as Peter Middleton puts 
it, to alter, to enhance, both for himself and for his reader. This is the field of ‘poetic 
knowledge’, the subjective insight that fails the evidential tests of conventional knowledge 
criteria, but which nonetheless probes ontologies (what might be understood) and 
epistemologies (our understanding of that understanding) through its “interrupted 
predicates and unconsolidated propositions”.6.2 At a conscious level, while we have no 
answer to the so-called ‘hard problem’ (our inability to account for the subjective sense of 
consciousness, our self-awareness), we have previously identified meaning within the 
conceptual structures encoded in language. This is the current understanding of cognitive 
science. “We only have access to our conceptual systems. Words (linguistic elements) 
reference concepts. Concepts are not, however, unrelated to the ‘world out there’.”6.3 
Concepts arise from re-described percepts, which derive from both our sensorimotor 
experience and our internal states, and all of which are filtered through our specifically 
human physical and neurological architecture.6.4 “These percepts are the raw data which, 
when reanalysed, form the concepts to which we have direct access.”6.5 When Oppen refers 
to an object or event he perceives in the world ‘out there’, he refers us to a mediated percept 
“redescribed into a format accessible to our conceptual system” and subsequently “assigned 
a linguistic label”.6.5 
 
 
If the unconscious management of the percept to concept re-expression is inescapably 
inaccessible to us, nonetheless, cognitive studies do have something to say about the 
necessary nature of such processing, and this edges us into the essential ground of Oppen’s 
apprehension. Oppen said: “The peculiar attribute of words is that they spring 





spring? The ‘image’ they conjure is “not an image of something, but the content of 
consciousness”;6.7 that is, it comes out of something as yet more amorphous, as yet more  
subjectively experienced, less objectified, less objectively defined. We might suggest the 
‘content of consciousness’ prior to its emergence into words is what Oppen identified as 
“[The Poem] before anything was said.”6.9 It correlates perhaps with the components that 
constitute the image schema hypothesis at the roots of preconscious and pre-verbalised 
understanding: a pre-linguistic level of meaning that must be, in its way, encoded prior to 
rising to the surface through the codes of concept and then of language. Oppen suggests: 
“we know of an actuality other than, prior to that which is the consciousness’[s] self- 
knowledge”6.10: ‘knowing’, presumably, as an intuited, pre-linguistically labelled, sense of 
coherence. He described that actuality [these phrases in upper case emphasis to himself in 
his notes] as: “The image, the spatial dimension, the temporal dimension: without this there 
seems no proof, no recognition, no conviction…the poem must conceive the world or it is 
argument, chatter”.6.11 So Oppen envisages the apprehension of reality at an unconscious 
and pre-verbalized level which spontaneously triggers the flow of image and words in 
consciousness and which authenticity he as poet is determined to capture as “the primacy 
of subject”6.12, in preference to a subsequent, post hoc, intellectualisation. 
 
6.2 Languages of Thought 
 
“True only by becoming true.” Quentin Lauer 
 
An Oppen Daybook entry (according to Stephen Cope: “Likely […] after the completion of the 
manuscript for Of Being Numerous”6.13) states: “I mean my work to be a process of thought. 
Which means I am the literary equivalent of the scientist not […] the entertainer,”6.14 which 
we may take to mean scientist as serious researcher, mindful of Middleton’s ‘poetic right of 
experiment and inquiry’. The research study of what was called a ‘language of thought’ was 
first formalised forty years ago among philosophers of mind as a Language Of Thought 
Hypothesis (LOTH), notably by Jerry Fodor in his 1975 book of that name, coincident with 
Oppen’s publication of Primitive. It has developed since alongside the research of 
neuropsychologists.6.15 LOTH asserts that thought and thinking take place in a ‘mental 
language’ and that this language consists of a system of representations that is physically 
realized in the brain of thinkers. LOTH philosophers opt for a restricted range of applications 
for their hypothesis, having in mind primarily simple propositional relations between 
concepts, typically expressible in the varieties of propositional logic (also called predicate 





a semantic one”6.16 as we have earlier stated, and in line with structuralist thinking in 
cognitive linguistics. We can, however, separate Chomsky’s generalized notion of the 
‘language of thought’ from this specific LOTH. The latter is a rigorous schema operating 
within strict philosophical logic. However, the ‘softer’ notion remains a perhaps more 
usefully suggestive hypothetical tool in cognitive science, even where the actual ‘mechanics’ 
of the formation of structures of understanding (if such reductionist terminology proves 
appropriate), and which must include those such as image schema simulations, remain 
unknown. We have considered the significance of grounded cognition in the formation of 
mental representations, such that information from all the sensory modalities is potentially 
involved. While LOTH is silent about the nature of some mental phenomena (qualia, sensory 
processes, visual and auditory imagination, sensory memory, perceptual pattern-recognition 
capacities, dreaming, hallucinating), there is strong evidence that consciousness exploits an 
image-like representational medium in many of these kinds of mental tasks. “Whether 
sensory or perceptual processes are to be treated within the framework of full-blown LOTH 
is again an open empirical question. It might be that the answer to this question is 
affirmative. If so, there may be more than one LOT realized in different subsystems or 
mechanisms in the mind/brain. So LOTH is not committed to there being a single 
representational system realized in the brain, nor is it committed to the claim that all mental 
representations are complex or language-like, nor would it be falsified if it turns out that 
most aspects of mental life other than the ones involving propositional attitudes don't 
require a LOT.”6.17 
 
 
In the well-established Chomskian idea of ‘deep structure’ in natural language formation, we 
have specifically the study of the syntax of generative (also known as transformational) 
grammars. A generative grammar of language attempts to give a set of rules that will 
correctly predict which combinations of words will form grammatical sentences. So in this 
picture a sentence is a ‘surface structure’ that has been derived from a deeper one, with an 
additional lexical form obtained from processing that surface structure subsequently. 
Chomsky has noted that by separating deep from surface structure, one could understand 
‘slip of the tongue’ moments (where someone says something unintended) as instances 
where deep structures have not translated fully into the intended surface structure.6.18 The 
notion of underlying structure has been taken up in areas of research other than linguistics 
and typically deep structures have been thought of as representing meanings while surface 





concept of deep structure favoured by Chomsky or the majority of researchers in the field. 
The interplay between levels is, in their opinion, subtler and more complex in both syntactic 
and semantic terms and we are at risk of over-simplification. 
 
 
Whatever conceptual shuffling is, however, active at pre-conscious ‘levels’, current 
reductionist research thinking supports the understanding of that transition from 
unarticulated perception to pre-linguistic labelling as involving a minimal conceptual unit, a 
morpheme equivalent from which a conceptual component of an image schema, for 
example, is built.6.19 The view is of a ‘mental representation’ which the brain uses to denote 
received experience in symbolic form.6.20 Within this schema, any coherently organized 
knowledge such as that of an in-out containment schema must be based on individual pieces 
of minimal conceptual coherence. It also assumes mental states are ultimately physical 
states; that mental changes and physical changes (neural correlates) are concurrent.6.21 
While correlates are far from being necessarily causal, many are. So we might hypothesize a 
mental representation in the brain as a consequence of neural activity in which memory 
comparison, categorization and inference, have resulted. Even in the relatively simple case 
of sight, it seems we see as much through our brains as our eyes. Our visual experience is a 
mixture of information coming in from the eyes with much prior association evident in 
transient neural activity in the visual cortex. For every neural connection carrying 
information from retina to cortex, there are at least ten going in the opposite direction. 
Research also shows the same brain areas in use for vision as for our visual imagination.6.22 
Information from the retina is insufficient and we use our imagination to fill in the gaps,  
converting an inadequate image from the eyes into something detailed and precise in the 
brain. These concepts will be “denoted by symbol or group of symbols.”6.23 We know the 
brain is buzzing with local constellations of neural networks, operating below the level of 
consciousness. In each moment what may be called ‘net consciousness’ (which we might 
envisage as some kind of composite of grounded simulations which themselves are 
composites of many mental representations) consists of the transiently recruited assemblies 
of neuron activity, both sensory-stimulated and triggered by association. Those mental 
representations which constitute coherent concepts allow us to draw inference about our 
experiences; to categorize, remember, make decisions, and learn. We have already 
discussed how abstract concepts can arise from the transformation of concrete concepts 
derived from embodied experience, and how “the mechanism of transformation is that 





mapped onto a blended space.”6.24 In short, it is proposed that a mental representation is an 
internal cognitive symbol, or set of symbols, representing the brain’s experience of ‘external 
reality’. If this seems rather static, the representation is also, of course, a mental process 
making use of such symbols.6.25 The mental imagery will be of things not currently seen or 
sensed by the sensory-motor system: objects, events and situations. Through mental 
representation we may not actually see and smell but we can imagine in any of the sensory 
modalities. We can even imagine things we have never seen or done before.6.26 
 
6.3 Phenomenal Consciousness 
 
“Subjective experience is a slippery fish” Anil Ananthaswamy 
 
A focus on the brain as an organic biological entity that grows and develops as the organism 
does is a prerequisite to a neurally-plausible theory of how image schemas might structure 
pre-linguistic and subsequently fully verbal languages. “Convergent evidence from the 
cognitive neurosciences is establishing a neural basis for image schemata as dynamic 
activation patterns that are shared across the neural maps of the sensorimotor cortex.”6.27 
Numerous experimental studies on fully-functioning individuals, coupled with neurological 
studies of patients with brain injury coupled to language deficits, have established that “the 
sensorimotor cortices are crucial to the semantic comprehension of bodily action terms and 
sentences.”6.27 There is active investigation of the neurobiologically plausible bases for image 
schemas, by tracing the cognitive and neural development of such schemas through both 
animal neuroanatomical and human neuroimaging studies. In addition, recent fMRI 
(functional magnetic resonance imaging) and ERP (event related potential) experiments 
show that literal and metaphoric language stimuli activate areas of sensorimotor cortex 
consonant with the image schema hypothesis. “These emerging bodies of evidence seem to 
show how image schematic functions of the sensorimotor cortex can and probably do 
structure both metaphorical understanding and linguistic expression.”6.27 6.28 
 
 
The phenomenologist philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (whom Oppen acknowledged 
having read6.29) said that “science manipulates things and gives up living in them.”6.30 In other 
words, the discourse that is science typically functions through a subdivision and conceptual 
manipulability of objectified phenomena, studying the world as it were from the ‘outside’, 
as opposed to subjectively ‘experiencing’ it. This is merely a statement of fact, of the 
constraints inherent in the methodology of scientific analysis. However, where the 





what conscious scientia can we expect to grasp? Heller suggests that the poetic cannon falls 
foul of the generalizing and abstracting procedures of science in the categorizing of 
authorship in terms of its “repertoire of devices and effects”, rather than following 
Zukofsky’s identification of authors as articulated mind-body states with “capacities to ‘tune 
in’ on the ‘human tradition’.”6.30 And further, that “this tradition, a response to felt needs, 
to ‘keeping time with the pulse of existence’, and not to the representations of the classroom 
or writing workshop, is what informs an individual poetic talent.” Heller has put this in terms 
of the “writer [as] not a user of the tool ‘language’ but [as] a kind of idiom (Merleau-Ponty’s 
formulation) or a genre.”6.30 The poet isn’t using the tool of language to express but, from 
the phenomenologist’s perspective, the poet and the language are one, and the language is 
using the poet as much as vice versa. In fact, to dismiss the dualistic identification altogether 
is to assert that the poet is the language and the language the poet, and the poem merely 




Neuroscientific research casts an interesting focus on this. “To be aware enough of a 
stimulus to reflect on it and talk about it” is to have what’s called “access consciousness”.6.31 
But researchers take this as just one end of the spectrum ranging from completely unaware 
to fully aware. Around the midpoint of this would be ‘phenomenal consciousness’, the 
subjective experience of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling or touching. Experimentally there 
are many examples in which subjects demonstrate awareness of a lot more than we put into 
words. For example, in vision observers of a complex scene while focused on just a part of it 
are subsequently able to demonstrate conscious recall, of an unconscious awareness, of 
much that surrounds the focus, even in visual scans lasting no more than a few hundred 
milliseconds.6.32 While children show the pattern-finding capabilities characteristic of the  
human brain that we have previously noted, they are less good at focusing attention on 
particulars and shutting out peripheral ‘interference’. Adult control of attention is likened to 
a spotlight, in contrast to the lamplight of the child “shedding diffuse light on everything 
around”.6.32 As a result, young children may experience the world as ‘total immersion’. Alison 
Gopnik, a psychologist at the University of California, Berkeley, describes this as akin to an 
adult’s total immersion in an engrossing movie: “You are not in control, your consciousness 
is not planning, your self seems to disappear…Yet the events in the movie are very very vivid 
in your awareness”.6.33 As Oppen struggles to express it: “Impossible to doubt the actualness 





the principle of ACTUALNESS for it, itself, is actual beyond doubt.”6.34 Similarly: “The prosody 
and the ‘philosophy’ cannot be separated […] but I can speak of the process of poetry, and 
poetry has come from everywhere […] and everything we know or think we know.”6.35 
Linking the two in a Daybook entry: “Actualness is prosody, it is the purpose of prosody and 
its achievement, the instant of meaning, the achievement of meaning and of presence, the 
sequence of disclosure which comes from everywhere.”6.34 Typically, for ‘convenience’, a 
cognitive scientist today might say (inheriting directly from the dualism of early modern 
thinkers such as Descartes and Locke) that perception, imagination, intellect and the will, 
are Kantian ‘representations’, or ideas in the mind.6.36 This is the dualistic mental 
representational language we have used in exploring image schemas and conceptual 
metaphor. As Taylor Carman clarifies Locke’s original formulation, ideas were taken as 
objects of consciousness; “we are aware of them; they are what our attitudes… are 
about.”6.36 The phenomenologist’s criticism of this dualistic conceptualisation scheme is that 
we don’t know how we manage to be aware of anything. We don’t understand our own 
awareness of our ideas. Do we need a further layer of ideas beneath those ideas which yet 
fail to explain our awareness of an external world? 
 
6.4 Conclusion: The Shadows of Water6.37 
 
“the singing was and is” George Oppen 
 
Oppen’s “fastidiousness”6.38, as Michael Heller points out, led him “deeper into 
uncertainty”.6.39 The world became ever “more mysterious to him […] Instability, 
uncertainty, these were the atmospherics and risks of enlarging freedom. The poet who 
followed out their dictates and pressures was that ‘unacknowledged legislator’ of reality.”6.39 
John Taggart has written that “the poetics of a major poet throws everything into 
question.”6.40 Where “good” poets, “even interesting poets”, question, they do so “within 
their generation’s understanding.” In contrast, major poets “continue to consider all answers 
and their assumptions […] open up the range of what the poem might be […] by putting 
everything in doubt […] make the poem always possible.”6.41 He reiterates the fact of words 
as “two things” which “fulfil two functions”. They are “the means by which things … are 
brought to conscious definition” and they are “things in themselves.” Then, in talking of 
Oppen’s poetry and its historical absence from anthologies, Taggart writes: “The poem which 
at every point radiates process, often in jagged hesitating manner, frustrates expectations 
fed on ‘finished’ verse”.6.42 He continues: “Oppen’s poetry is a continual, if quiet, opposition 





“The poem hesitates…the poem hesitates but moves on…the poem moves on…the poem 
ends quietly”.6.43 “The more and more scrupulous exercise of attention produces further 
isolation and knowledge that more and more knows itself to be provisional.”6.44 
 
We began this discussion with the objective of exploring Oppen’s late poetics in relation to 
our current knowledge of cognition and its expression as language. We have looked at Oppen 
as a major 20th century example of a poet searching for meaning at the most fundamental 
level of self-conscious speculation available to the reflective individual. He knew nothing of 
the brain’s functioning that we now know from the neurosciences. He seems to have taken 
no great interest in the emerging cognitive psychology of his day. Yet he did read amongst 
the works of ‘philosophers of mind’, specifically Maritain, Heidegger, Hegel and Merleau- 
Ponty; and he exchanged ideas with many friends and fellow poets, each with their fingers 
to some degree on the intellectual movements and cultural pulse of their times. We have 
made the point that Oppen was a poet and not an academic. While the possibilities for 
reflective exploration of consciousness, perception and meaning, were available to him not 
only in the psychological sciences and philosophies of mind into which he took some 
selective interest, there were also perennial Eastern philosophies with their foci on 
consciousness, its deeper relationship to experience, and its suspicion of over- 
intellectualisation, which he might have pursued but did not.6.45 Nor does he seem to have 
taken any overt interest in the evolving academic studies of linguistics and semantics. Oppen 
was an outsider and an individualist in all senses of the word. Yet his calling was to work 
through some of the deeper questions of the self in its consciously analytical and intuitively 
preconscious conditions; questions of what it means to ‘experience’; to know deep emotion 
and to connect it with the directly impinging world. His calling was to work through these 
questions with, and in, words; to go deep and somehow re-emerge with language; to take 
words, matching their inadequacies just sufficient to put them on the page as they arose, 
pondering long and hard on the use of each, habitually revising and redrafting, ‘worrying 
away’ at them unceasingly, reusing them over and over, as if somehow to get them by 
attrition to encapsulate just some iota of authentic being: 
 
…to say what one knows and to 
limit oneself to this… from ‘The Lighthouses’, NCP 256. 
 
What cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics give us today is a conceptual framework 
of grounded cognition, image schema and conceptual metaphor, and tentative models for 





might or might not echo Michael Heller’s assessment that “of all contemporary poets, none 
has more searchingly investigated, through poetry, the attempt to mean, to examine how 
language is used and thus to account for the very vocabulary of our modernity”.6.46 Heller 
was writing in 1985 and thirty years of continuing innovation have passed. Nonetheless, 
while Peter Nicholls commented in 2007 on the growing regard for Oppen over ‘the last 
decade’6.47, still Michael Heller was writing in 2008 that Oppen, “as a poet whose language 
is spare and whose sentiments are uncommon”, certainly “would, at any time, be difficult to 
put into focus or to place into an academic category”.6.48 This difficulty to categorise (beyond, 
that is, the obvious Objectivist stance of his early adult years) is perhaps the greatest 
compliment we can pay George Oppen and most certainly applies to his late work considered 
here. No poet appreciates categorization alongside others; each poet hopes for individuality 
in their work; to be different is to be oneself and the product of one’s own struggles rather 
than the product of the clichés of one’s time. Oppen certainly escaped those clichés. 
 
 
If our original question was to ask whether or not correlations between the later Oppen’s 
preoccupations and our current cognitive scientific insights exist, then the evidence of this 
dissertation suggests an answer in the affirmative. The point, of course, was to support the 
notion of an exploratory poetics in pushing at the boundaries of conceptual, and hence 
aesthetic, possibility. The significance of Oppen’s later poetry for second-decade 21st century 
poets lies, therefore, in Peter Middleton’s “putting pressure on intelligibility so that it 
alters”.6.49 If we were to take Oppen’s individual struggle for clarity as, among other things, 
a one-man experiment in the exploration of phenomenological ideas applied to poetic 
practice, then we could say he was indeed stretching our conceptual boundaries. His is a 
‘philosophical poetics’ and a ‘poetics of being’. His very questioning of the cognitive process, 
of what  may  and  what  may  not  be  expressible,  what  meant,  what   truly  meaningful  if   































































































































































































[…] shall we 
say more 
than this I can 
say more there it 
is I can 
say more we have already begun 
to speak walk the round 
earth for dark 
truths and blazing 
truths are the same they 
move waver almost 
stand in my 
mind continually 
in our dreams like the shadows 
of water 
moving if 
in time we see 
the words fail this 
we know this 
we walk in and is all 





will speak from ‘Neighbors’, NCP 284. 
 
 
6.5 Finally: Beyond Oppen 
 
“It is a good moment for the possibilities of the poem” The Enthusiast 
 
We can place this thesis in its wider context. The formalism and cliché of early 20th century 
English language verse had been replaced by the adoption of vers libre and the radical form 
and content of Eliot’s ‘Prufrock’ and ‘Waste Land’, as well as by Pound’s Imagisme (in its 
pristine, pre-‘Amygism’, form). In both, the concision and precision of language (le mot juste 
and the ‘luminous detail’) informed a prosody which moved beyond exclusively semantic 
sense alone, incorporating aspects of the ’concrete’, the dissonant, and the juxtaposed, that 
were emerging in other art forms at the time. We might loosely equate an exclusive 
attention to the purely semantic in poetic language with the purely representational in the 
visual arts; while the non-semantic aspects of language parallel abstraction in the visual. The 
avant-garde modernist aesthetics which continued to evolve during the 20th century 
included this disruption of prosaic semantic sense: in the extreme as Dada-esque attention 
to the visual and the aural ‘materiality’ of language; in the more moderate as a balance 
between semantics (including etymologically layered polysemy) and that materiality. At 
the turn of the twenty-first century, critic Marjorie Perloff expressed a view of 
   
early 







 modernism  has  provided  the  seeds  of  the  materialist  poetic  which  is  increasingly
 
our
 own.”6.50  She  described  the  ‘new  poetics’  arising  out  of  “Language
 poetry and related avant-garde” practices in its radical distinction  from ‘the true voice 
of feeling’ or ‘natural speech’  paradigm “so dominant in the 1960s and 1970s.” Donald 
Davie  has spoken  of the readership  that  prefers  “nothing  difficult ”, characterised  by 
others as ‘the cult of Larkin’. 
 














































attempting to create”,6.54 with which we introduced this 
dissertation’s research question,
 
does seem to be a poetic research project that is very 
much alive and well. Part of that, in
 
Peter Middleton’s recent words, “re-invites the timely 






























complexities that arise when we start to ask 
questions about just what lines such as those
 
opening [Oppen] lines [of the first poem of 
Seascape: Needle’s Eye] could possibly be saying,
 
and the possible directions in which we 
would need to go to find conceptual assistance.” He
 
continues: “The urgencies felt in Oppen
’s poem underline the value of understanding the
 
semantics of syntactic breakdown; this is 
not a poem that wants us to settle only for the
 
pleasures of opacity.”6.56 Rather, as Simon 
Jarvis puts it: “where vocabularies break down […]
 
the possibility of new thinking is 
glimpsed.”6.57 In such “multi-phasic or polyphonic” readings,
 





















































































               
poetry and related avant-garde” practices in its radical distinction from ‘the true voice 
of feeling’ or ‘natural speech’  paradigm “so dominant in the 1960s and 1970s.” Donald 
Davie has spoken of the readership that prefers “nothing difficult”, characterised by 
others as ‘the cult of Larkin’.6.51 Fifteen years after Perloff’s essay collection, the
authorial voice, that  “laureate  poetry  –  intimate,  anecdotal,  and  broadly  accessible”6.50   
thrives anew, not least under the guise of widely popular performance poetries among 
a younger generation already familiar with lyric and rap. At the same time, the 
experimental engagement with “the technological and formal inventions of modernism 
at its origins”has kept its course, thriving among a smaller audience through magazines 
and online sites. This is Perloff’s ‘second wave’ modernism. She quotes Velimir 
Khlebnikov: “the roots of words are only phantoms behind which stand the strings of 
the alphabet.”6.52 She quotes Wittgenstein: “To imagine a language is to imagine a form 
of life.” Oppen’s materiality of both that life and language is here. Perloff’s essay coll- 
ection
 
goes on to explore modernism at the millennium, identifying innovative threads 
that
 
connect present day experimentation to the aspirations of those radicals of one 
hundred years ago; aspirations prematurely nullified by the First World War and 
the
 
two major totalitarian regimes that followed, and by a second World War and   a Cold 
War
 






























cognitive poetics adopts  the  premise  that  a  poem-text  exists  as  co


























processes in that text, seeks to integrate the experiential realism of 
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Middleton's concern is for the development of a literary criticism that can encompass the 
issues of this linguistic fragmentation and speculative propositionality. Writing in 2010, he 
felt the discussion to be "premature because literary studies is in the process of re-
assessing its commitments to certain understandings of language, reasoning, and mind 
that for several decades provided epistemological support and ontological axioms whose 
role as guarantors of argument tended to be overlooked, and whose authority was there-
fore  hard  to  engage  with,  let  alone  challenge."6.59  One  evolving  literary  critical  approach  
which explicitly recognises the developments in cognitive psychology and cognitive 
linguistics to which this dissertation  refers is the stylistics focus known as cognitive 
poetics.6.60 I have added a short
t c hi t t o a p a o t ,ht r o hp a a c t i ci t ghp c o hv m s thg ot hc t hw i t r ho hj c b hc f h p m t t i t gh
hp a o s s m a ohc t hi t t o . . i g i b i . i t y - "6 - 61  In  that  vein,  George  Oppen's  late  work  offers  a  direct
 route  into  those  issues  of  cognition  as  they  relate  to  the  aesthetic  possibilities  of  
poetic knowledge - a corpus of unique importance in the 20th century innovative 
poetic canon.
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Appendix One: Oppen’s Crisis of Confidence 
 
‘A simple realism’A.1 
 
A.1 Wounds I Didn’t Know I Had 
 
“People visit and I am shaken.” George Oppen 
 
Oppen completed Of Being Numerous early in 1966, although the collection would not be 
published until March 1968. In a subsequent Daybook note to himself in June 1966, Oppen 
described his reading of Heidegger’s Essays on Metaphysics: Identity and Difference 
(translated by Kurt F.Liedecker, published in 1960, and borrowed from Brooklyn Public 
Library by Mary Oppen) and his response to it. “I had been reading the first essay, 19 pages 
long, without being able to understand it clearly. Tho I was reading with great excitement 
and effort […] That night I sat up late, very carefully reading the essay, and after many hours 
felt I had understood it.”A.2 He adds that having “turned it over and over in my mind for a 
long time, unable to accept the [idealist] assumption, but convinced that a part of the 
statement was of crucial importance to me, of such importance as to alter the subjective 
conditions of my life, the conditions of my thinking, from that point in time.”[my italics]A.2 I 
italicize the final phrases because they are so significant a statement. While Oppen will take 
time to absorb this alteration to his thinking, it is the moment that marks the turn away from 
the predominantly assertive poetry of social and political comment to one in which he will 
explore a more personal boundary between external and internal, subjective, realities. The 
evolution of Oppen’s being in a state of doubt, in questioning mode, about himself and the 
world, including certain ethical uncertainties (which he would write about to his daughter in 
the same month) is evinced in a letter he wrote to poet John Crawford several months earlier 
(January 1966). He refers to his wartime experience and a pacifist dream-based conviction 
of the time that “[I] shouldn’t be trying to kill people”. Bearing in mind the turmoil of 
American cultural and political life in 1966 (after a month-long pause in the bombing of 
North Vietnam, bombing would be resumed on 31st January 1967 and the Oppens would join 
the anti-war demonstration to Washington in response) he nonetheless could say: “I don’t 
know that I know absolutes, and can’t imagine knowing absolute values, even in dreams. I 
am sure, in fact, I don’t.”A.3 In discussing dreams, superstitions, and theological implications 
(which Oppen refers to as “unexamined presuppositions”), he admits that “I don’t find it too 







Following their annual summer months’ sailing holiday on the coast of Maine, the Oppen’s 
decided to move from New York to San Francisco, a move which they completed in mid-  
February 1967. The change of location would also mark the change of emphasis, indeed  
‘direction’, in Oppen’s writing. In a letter to Frederick Will in late April/early  May  1967,  
Oppen will write: “Having no German at all, much less Heideggerian German, I am dependent 
on translations, therefore my knowledge of H. is sharply limited.”
A.5
 Nonetheless, he 
attributes the insight expressed in ‘Route’(‘13’, NCP, 201) which relates directly to the 
question of conjectural poetics, to his even earlier readings of Heidegger: “Substance itself 
which has been the subject  of  all  our  planning /  And  by  this  are  we  carried  into  the  
incalculable.”A.6 As for  the  poetic  practicalities  of  writing  the  incalculable,  in  an  undated  
letter (probably from early 1968) written to his philosopher son-in-law Alexander 
Mourelatos, Oppen reveals his difficulties in moving on from the poems written for Of Being 
Numerous: “I am having trouble getting beyond it, I find myself making cadences I don’t  
need, making cadences I’ve used before only because I did use them before – ‘imitating  
myself’, unable to get clear – or back in the world.”A.7 In trying to pin down what does 
count
 
in a poem, he tells Mourelatos: “a poem is really about myself. It is an instance of ‘being in
 
the world’ Yes: an admission of ‘what is autonomous in us’ or ‘in the genes’; it could even
 
refer to Kant, you see; the limits of judgement, the limits of pure reason.” Quoting his own
 























it s  o b j ec t iv it y  a s  det a c h ed.He
 
acknowledges Heidegger’s role in drawing him into a h eno m -
enological perspective on the
 
world in which he has yet to find (to steal Pound’s phrase) a 
language in which to think, let
 
alone write. Oppen often added comments to his Daybook notes
at a later time, and a typed
 
addition to the handwritten note of June 1966 probably dates from 
this 
later time. In it he
 



































































extended interview to L.S.Dembo on 25th April.
 
The Oppens then went via New York to
 
Maine for their usual sailing holiday, staying there until the start of September. The summer
was stormy and the sailing less satisfactory than usual. In letters of July and November (to
 





spoke several times of the difficulty of “getting beyond” Numerous”.A.9 The start of 1969 then 
saw negotiations begin over publication of a Collected Poems with the UK’s Fulcrum Press, 
which was to prove protracted and ultimately abortive and would cause Oppen a good deal 
of frustration over the coming two years. Around this time (late 1968/early 1969), Oppen 
exchanged letters with poet Robert Duncan, following publication in 1968 of Duncan’s 
Bending the Bow collection. Oppen was extremely complimentary: “temporarily 
overwhelmed […] it is very far beyond what has been done.”A.10 Oppen sent Duncan “a 
selection of Heidegger [ ] ‘early’ and ‘late’ periods.” He also comments, referencing his own 
writing in contrast to Duncan’s, that “I mean to find, not create, the handholds.” He 
recognises Duncan’s difference: “And am troubled now to witness your leap, the leap also in 
the music [ ] my dedication to ‘realism’, to the proof in the image rather than the creation 
of image for the first time, I feel, challenged [ ] and yet, finally, I feel we must find [ ] We are 
native, hopelessly native . . Hopelessly included . But you’ll find yourself closer to 
H[Heidegger]’s Dasein than I am.” In spite of a firmly established phenomenological stance 
by this stage, Oppen remains rooted in the materialism of his objectivist principles, yet 




On the up-side, the move to San Francisco had begun to contribute an impetus to new work, 
first in some of the ‘San Francisco Poems’ that Oppen would include in Seascape: Needle’s 
Eye (1972). In letters to his niece, Diane Meyer, and to his friend Harvey Shapiro (poet and 
editor of the New York Times Book Review), Oppen refers to their ongoing composition. In 
the Shapiro letter he even states: “I’ve been working over it all these months. And in fact, 
more: I had notes and scraps of it written on our exploratory trip last year.”A.11 While Oppen 
can say “it is blazingly beautiful in and about San Francisco, a great deal more beautiful than 
perhaps the poem manages to say”, he is conscious of political events: “Difficult again to 
believe in the importance of poetry. The army tightens up, some kids surely will be shot soon. 
Art becomes (again) more and more a struggle against the artworld, the art-attitudes .. and 
against little else”A.11 – Oppen presumably feeling again the social and political echoes of 
the 1930s’ turmoil in which poetry did indeed fail him, and then the intolerant politics of the 
early Cold War years which drove him, and his family, into exile in Mexico. Nonetheless, the 
move ‘beyond’ will be in the offing as Oppen turns progressively towards the more 







subsequent collections, but not before the most unsettling twelve months of his later life 
which was about to fall upon him. 
 
On 6th May 1969 Oppen was awarded the Pulitzer prize for Of Being Numerous. Oppen’s 
letters of that month, for example to Harvey Shapiro and L.S. Dembo, reflect a disorientation 
that followed the recognition. He speaks of the prize as “in view of the record, a questionable 
compliment” but “On the other hand, I needed it badly”A.12 [SL 195]. He reflects on being “at 
sixty-one, the self-confident unknown is awkward - - - I mean gauche, a gaucherie, I commit 
gaucheries at parties”.A.12 It seems Oppen has been taken out of his social comfort zone and 
what he observes in himself as inadequacies are revealed (“I picture myself as a flustered 
infant”A.12). To his sister, June Oppen Degnan (publisher of San Francisco Review and a key 
organiser for both McCarthy’s and McGovern’s Democratic presidential campaigns), he 
writes “I don’t quite know what I’ve done in and thru this book (with the slightly 
embarrassing help of a deceased newspaper publisher [Pulitzer]) Something. Something 
done far more directly in the teeth, the orthodontures, of the poetic taste, the artistic 
sniggers and nervous ticks of the moment than I knew”.A.13 His analysis “on that level of 
gossip [referencing a Strand magazine review] to understand […] to analyse the formation  
and deformation of taste, fighting a battle of taste - - - I’m licking wounds I didn’t know I 
had: [ ] trying to take pride in valors I was unaware of having possessed.”A.13 
 
 
A.2 Reasons To Love 
 
“Only one mistake, Ezra!” George Oppen 
 
The following month Oppen met Ezra Pound for the first time since 1937, quite by chance, 
in the offices of New Directions Publishing. As he described it: “Jay Laughlin [founder and 
editor] and two or three other people of New Directions in the room. Pound enters with 
Olgar Rudge. Pound silent. Olgar and the rest chatter to cover situation. I didn’t want to 
chatter, and stood up to leave. Jay says to Pound: give George a copy of your book.A.14 Pound 
says – uninflected, low voice: How do I know he wants it. I walked over to Pound and held 
out my hand and said, I want it. I had stood close, so that Pound would not need to reach 
out. But Pound stood up, and that brought us touching, or nearly touching each other. Pound 
took hold of my hand, and held on. I began to weep Pound began to weep. We cried over 
each other – by that time neither of us could speak, so I took the book, and left. I don’t know, 






sincere or serious person who ever met Pound has reason to have loved him. I write this out 
simply for the sake of the facts, the historical facts.”A.15 
 
 
In mid-summer 1969, George and Mary were in Maine on their annual sailing holiday based 
at Little Deer Island, and sailing a boat he characterized subsequently as “very small, very 
precarious and very cozy, very innocent” – being, presumably, a return to a hands-on 
innocence of familiar activity and security of location. Picking up the poetry, however, 
proved difficult and the inexorability of the Vietnam War and the political and social fall-out 
pressed hard on him. Writing to George Johnson, a translator and professor at Ottawa 
University: “The young seem to me magnificent, but I am aware that it is largely that they 
are young [ ] Must be admitted, however, that so far their courage has held, and perhaps 
ours will too.”A.16 On their way back from Maine in September, the Oppens spent two weeks 
in Brooklyn before heading home to San Francisco. Oppen may have read at one or two 
events in San Francisco in late September and early October, the evidence is unclear, but on 
16th October he cancelled the reading tour of eight universities planned for October, 
November, and February, due to begin on 22nd October. As he explained to Elizabeth Kray 
(the American Academy of Poets organizer) in an apologetic telegram: “It would seem I can’t 
go into business as a famous man - - or half-famous either. [ ] I didn’t know that about myself, 
or had forgotten […] I can no longer hear my poetry, I will never be able to write another 
line, I will never know myself again […] The books will have to fend for themselves [ ] I lack a 
public character: [ ] I am afraid I am incapable of it.”A.17 
 
 
Handling recognition after a lifetime of relative neglect by the academic and literary 
publishing worlds might be one factor in Oppen’s withdrawal.A.18 More deeply, Oppen as a 
young man had stepped boldly away from the confines of his family’s values and made a 
social, cultural, and political life for himself and Mary which put him at odds with the 
prevailing establishment for at least thirty years. War service in the infantry, for which he 
had volunteered, brought its share of traumatic experience and then he returned to his 
home country to find himself labelled subversive for his pre-war Communist affiliations in 
spite of that war service; a decade-long exile in Mexico for himself and his family followed. 
The post-war Oppen seems often to display aspects of personality we might today readily 
identify as facets of post-traumatic stress which we now know one never gets truly over but 
simply learns to live with. As Rachel Blau DuPlessis put it: “all the scarring, emotional stress, 
guilt, sorrow and survivor’s luck make, according to veterans, a very fraught minefield.”A.19 




writing. DuPlessis adds that “Oppen is Oppen, with flaws, annoyances, blind spots, needs, 
repeated anecdotes, a sometimes annoying, unanswerable bluntness.”A.20 Yet this was 
mixed in with a generosity of spirit and a dry humour to which many friends and 
correspondents have attested. Nonetheless, Oppen was an outsider whom the Pulitzer Prize 
suddenly brought in from the cold. It brought him, and indeed he and Mary as a couple, to a 
crisis of self-confidence, of identity, and an insistence on his part of not needing the 
notoriety. When 1970 saw the failure by Fulcrum in London to ensure publication of his 
Collected Poems (which fell instead to New Directions in 1975), in a letter to poet Philip 
Booth he speaks of “little stability gained in being 62.”A.21 He and Mary had undertaken their 
customary summer sailing holiday, but Oppen says of it: “I’ve been shaken somehow or 
other this last year, Phil [ ] which is somehow or other, I suppose, responsible for our failing 
to get to Castine again [one of their familiar sailing destinations], tho I forget the details of 
that – Bad weather once, I remember, we turned back – But we’ve been doing odd things -- 
-- the ‘world’ of poetry: too much for our sense of who we are and who and whatever we 
are not.”A.21 
 
In July 1970, Oppen wrote to his sister June Oppen Degnan of the now established move 
from New York to San Francisco and “the NY poem [Of Being Numerous] [being] intellectual 
and philosophic”, whereas the SF poems are “atmospheric”.A.22 He added: “I am fascinated 
by the thought of a ‘philosophic’ poem about a small and beautiful city – to be able to say 
what a small and sophisticated city means. […] the meaning of sophisticated small cities – 
‘atmospherically’ at least.” Earlier in 1970, writing to Harvey Shapiro, Oppen elaborates: “My 
own work thins, is what’s happening, thins in the influence of the California skies and the 
seascape [ ] Something happening to the solidity of objects and the sense of city [ ] Those 
islands, those things which seem at the same time uncompromisingly to exist and to be lost 
still in my mind but the emphasis shifts for me to the thing they are lost in – [ ] Well, there 
we are: [ ] This In Which, which I seem to have spoken of before, but the centre of the picture 
changes for me…”A.23 Oppen’s new found vision seems also well expressed in the following, 
from an October 1970 letter to poet Philip Booth (author of Letter from a Distant Land 
collection): “that distant land, the world one slowly wakes to [ ] Always wakes to And always 
slowly at each waking. [ ] The sea that makes us islands [ ] The margins”.A.24 While Oppen 
retains some residual anxiety – that “little stability gained in being 62”A.24 – by the end of 
the year he is able to tell Harvey Shapiro that “finally, -- last couple months – I’m able to 
write lines without absurd and self-destructive labour.”A.25. The ‘San Francisco Poems’ were 





would not be published until the end of 1972 and the New Directions Collected, as we’ve 
said, not until 1975. Unaware of the delays to come, in April 1971 Oppen writes to 
L.S.Dembo: “a new book, after long false starts and confusion now beginning to take on 
shape (San Francisco coloring everything, an obsession I can’t break if I wanted to. And SF is 
not my idyllic childhood of boats and etc nor my adulthood but a lost adolescence. A.26 which 
he also characterizes as a work “with its meaning for me, autobiographical, and, I think, a 
more historical meaning – This distance, this edge of the country, [ ] and the thing beyond 
or outside the sense of metropolis.” He would elaborate this several years later in an 
interview with Charles Tomlinson at the BBC, during a visit by invitation to the Modern 
American Poetry Conference at the Central London Polytechnic in May 1973: Seascape: 
Needle’s Eye as a title he refers to “the scene, it is the edge of a continent, and it’s a bare 
edge of a continent. You come - - you stand on a little beach, you can stand on one little rock 
and look out - - if you saw far enough you’d see Honolulu. There’s nothing between. It’s a 
bare, bare edge; it’s a metaphysical edge. What happens there - - the symbol of the needle’s 
eye is the horizon, the horizon at sea, in which dimensions close, coincide. The … the detail, 
the objectivism in the sense it was usually understood, and the sky, the unlimited space, the 
unlimited. At that point almost touch leaving a needle’s eye.”A.27 Back in 1969, in a letter to 
his sister, he had referred to himself as “this clumsy camel face to face with the unblinking 
needle’s eye” [SL 196] and Oppen’s description indicates his move away from the exclusively 
material world in these poems towards ‘a metaphysical edge’ and ‘the unlimited’. The 
Seascape collection was finally published in December 1972 by Sumac Press and in response 
to a Michael Heller comment, Oppen writes: “I think you say correctly, speak accurately of 
some change in the language [ ] the language ‘rises’ a little? [ ] etherealizes a little, so 
imminently confronted by one’s temporality --- even a camel might peak thru at that point, 
a camel or an old gent - - -“.A.28 
 
While the ‘Horizon’ collection (as he referred to Seascape) finally reached publication, Oppen 
had moved on: “a few poems since Horizon [ ] Few, but they’re steps. Gain a line at a 
time”A.29, poems that would eventually be collected as Myth of the Blaze (1972-75). Having 
passed through the post-Pulitzer crisis of confidence, Oppen is able to write of his 
insecurities of self and of knowing what one wants: for example, to Harvey Shapiro: “Can’t 
bear much fame, can’t bear much neglect [ ] Your very self injured by fame, the poems 
insulted and injured by neglect [ ] (to put a lot briefly; [ ] ‘the poems’ means in part to have 
spoken and not been heard, to have said and not been heard)[ ] Nothing seen from 




unsure” over the writing of what became ‘Of Hours’ in the Seascape collection: “And the 
early versions very faulty. Been slow. [ ] Been almost unwilling. [ ] Sense of helplessness now 
and then […] yes and one doubts poetry. Not, for me, the fact that no ‘ordinary’ person reads 
it --- I don’t really think about that. But one says so little ---- one knows so little [ ] we know 
so little before and after we have read George Oppen.” He concludes his letter with “And 
hard to talk of the question you raise: what one wants, to know what one wants, to move 
towards it --- What is it? Fear of loss of oneself as one knows himself, is familiar with himself? 
? ‘Fusion of subject and object’ where all is acted upon? [ ] I don’t know [ ] I suppose fear’s 
a great part of our lives [ ] I don’t know.”A.31 
 
 
Out of the post-Pulitzer turmoil comes a readjustment in Oppen’s thoughts and feelings 
about subject, object, and how to write about them. To L.S.Dembo he writes: “I am trying to 
write […] about the benevolence of the real”A.32 (a phrase he had used in ‘Route’ 13). “If 
there’s a benevolence, however, it is the real which is benevolent.”A.33 His emphasis is on 
“the limit of what one knows acknowledged, the inaccuracies of knowledge” and the fact of 
words as “a mode of being […] The words distort, but are our mode […] I keep thinking a 
single word, any word, holds all of the actual [ ] And then in typescript [ ] they don’t.”A.33 
Then in the summer of 1972 he writes a marvellously evocative letter to his niece, Diane 
Meyer, describing the sailing in Maine but including an insight into the Oppen’s lifelong 
‘outsider’ experience, even though here in later life his and Mary’s circumstances have 
changed: “We play with loneliness, I suppose: [ ] always have, suffering loneliness almost 
painlessly, there being two of us [ ] But not without fear [ ] Extremes of loneliness, in a way, 
metaphysical loneliness, there being two of us [ ] And yet it is surely the breath or is it the 
ether of life to us”A.34 – phrases echoed in ‘The Book of Job and a Draft of a Poem to Praise 
the Paths of the Living’ which will appear in the Myth of the Blaze collection in 1975 (NCP, 
240)A.35. Oppen’s letter to Michael Heller of December 1972 in which he spoke of a “change 
in language” is interesting for its record of Oppen’s being “puzzled” by the reaction to his 
work: “[the books] mean to say [ ] Being [ ] I had supposed myself to be speaking with 
dazzling clarity.”A.36 The draft to this letter in the Oppen archive is illuminating: “I begin to 
understand that the earlier books [The Materials (1962), This In Which (1965), and Of Being 
Numerous (1968)] have been taken to be a simple realism – I was in these books speaking of 
Being: I had thought I could arrive at the concept of Being from an account of experience as 
it presents itself in its own terms – Needle’s eye is perhaps more familiar, more personal, or 





----- It will be taken as less than I meant it to be if it is not taken in the light of the previous 
books […] I was sure I had said, managed to say ------ Being – [quoting from the opening 
poem of Seascape, NCP 211] ‘the most obvious thing in the world’ (sic) ‘ob via [ ] the obvious’, 
a simple realism.A.37 It is in this letter that Oppen makes his most well-known assertion: “if 
we still possessed the word ‘is’, there would be no need to write poems.”A.38 
 
 
A.3 ME – a cornerstone 
 
“Tell’em I told you to.” William Carlos Williams 
 
In January 1973, a month after the publication of Seascape: Needle’s Eye, Oppen writes twice 
in quick succession to Robert Duncan, commenting initially on a reprint of a Duncan essay 
published that month, and including that remark: “But consciousness itself – self- 
consciousness in itself, by itself carries the conviction of actuality.”A.38 In the second letter, 
Oppen repeats: “Consciousness in itself, and of itself, (I think Descartes might have said) 
establishes the fact of actualness, for it, itself, is undoubtedly actual. And so we have the fact 
of actualness. Which is the miracle.”A.39 In the first letter he also says: “The word in my mind 
is above all ME – a cornerstone […] despite ‘what happened’ [“I am bound by some things 
that happened.”],various poundings on that stone [ ] Not chosen [ ] Was chosen.”A.40 Then, 
in the same month, to Michael Heller: “the direct feel of living [ ] replacing the abstract 
‘soul’.[…]The love of the world. [ ] could one imagine, as the first moment in history of the 
sacred, not personification of the known, but the imagination of the first moment at which 
object (sic) becomes object: [ ] among sensations,”.A,41 The Cartesian separation of body 
from soul is implied in the exchange with Heller, with Oppen on the side of the embodied 
physical experience (“the direct feel of living”) as prime, filtered through the conscious self, 
even though the second Duncan letter has Oppen struggling through repetition to somehow 
suck the experience of reality into the inadequacy of the word ‘actual’. We might note that 
in the contemporary ‘global workspace’ model of consciousness, conscious (but not non- 
conscious) information is rapidly and widely distributed across the brain, provoking 
synchronized brain activity that accompanies and is, therefore, the physical evidence for, 
conscious processing. Neuroscientific studies identify conscious visual perception, for 
example, with this increase in communication frequencies across different brain areas. The 
global workspace model suggests that conscious awareness of such visual information 
requires three conditions: a primary processor i.e. a neuronal network such as the primary 
visual cortex that processes incoming visual signals; additionally, sufficient time for this 




specifically the prefrontal cortex as major site of information processing; and thirdly, the 
sustained ‘amplification’ of both the ‘bottom-up’ input and the ‘top-down’ assimilation to 
engender “a state of reverberating, coherent activity among many different brain 
centers.”A.42 This is consciousness conjectured on the basis of experimental evidence and the 
example of visual perception is pertinent to Oppen, who writes to Donald Davie also early in 
1973: “My ‘proofs’ are all images. My proof is the image. ‘The common place,’ ‘that which 
we cannot NOT see,’ etc, I don’t think I’ve proposed anything but that we commit ourselves 
to that mystery in fact I think we must, I think we do.”A.43 
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Appendix Two: A Cognitive Poetics Perspective 
 
‘To each other we will speak’ 
 
“Meaning and understanding are not predetermined or fixed in any way, they are continually 
evolving concepts, negotiated by all those involved in the discourse world.” 
 
Joanna Gavins. Text World Theory: An Introduction. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2007, 20. 
 
 
The Language writers became the dominant American poetic movement of innovation by 
the time of George Oppen’s death in 1984, and their influence remains long after. What 
characterised their practice was an explicit attention to language experimentation in light of 
the accumulating advances in linguistics. Having identified correlations between Oppen’s 
personal interest in cognition and developments in cognitive science, it is interesting to feed- 
back certain emerging practices of present-day literary analysis, in a branch of stylistics 
known as cognitive poetics, that are rooted in the relationships between cognitive studies 
and reader experience. This extends our brief discussion of Chapter 4.1. 
 
In so far as a writer and a reader share a common cognitive mechanics rooted in a pre- 
linguistic image schematics that persists into adulthood and which consists of common basic 
conceptual sets of relations; and in so far as they share a common language as extension of 
that embodied perception and physical experience; then so-called ‘textuality’ has been 
identified as the exchange engendered by a text, the felt experience that links reader and 
writer. Further, the notion of ‘texture’ is taken to be that “experienced quality of 
textuality.”AA1 In appealing to the ever-evolving evidence and insights of cognitive 
psychology and cognitive linguistics, cognitive poetics as a branch of stylistic analysis both 
exploits a systematic approach and claims interdisciplinary corroboration. Among its 
advocates, Peter Stockwell (Texture. 2009) has categorised an aesthetics of textuality, 
collating the cognitive insights into attention, conceptual grammar, and psychological 
identity, upon which we might draw in considering a reader’s experience of textuality and 
texture. The subjective acquires elements of objective description and analysis backed by 
the cognitive sciences informing traditional literary categories such as resonance, intensity, 
sensation, empathy, and voice. 
 
Consider first the issue of readerly attention from a neurological and linguistic perspective. 
For instance, there is a poet’s use of the definite article (the) and the determiner (this, that, 
these, those), or indeed the possessive form (my, your etc.) as indicators of so-called ‘Given’ 





and reader). However, their use may more subtly also ‘position’ the reader in relation to the 
poem’s speaker, for example in establishing context or backgrounding facets of the text’s 
conceptual construct as functions of attentional focus. If definite articles, determiners, and 
possessives anchor a reader semantically within the context of a text world, indefiniteness  
marked by the use of a, an, some, and any, for example, when not referencing generic 
information, typically introduces new, previously unshared, information, both targeting and 
projecting a new aspect within an established background. In Nancy Gaffield’s words: 
“indefinite reference is used to assert rather than to presuppose.”AA2 She continues: 
“Literary communication, unlike face-to-face communication, does not rely on a specific 
given situational context. Thus, writers create a sense of shared context by various linguistic 
means— deictic reference and definite reference being two important ways […]. Deictics and 
determiners then can be employed to construct a non-factual possible world. Furthermore, 
definite reference does not simply rely on or imply shared knowledge, it can produce shared 
knowledge.” As Elena Semino also puts it: “This is because definite articles carry in 
themselves a presupposition of the unique existence of referents of the noun phrase they 
introduce.”AA3 “In other words, the use of definite reference helps the reader to imagine a 
world in which the specific context evoked exists, and to identify with it.”AA4 
 
Oppen clearly does use definite articles to background a scene (the presupposition being we 
share understanding of that context) with indefinite article as the foreground (asserting an 
attentional focus, an attractor, without presupposition). For example, in the opening poem 
of the Myth Of The Blaze collection, ‘Latitude,Longitude', which we have already considered 
(Chpt. 4.3), Oppen writes: “climbed from the road and found/over the flowers at the 
mountain’s/rough top a bee…” (NCP 237); and “a bee”, that bee (indefinite but particular) is 
the focus of the first two stanzas of the poem, its “thin legs crookedly/ a-dangle”. The 
definite articles lay the generalised ground of road, flowers, and mountain top, before that 
something particular is identified. To apply a cognitive poetics reference to attentional focus, 
we can then recognise that the poem goes on to foreground a question (“if we could/ find”) 
and link it to a shared frame of knowledge in “all/ the gale’s evidence”. As we previously 
discussed, the contention of this poem centres on what “defines// poetry”. What Oppen has 
clearly done in the poem’s structure is to define a location, then draw us in to a detail within 
it, and from this construct his argument, albeit it a proposition in which his fragmented 
syntax is more speculatively suggestive than assertive. Distinctions between definite and 
indefinite denote Oppen’s own perceptions of these elements and their status in the text 





duration of the poem’s making reflect the psychophysical, the embodied, conceptual 
framework through which Oppen is seeking to understand and to speak. The poiesis, the 
process, the act, of Oppen’s making the poem is a manifestation of the mental question and 
coherence that is Oppen’s experience in those moments, with his language an extension of 
that embodied perceptual to conceptual construct. 
 
We need not suppose that Oppen is consciously engaged in conjuring what today we would 
call discourse schemas with his reader. Yet in a ‘text world’ as opposed to a face-to-face 
‘discourse world’ there are no necessarily automatic personal, spatial, or temporal, contexts 
that are shared between authorial voice and recipient, even though both may share possible 
cultural experiences, and certainly share the conceptual knowledge encapsulated in image 
schemas. In the case of the latter, as Stockwell puts it: “the most important principle in 
cognitive science … is that there are common aspects of humanity so that claims made about 
one group of people and their cognitive capacities must also be true of all people. Of course, 
this is not to deny cultural, ethnic, racial, gendered, geographical, historical, ideological or 
other myriad differences across humanity, but the broad window of human possibilities is 
constrained by the common way in which our minds work and our bodies interact with 
reality.”AA5 Language is a manifestation of mind, and there are continuities: “between how 
you understand phonemes and how you understand syntax; between the way you learn to 
manipulate physical objects in spaces and the way you learn to use language to have effects 
on other people; between finding your way around a room and finding your way round a 
text […] language and cognition are not separate, literature and natural conversation are on 
a continuum with each other.”AA5 
 
In referencing ‘text world’ and ‘possible world’ approaches, Nancy Gaffield states: “When 
the writer, the reader and the text come into ‘collision or collusion,’ […] meaning is 
negotiated and a text world is constructed, as if it contained actual people, places and 
events.”AA6 In reading a poem, we unconsciously identify correspondences between 
signifiers we recognise from the actual world (chronological, physical, taxonomic, for 
example; see Ryan, 1991AA7) with those from which we equally unconsciously conjure a text 
world. There are shared linguistic devices which act as attentional and conceptual stimuli 
and from which a reader conjures meaningful responses. The cognitive scientific assumption 
is that higher level mental functions such as those associated with reading and interpreting 
a later Oppen poem are elaborations of more basic cognitive mechanisms. One much studied 
mechanism with obvious import is that of visual perception. The brain translates an 




What were once the merely descriptive theories of Gestalt psychology now correlate as 
neuro-scientifically validated explanations, for example, of foreground-background 
perceptual processing. Stockwell has taken these neuroscientific facts and produced a list of 
what he considers “the typical features of good textual attractors”, stylistic devices that “cut 
across traditional linguistic matters” in blending grammatical and experiential notions 
equally to capture and keep reader attention.AA8 
 
Oppen’s later poems display one immediately evident attention-grabbing practice grounded 
in a fundamental neurological response to visual perceptual phenomena known as 
‘inhibition of return’ (IOR). This denotes the disengagement of brain-eye focus from overly 
static objects; the preference being for a rapid visual search of surroundings along with IOR’s 
disinclination to return attentional focus to the preceding locus. Not only is movement of 
more interest to mental processing than stasis, novelty over familiarity prompts the same 
diversion of attention. Oppen’s late work is, of course, filled with the disjunctions that shift 
the reader abruptly to what Stockwell calls ‘currency’, that is “the present moment of 
reading [being] more attractive than the previous moment.”AA9 The reality of a collagic 
juxtaposition of components is to zig-zag the reader’s attention, keeping it repeatedly 
refreshed by the unexpected. One of the simplest lyrics in Oppen’s Primitive collection serves 
as the simplest of examples: “the great open// doors of the tall// buildings and the grid// of 
the streets the seed// is a place the stone/ is a place mind// will burn the world down alone/ 
and transparent// will burn the world down tho the starlight is/ part of ourselves.” (‘Waking 
Who Knows, NCP 2008, 273). The mechanics of the poem’s stylistic structure that operate 
on a reader’s attentional interest are straightforward. Having established the urban images, 
in line four we cut from ‘the streets’ to ‘the seed’. The seed of what? As what? The break 
from the linear semantic sense of the preceding lines certainly refocuses our attention. As 
possible explanation, Oppen continues “is a place”, but again cuts the semantic continuity 
of the seed as a place with “the stone”, and then the stone also as “a place”, before “mind” 
cuts in to “burn the world down”. As we digest and interpret the meaning of this, the 
unexpected recurs in the suggestion of mind not only “alone” (which may itself be a less 
obvious descriptor than first sight suggests, something indeed to be questioned within the 
tone established by the poem to that point) but “transparent”. Then the attentional 
reinforcement of repetition “will burn the world down” is qualified (rather than cut here) 
with “tho” and the image of “starlight” as “part of ourselves”. The disjointed and the 







not Oppen intends this as a deliberate ploy or, as is much more likely, simply putting his own 
mental reasoning with its linear and non-linear characteristics into practice. 
 
As visual attractors, it is  perhaps  not surprising  that research shows that  human  figures  
attract greater unconscious perceptual attention than their surroundings, in the first 
instance: “Familiar objects in the visual field are more readily resolved as figures, since a 
conceptual template is already available.”AA10 Translate that to the literary setting and reader 
attention will be attracted as first impulse towards what Stockwell terms “empathetic 
responsibility”. Envisaged speaking humans in particular combine both familiarity, 
immediate empathetic potential, and movement, as unconscious attractors to the reader. 
The later Oppen poems undoubtedly display both personal experience and authorial 
opinions (albeit often speculative). As readers, we are drawn to the first person presence 
even where it is understated: “’out of poverty/ to begin// again’ impoverished// of tone of 
pose that common/ wealth// of parlance Who/  so  poor  the  words//  world  with   and  
take on substantial// meaning    handholds  footholds// to dig in one’s heels  sliding//  
hands and heels beyond the residential/ lots the plots it is a poem// which may be sung/ 
may well be sung” (‘Song, The Winds Of Downhill’, Seascape: Needle’s Eye, NCP, 220). As 
readers, we are likely to ‘identify’ with Oppen here, where he transmutes a physical 
experience of desperation into a metaphor for the struggle to match language to meaning. 
 
We will return to ‘identification’ shortly. Before doing so, as two last attention-focusing 
devices (and there are others, as Stockwell elaborates), consider the perceptual attraction 
to ‘brightness’ and ‘fullness’ in Oppen. One of the impressions that Seascape: Needle’s Eye 
as a collection conveys is of San Francisco as a city under a bright sky and beside a vast blue 
ocean; with Moon and stellar night sky also repeatedly in contrast to that, and themselves 
changing the ocean from myriad daylight colours to darkness: “Climbing the peak of 
Tamalpais the loose/ Gravel underfoot// And the city shining with tremendous wrinkles/ In 
the hills and the winding of the bay…” (NCP, 231); “…the wave belly-lovely/ Glass of the glass 
sea […]/On the open water […]/… the outer/ Limit of the ego ” (NCP, 211); “In the starlight 
[…]/[…] and the tide running/ Strong as a tug’s wake shorelights’// Fractured dances across 
rough water […]//[…] A wind blowing out// And out to sea […]//The small mid-ocean/ Moon 
lights the winches” (NCP, 213-214); “… the waves’/riot/ Brilliant as the world/ […]// This is 
the seaboard […]/ In the great bays and the narrow bights” (NCP, 216); “A city street/ 
Leads to the bay//[…]/ The great loose waves move landward/ […]/ Along the length of coast 
in the continual wind/ The ocean pounds […]” (NCP, 222-223); “The sea and a crescent strip 




breakers//[…]” (NCP, 226); “[…] of the tide/ brimming// in the moon-streak/[…] (NCP, 228); 
“[…]that face// More blinding than the sea[…]” (NCP, 230). 
 
It’s worth returning to what cognitive mechanics has to say about our unconscious 
recognition of movement in a little more detail. By coincidence, we have already noted 
Oppen’s use (in a letter to John Taggart in 1974) of the phrase “the moving edge” in referring 
to the ever-changing contextual position of his poems, both over time and in the face of new 
readers.AA11 The phrase echoes a cognitive mechanics notion regarding ‘figural edges’ in 
which, in the visual cognition context, it’s the processing of edges that defines objects and 
figures (or indeed in defining an absence, a lacuna). In detecting an object crossing the visual 
field, the brain-eye notes changes between foreground and background planes, identifying 
advancing edge occlusion of background and trailing edge re-emergence of background, and 
thus a relative movement-versus-stasis relationship. In reading, we experience correlates of 
motion both directly through active verbs and by inference through changing spatial 
relations. This relates to attentional changes known as ‘shift’ (apparent translational motion) 
and ‘zoom’ (apparent changes of scale).AA12 Whether zoom or shift, these attentional 
changes posit one entity (e.g. foreground) in relation to another (e.g. background), so the 
brain-eye must look from one to the other, which is sequential and therefore time- 
dependent. Even a stationary object has been through that comparative examination, and  
the correlation with the literary reading process is that the reader must go through an 
equivalent mental ‘observation’ between object, figure, or space, and surroundings in order 
to establish apparent motion. As Stockwell puts it: “reading involves the dynamic apparent 
or actual motion of figures across a ground. This can be regarded as a psychological basis for 
the common description of reading as a journey and the perception that texts are dynamic 
and motive, when in fact it is the reading that gives it this apparent relative motion.”AA13 
 
In a later Oppen poem such as the second section of ‘The Book of Job’ from Myth of the 
Blaze, we see this cinematic tracking (as Stockwell neatly refers to it): “the long road/ going 
north// on the cliffs small/and numerous// the windows// look out on the sea’s simulacra/ 
of self-evidence meaning’s// instant wild-/ eyed as the cherry/ tree blossoms// in the 
fanatic glass from our own/ homes our own/rooms we are fetched out […]” (NCP, 241-2). 
The active verbs here dominate the action in going north, looking out, fetching out. However, 
we can also refer to the image schemas that emerge out of motor-sensory experiences that 
we all share and their implications for, for example, perceived movement. Such cognitive 
grammars derive from the work of LangackerAA14 in which linguistic forms are considered to 




linguistic spatial schematics are taken to persist into adulthood as image schemas. 
Importantly these are not mental picture ‘images’ but representations of conceptual sets of 
relations. Our earlier reference to the exemplary work of Tyler and EvansAA15 showed that in 
a spatial schema the foregrounded ‘trajector’ (the primary attentional focus) moves 
towards, or into, or through, the backgrounded object or field, called the ‘landmark’. We 
don’t understand dynamic prepositions such as through, by, on, under, over, etc except 
through movement schemas. These schemas can be seen to underlie clausal structures in 
the form of ‘action-chains’, clauses with noun-phrase referents and predications.AA16 
Imagined as an energy transfer along an action chain of clauses, the schema may compound 
itself into line, sentence, even stanza scale cohesion. Beyond active verbs, the adverbial and 
often the preposition alone suffices: “by car” (NCP, 238); “in the green storm” (NCP, 238); 
“beyond the blunt towns” (NCP, 239); “in the veins” (NCP, 240); “of the sea’s surf […] of the 
world […] of the land” (NCP, 240); “wave upon wave” (NCP, 241); “on the cliffs […] on each 
other” (NCP, 241-2); “over the glass lens” (NCP, 243), and so on. The image schema 
hypothesis and its conceptual metaphor elaboration have been ideas ‘arising’ (vertical 
orientation schema) ‘out of’ (containment schema) cognitive research frequently ‘applied’ 
(force schema) to literary texts, and so I will not ‘labour’ (conceptual metaphor) them here. 
 
Having picked a key insight from cognitive linguistics, let’s select one from cognitive 
psychology in returning to the sticky issue of identity. The Handbook of Self and IdentityAA17 
lists sixty-six different terms for aspects of self and identity,AA18 highlighting the complexity 
of social, psychological, philosophical, and neuroscientific interpretations and perspectives
.
 
Within cognitive poetics, identity and identification by a reader with the ‘figurative’ contents 
of a text are associated with the psychological facets of “empathy, sympathy, attachment 
and engagement in various overlapping ways.”AA19 While narrative fiction with its typical cast 
of characters will be the place in which text-world characterisation meets a reader’s pallet 
of experience, self-awareness, and insight into the human condition, a late Oppen poem also 
solicits a direct response from reader to poet. The feelings elicited by us as readers are most 
likely qualitatively the same as those we experience in day-to-day life, the difference being 
one only of degree.AA20 The cognitive sciences can inform, as we have seen, the 
‘informational content’ of a poem, but they may also inform our aesthetic, including 
emotion-based, responses. Oppen’s late poems are often ‘I and you’ dialogues, but with 
significant narrative elements to them. At its simplest, in the ‘Latitude, Longitude’ example 
already discussed, the climbing from the road to discover a bee is followed by a conversation 





is there ‘for us’. In contrast, in ‘The Book of Job’ Oppen moves from place to place (mostly in 
narratives of remembrance), in this case often invoking a ‘we’ which does not include the 
reader, placing himself instead within a group ‘not beaten’ or ‘the greasers’ or ‘survivors’ or 
those who ‘forget’. The reader observes these, detached from but potentially drawn to them 
if the attentional attractors are effective. Reading such a poem has been described as “both 
a test (of identification) and an ordeal (of syntax).”AA21 A ‘real world’ reader ‘maps’ his or her 
self on to a ‘text world’ counterpart (the you, we, or us, of the poem), the extent of switching 
between worlds depending upon whether the reader identifies particularly with their text 
counterpart. As readers, we are modelling the mind, the personality or personhood, of the 
identities on the page in all the complexity and fluidity of identity with which we are familiar 
in the real world, recognising ‘prototypical’ situations and characteristics but also able to 
modify and accommodate differences. 
 
The cognitive poetics approach is an interesting application of cognitive scientific ideas and 
discoveries, an open-minded and inquisitive transplantation seeking something of the 
analytical rigour sometimes lacking in literary critiques. The roles of writer, reader and critic, 
are different and we cannot know how George Oppen would react confronted with these 
developments. I have no doubt, however, that he would have considered the matter with 
his customary deliberation, determined always (to quote from his penultimate published 
poem) that “…we/ will speak// to each/ other we/ will speak”(NCP 285). 
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